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SOVEREIGNTY AND THE FEDERAL TRUST
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ABSTRACT
It has been long recognized that a deep tension pervades federal
American Indian law.  The foundational principles of the field—on
the one hand, the notion that tribes keep their inherent right of sover-
eignty and, on the other, that the federal government has a power
and duty to protect them—clash on their face.  Despite years of criti-
cism of this conflict, the two principles continue to coexist, albeit un-
comfortably.  Using the example of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute
Indians’ controversial proposal to store high-level nuclear waste on
their land, this Article revisits the tension in these doctrines, weighs
prior proposals attempting to reconcile them, and concludes that, ul-
timately, sovereignty and the federal trust are not reconcilable.  Find-
ing sovereignty superior—morally, historically, and politically—the
Article thus offers a new model for promoting native sovereignty: al-
lowing tribes to choose to be treated similarly to states.
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INTRODUCTION
Drive forty miles west of Salt Lake City on Interstate 80, the high-
way that connects New Jersey to San Francisco, and you reach a cross-
roads.  At the Great Salt Lake’s whitening edge, in the barren khaki
desert of sagebrush, solitary junipers, and brittle air, there is a choice.
Keep west and you will be in Tahoe or Reno by nightfall.  Or bear
south on State Road 196 for another forty minutes and find yourself
simultaneously in the middle of nowhere and the center of contro-
versy—Skull Valley.
The crossroads of Skull Valley is at once symbolic and real.  For
the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians, it represents the intersec-
tion of their future and their past.  The Goshutes have fiercely clung
to this “beautiful wasteland”1 as their ancestral homeland for nearly a
millennium, but now that existence is in peril.  At its apex, the histori-
cal Goshute tribe numbered 20,000 members.2  Today, less than 130
remain in the band, barely two dozen live on the reservation, only
four fluently speak the native tongue, and tribal poverty and unem-
ployment tops three times the national average.3
In part because of this situation, in part in response to it, the
Goshutes brokered a most controversial plan in 1997.  The tribe
signed a lease with a consortium of investor-owned electric utility com-
panies to store up to 40,000 metric tons of nuclear waste on their res-
ervation for up to forty years.  Under this plan, the waste would take
nearly twenty years to arrive by rail in Skull Valley, another twenty
years to remove, and once there would sit in steel and concrete cylin-
drical storage casks on a 100-acre cement pad under the desert sun.4
The reaction the Goshutes’ plan elicited was complex—and
heated.  The tribe found itself amidst a swirl of lawsuits, politics, legis-
lation, and more attention than it had ever seen.  Indeed, that the
Goshutes even considered this plan—voluntarily putting literally tons
of the most deadly waste known mere miles from their homes—is
1. Martin Kasindorf, Tribe Seeks Uranium Enrichment, USA TODAY, Aug. 12, 2002, at 4A
(quoting then-Chair of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians, Leon Bear).
2. Margot Roosevelt, Utah’s Toxic Opportunity, TIME, Mar. 13, 2006, at A11.
3. David Rich Lewis, Skull Valley Goshutes and the Politics of Nuclear Waste: Environment,
Identity, and Sovereignty, in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ECOLOGICAL INDIAN 304, 320 (Michael E. Harkin & David Rich Lewis eds., 2007).
4. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM’N, 1 NUREG-1714, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CONSTRUC-
TION AND OPERATION OF AN INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION ON THE RESER-
VATION OF THE SKULL VALLEY BAND OF GOSHUTE INDIANS AND THE RELATED TRANSPORTATION
FACILITY IN TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH xxix–xxxii (2001), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1714/v1/cover.pdf [hereinafter FEIS].
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somewhat remarkable.  But the tribe did not do so flippantly.  It spent
years studying the possibility, and when it came down to it, the price
was right.  The Goshutes deeply valued their land, but no one, they
noted, would “buy a tomato” or anything else “green or environmen-
tal” from them because of what slowly had surrounded their reserva-
tion:5 the nation’s largest stockpile of chemical and biological
weapons, including anthrax and the plague; military bomb testing and
training grounds; a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility; a mag-
nesium plant responsible for eighty-five percent of the nation’s annual
point-source chlorine emissions; and an area where the military re-
leased 3.5 trillion lethal doses of nerve gas.6  The roughly $40 million
the Goshutes would receive for accepting the nuclear waste thus
seemed the least the band deserved.  Accepting it might mean a cul-
ture different from some of their traditions, but the future it could
provide would be consistent with the core of what they have always
been: survivors.
The choice the Goshutes faced—past or future, tradition or
evolution, extinction or survival—could not be placed in starker
terms.  But it also was not their crossroads alone.  For the Goshutes’
struggle epitomizes the dilemma of survival, of maintaining different-
ness and Indian-ness, that Native Americans7 across the United States
face in increments large and small every day.  At the center of that
crossroads is the intersection of two timeless doctrines of Indian law—
tribal sovereignty and the federal trust responsibility—that exert enor-
mous influence on the outcome of what such choices will be.  Al-
though both are foundational to the field, the dual persistence of
native sovereignty and the federal trust leave tribes in a doctrinal
quandary: Sovereignty demands Indian self-determination, while the
trust injects the federal government into those decisions.
This Article uses the Skull Valley Goshutes’ nuclear controversy
to illuminate this tension.  The Article seeks to reconcile sovereignty
and the federal trust, ultimately concluding that the two concepts are
not reconcilable.  Accordingly, it proposes a new model based in sov-
ereignty, akin to what states bear today, to promote tribal survival.
5. Kevin Fedarko, In the Valley of the Shadow, OUTSIDE, May 2000, http://outside.away.
com/outside/magazine/200005/200005skullvalley4.html (quoting Leon Bear).
6. Lewis, supra note 3, at 316–17; Andrew Gumbel, Valley; of the Damned, THE INDEP. R
(LONDON), July 2, 2000, at 12; Brenda Norrell, Skull Valley’s Nerve Gas Neighbors, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 26, 2005.
7. Although the term “Native American” is more accurate, this Article follows the con-
vention of legal scholarship and many tribes, using “Indian” and “Native American”
interchangeably.
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The Article proceeds via three interweaving strands—the
Goshutes, the trust, and sovereignty.  Part I provides a brief history of
the Goshutes.  Part II outlines the legal framework for sovereignty and
the trust.  Part III describes the immense controversy surrounding the
Goshutes’ nuclear proposal.  Finally, Part IV seeks to braid these three
strands, to trace an initial architecture for a new model of tribal
sovereignty.
I. PEOPLE OF THE DESERT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SKULL VALLEY
GOSHUTES
Before the Mormons, before the fur trappers, before the conquis-
tadors, aboriginal peoples claimed as their home what we now call
Utah.  The most prominent of these groups included the Utes,
Paiutes, and Shoshone.8  But there was also a lesser known group that
had persisted for centuries: the Goshutes.
The Goshutes arrived in the region southwest of the Great Salt
Lake as early as A.D. 1200.9  Taking their modern name from the na-
tive Ku’tsip or Gu’tsip, meaning people of the ashes, dry earth, or
desert, the Goshutes’ territory was vast, extending across the Utah
West Desert from the Oquirrh Mountains on the east to Nevada’s
Steptoe Mountains on the west.10  Within this domain, the Goshutes
concentrated in three areas: Deep Creek Valley near Ibapah on the
Utah-Nevada border, Simpson’s Springs farther southeast, and the
Skull and Tooele Valleys.11  It was in this harsh climate that the
Goshutes made their centuries-long bid to “survive[ ] in an area where
very little survived.”12
8. OUIDA BLANTHORN, A HISTORY OF TOOELE COUNTY 36–37 (1998); DEAN L. MAY,
UTAH: A PEOPLE’S HISTORY 101 (1987).
9. See BLANTHORN, supra note 8, at 37. R
10. Dennis R. Defa, Goshute Indians, in UTAH HISTORY ENCYCLOPEDIA 228, 228 (Allan
Kent Powell ed., 1994), available at http://historytogo.utah.gov/utah_chapters/american_
indians/-goshuteindians.html [hereinafter Defa, Goshute Indians]; Dennis Ray Defa, A His-
tory of the Gosiute Indians to 1900, 12–13 (June 1979) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Univer-
sity of Utah) (on file with University of Utah Library, University of Utah) [hereinafter
Defa, Gosiute History].
11. See Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 5–6 (describing past and present con- R
centration of the Goshute population); see also James B. Allen & Ted J. Warner, The Gosiute
Indians in Pioneer Utah, 39 UTAH HIST. Q. 162, 163 (1971) (describing the Goshutes’ region
of inhabitance).
12. Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 13; see also MAY, supra note 8, at 28 (noting R
the Goshutes’ ability to extract food and supplies from the sparse environment they inhab-
ited); Jesse D. Jennings, Prehistory of Utah and the Eastern Great Basin, in 98 UNIV. OF UTAH,
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS 246 (1978) (describing the Goshutes as having an archaic life-
style); Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 13–16 (describing the Goshutes’ struggle for R
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A. Defining Survival—Traditional Goshute Culture
Goshute culture reflected—was defined by—the tribe’s survival in
this inhospitable land.  In an economy of hunting and gathering, the
desert’s limited plant resources assumed primary importance.13  The
Goshutes possessed a deep understanding of their environment, har-
vesting nearly 100 species of wild vegetables14 and hunting both in-
sects and other, typically small, game.  The most important vegetable
was the pine nut, and the most important insects were red ants, crick-
ets, and grasshoppers.15  Goshutes also hunted lizards, snakes, small
fish, birds, gophers, rabbits, rats, skunks, squirrels, and, when availa-
ble, antelope, bear, coyote, deer, elk, and sheep.16
The traditional Goshute political organization was the family, and
most Goshutes gathered with other families only two or three times a
year, typically for pine nut harvests, communal hunts, and winter lodg-
ing.17  These gatherings often lasted no more than two to six weeks,
although winter gatherings were longer, with families organizing
under a dagwani, or village headman.18  The dagwani delegated re-
sponsibilities, served as a “clearinghouse for information,” and pro-
vided some leadership,19 but “possessed little real political power.”20
Most Goshutes adorned themselves with vegetable fiber clothes,
rabbit skin capes, and animal skin moccasins, while those with greater
hunting skill sported full buckskin attire similar to many Great Plains
tribes.21  Goshute dwellings varied by resources and locale and in-
cluded semi-circular windbreaks, caves lined with grass, and, in Skull
survival amidst economic poverty and the harsh conditions of the desert region they
inhabited).
13. RALPH V. CHAMBERLIN, THE ETHNO–BOTANY OF THE GOSIUTE INDIANS OF UTAH
(1911), reprinted in 2 MEMOIRS OF THE AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION pt. 5, at
337 (Kraus Reprint Corp. 1964); Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 163. R
14. Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 163; Sara Sue Price, A Comparison of Gosiute R
Material Culture and the Archaeology of Western Utah 6 (1952) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
University of Utah) (on file with University of Utah Library, University of Utah).
15. BLANTHORN, supra note 8, at 56; CHAMBERLIN, supra note 13, at 336; Price, supra R
note 14, at 5–6. R
16. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 13, at 335–36; Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 163; Defa, R
Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 9; Price, supra note 14, at 3–5. R
17. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 13, at 336 (describing Goshute families’ annual autumn R
cooperative rabbit hunts); Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 15–19 (describing the R
Goshutes’ hunting and gathering habits and familial interaction).
18. JULIAN H. STEWARD, CULTURE ELEMENT DISTRIBUTIONS: XXIII NORTHERN AND GOSI-
UTE SHOSHONI 279 (1943); Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 16–18. R
19. STEWARD, supra note 18, at 279. R
20. Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 16. R
21. Price, supra note 14, at 7–8. R
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Valley, unique gabled houses.22  Perhaps most common, however, was
the conical lodge made from logs thatched with juniper or cedar bark
and branches.23  Goshutes used these lodgings for their communal
winter gatherings, where they told their myths.  In these myths, hawk
and coyote dominated, and it was a quarrel between the two on a
large mountain that formed the Goshutes’ terrain: “In anger hawk
flew high, then swooped down on the mountain and clawed it, break-
ing off the top and scattering it into smaller mountains.”24
B. Facing the Saints—Mormon Settlement and Displacement
For many years, the Goshutes had effectively no contact with Eu-
ropean colonists.  As early as 1776, Spanish missionaries and, later, fur
trapper Jedediah Smith observed the Goshutes,25 but these observa-
tions discouraged rather than encouraged further Euro-Goshute en-
counters.  Their journals described the Goshute domain as
impassable—“barren and desolate,” lacking in water, “destitute of
game”—thus urging travelers to cross westward elsewhere.26  It was
not until the 1830s, when Spanish slave traders (and the Utes) began
abducting Goshute women and children into forced servitude in Cali-
fornia and New Mexico, that colonial contact occurred with any regu-
larity27—and that contact was merely a horrible, emerging harbinger
of the sea change about to come.28
On July 24, 1847, the vanguard members of the Mormon wagon
and handcart companies entered the Salt Lake Valley, and the unfet-
tered transformation of Goshute life began.  Although many
22. Id. at 10–12.
23. Id. at 10; see CHAMBERLIN, supra note 13, at 346. R
24. Floyd A. O’Neil, The Utes, Paiutes, and Goshutes, Utah History to Go, http://
historytogo.utah.gov/people/ethnic_cultures/the_people_of_utah/theutessouthern
paiutesandgoshutes.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
25. MAY, supra note 8, at 24; CHARLES S. PETERSON, UTAH: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 9 R
(Gerald George et al. eds., 1977); Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 23.  Father Pierre R
Jean De Smet is believed to be the first European to actually contact the Goshutes. JOHN
UPTON TERRELL, AMERICAN INDIAN ALMANAC 385 (1971).  For more information on Smith’s
journey, see DALE L. MORGAN, JEDEDIAH SMITH AND THE OPENING OF THE WEST 7 (1953) and
Charles Kelley, Jedediah S. Smith on the Salt Desert Trail, 3 UTAH HIST. Q. 23, 24 (1930).
26. MAY, supra note 8, at 24; Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 24–26. R
27. See id. at 28–33 (explaining that enslavement of Great Basin natives was somewhat
customary by 1813 but increased with the opening of the Old Spanish Trail). See generally
William J. Snow, Utah Indians and the Spanish Slave Trade, 2 UTAH HIST. Q. 67, 69–73 (1929)
(examining the exploitation of various Utah Indian tribes in the nineteenth century).
28. See Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 33 (noting that the slave trade struck R
fear in the Goshutes).
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Mormons assumed that Indians were a “chosen people,”29 these relig-
ious pilgrims were not immune from the contemporary cultural view
of Native Americans as more “creature” than human.30  The resulting
mix of beliefs proved to exacerbate the harm.  Unlike many Euro-
Americans pursuing property or money in the West, the Mormons did
not just displace native occupants.  They actively sought to assimilate
Indians into their culture and religion,31 consequently speeding their
displacement.32  The Goshutes were no exception.
In the autumn following the Mormons’ arrival, a group of
Goshutes traveling to the Salt Lake Valley to bathe in natural hot
springs taught a number of Mormons how to survive on the land’s
resources, demonstrating techniques for gathering sunflower seeds,
harvesting sego lily and other roots, and making cricket meal cakes.33
29. S. Lyman Tyler, The Indians in Utah Territory, in UTAH’S HISTORY 357, 359 (Richard
D. Poll et al. eds., 1989) (noting that the Book of Mormon identified American Indians as
a branch of the House of Israel).
30. See MAY, supra note 8, at 102 (describing the attitude of white immigrant settlers in R
Utah toward Indians).  Any generalization of an entire group’s attitude is of course fraught
with fault by definition—necessarily over- and under-inclusive.  Mormon-Indian relations
were unquestionably complex. See Ronald W. Walker, Toward a Reconstruction of Mormon
and Indian Relations, 1847–1877, 29 BYU STUD. 23, 23–24 (1989).  Many accounts charac-
terize Mormon settlers as friendly and bearing good intentions, for example, MAY, supra
note 8, at 102–03; Tyler, supra note 29, at 358–59, and there is evidence that many R
Mormons were more enlightened in this respect than their contemporaries. See, e.g., MAY,
supra note 8, at 102–03; Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 34.  Still, a rather disdain- R
ful perception of Native Americans as “treacherous” often emerges.  Defa, Gosiute History,
supra note 10, at 43 (quoting Mormon settlers); see also BRIGHAM D. MADSEN, THE SHOSHONI R
FRONTIER AND THE BEAR RIVER MASSACRE 15 (Charles S. Peterson ed., 1985) (describing
Goshutes as “degraded” and “wretched”); Floyd A. O’Neil & Stanford J. Layton, Of Pride
and Politics: Brigham Young as Indian Superintendent, 46 UTAH HIST. Q. 236, 236–37 (1978)
(noting the Mormon leaders’ promise of accommodation and respect for Indians, who
were nevertheless crowded off of choice land); Tyler, supra note 29, at 359 (quoting Brig- R
ham Young and describing his friendly conduct toward Indians despite his belief that they
were a “degraded and ignorant” people); Coulsen Wright & Geneva Wright, Indian-White
Relations in the Uintah Basin, 2 UTAH HUMAN. REV. 319, 319, 339 (1948) (describing white
views of Indians as an inferior race that harbors savage traits). See generally Dale L. Morgan,
The Administration of Indian Affairs in Utah, 1851–1858, 17 PAC. HIST. REV. 383 (1948) (pro-
viding a historical account of activities conducted by the Administration of Indian Affairs
in Utah).
31. Tyler, supra note 29, at 359; see also Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 45 R
(noting that by 1852 Mormons had begun to acculturate the Goshutes into Mormon soci-
ety).  For instance, Mormons abhorred the Indian slave trade, and Young urged settlers to
purchase and free potential slaves and to marry native women, in hope of assimilation.
MAY, supra note 8, at 106. R
32. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS IN THE UNITED STATES 19–83 (1989)
(explaining the European displacement of Indians). But cf. Tyler, supra note 29, at 358 R
(contending that Mormon impact “did not differ substantially from the outcomes else-
where in the United States” where whites encountered Indians).
33. THOMAS G. ALEXANDER, UTAH: THE RIGHT PLACE 97 (1995).
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The favor, however, went unreturned.  Goshutes quickly became
known among whites by the demeaning moniker “Diggers,”34 with the
newcomers repeatedly lamenting Goshutes as “the most miserable
looking set of human beings . . . ever beheld.”35  Writing about his trip
through the area a number of years later, for instance, Mark Twain
described the Goshutes as:
[T]he wretchedest type of mankind . . . . [They] have no
villages . . . a people whose only shelter is a rag cast on a bush
to keep off a portion of the snow, and yet who inhabit one of
the most rocky, wintry, repulsive wastes that our country or
any other can exhibit.36
Unfortunately for the Goshutes, the Mormon impact was not lim-
ited to verbal slights.  Just as European colonists had done elsewhere,
the Mormons brought with them new diseases, and many Indians be-
gan suffering from smallpox and measles.37  Even more problematic,
the Mormon influx opened Goshute territory to white land grabs.  In
July 1849, Mormon leader Brigham Young and a group of men en-
tered Tooele Valley in search of suitable settlement locations; within
three months, the Mormons had established a permanent presence.38
Approximately a dozen Mormon families spent the 1849–1850 winter
in the Tooele region.39  By 1853, the city of Tooele boasted 602
Mormons and its neighboring community of Grantsville had 159.40
The effect was obvious.  Unfamiliar with the “strange white cul-
ture” and its “idea of exclusive [resource] use,” the Goshutes’ com-
plete displacement quickly became imminent.41  To provide water for
their new farms, mills, and housing, Mormons began permanently oc-
cupying land near streams and canyons—the same locations that the
Goshutes traditionally used.42  Consequently, already sparse resources
became even scarcer, and the Goshutes were forced to move away
from the places they had historically relied upon for sustenance.43
34. See BLANTHORN, supra note 8, at 39; Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 163. R
35. Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 49 (quoting non-Mormon Superintendent R
of Indian Affairs Jacob Forney).
36. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 146–47 (Beverly R. David & Ray Sapirstein eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 1996) (1872).
37. ALEXANDER, supra note 33, at 97. R
38. Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 42. R
39. Id.
40. Id. at 43.
41. Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 164. R
42. Id.
43. See Tyler, supra note 29, at 358 (detailing the Mormons’ use of Indian grazing land R
and the reliance of both Mormons and Indians on the same water source).  Other Mor-
mon-led resource extraction, including timber harvesting, ranching, and mining, also laid
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C. Conflict Continued—The Goshute War and the Treaty of 1863
By 1860, the non-Indian population in the Goshutes’ traditional
domain was 1,000, more than the Goshutes themselves.44  As this
white presence swelled, hostilities also heightened and the conflict
continued.  An 1851 incident in which a group of Goshutes abducted
a small herd of cattle was emblematic of the growing tension.  The
Goshutes ran the stolen cattle into Skull Valley for slaughter.45  Four-
teen men pursued but, after deeming the Goshute group too large,
held back and waited for additional men.46  When they returned with
reinforcements, including military officers, they attacked the Skull
Valley encampment, killing nine Goshutes in the process.47  But if the
white community intended to use death as retaliation, the impetus
behind the Goshutes’ raids was more paradoxical.  While some were
spurred by revenge,48 most were motivated by necessity.  Due to white
occupation of their best lands, the Goshutes’ livelihood gradually be-
came dependent on the very immigrants who were displacing them.49
As one settler observed, “[I]t is really a matter of necessity with these
Indians that they starve or steal . . . .”50
In 1860, the growing hostility came to a head.  The Pony Express
began service along a route that traversed the Goshute domain, with
at least twenty stations on Goshute land, further diminishing available
resources.51  In response, Goshutes began raiding mail stations and
stage coaches, stealing supplies, and, sometimes, killing resisters.52
Settlers reacted by calling in the military, which attempted to protect
the route by attacking Indians and defending stations and coaches.53
The federal government also sought to quell Goshute hostility by giv-
a heavy hand. See Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 163–64; Defa, Gosiute History, supra R
note 10, at 67–69, 72–75 (describing how ranching and mining undertaken by the R
Mormons deprived the Goshutes of essential resources and threatened their way of life).
44. Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 164. R
45. Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 48. R
46. Id.
47. Id. at 48–49.
48. See, e.g., Floyd A. O’Neil, Utes, Southern Paiutes, and Gosiutes, in THE PEOPLES OF
UTAH 27, 57 (Helen Z. Papanikolas ed., 1976) (describing the killing of soldiers who raped
Goshute women).
49. Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 164–65. R
50. Id. at 167 (quoting Amos Reed).
51. Id. at 164; see also BLANTHORN, supra note 8, at 93–96; Defa, Gosiute History, supra R
note 10, at 46, 52 (noting that the Pony Express route followed the Overland Stage route, R
on which many stations that deprived the Goshutes of valuable resources had been built).
52. See O’Neil, supra note 48, at 57. R
53. See Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 54–55 (describing military attacks on the R
Goshutes and the assignment of soldiers to stations along the route to protect them from
and prevent Goshute raids).
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ing the stage company provisions to distribute along its route, yet the
Goshute raids continued.54  By the time the series of attacks, which
became known as the Goshute War, ended in 1863, over 100 Indians
and approximately sixteen whites were dead.55
On October 12 of that year, the Goshutes entered into a treaty
with the United States, signed by Abraham Lincoln, in which they de-
clared their mutual “peace and friendship.”56  Specifically, the
Goshutes agreed to end “hostilities and all depredations upon the em-
igrant trains, the mail and telegraph lines, and . . . citizens of the
United States,”57 and to allow construction of military posts, mines,
and rail lines in their territory.58  In exchange, the United States
agreed to pay $1,000 per year for twenty years as “full compensation
and equivalent for the loss of game” and the “inconvenience” of settle-
ment.59  Despite these concessions, the Goshutes did not relinquish
sovereignty over their land.60  Rather, the treaty described “the coun-
try of the Goship” as the tribe’s traditional domain; it included no
territorial surrender.61
D. Removal Resisted—Federal Neglect and Failed Relocation
After the treaty, the Goshutes ended their attacks, but the treat-
ment they received in return was anything but friendly.62  When Brig-
ham Young was made governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs
upon Utah’s receipt of territorial status in 1850,63 he wrote Congress
requesting that Utah’s indigenous peoples, including the Goshutes,
be relocated to a reservation where “white men [do not] dwell.”64
Nothing ever came of his proposal, but when Jacob Forney replaced
Young as Superintendent in 1858, he too ventured to consolidate “all”
54. Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 167. R
55. MAY, supra note 8, at 105; see also Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 56 (noting R
that the stage company lost 17 stations, 150 horses, and 16 men in the attacks).
56. Treaty with the Shoshonee-Goship Indians, U.S.-Shoshonee-Goship Bands of Indi-
ans, Oct. 12, 1863, 13 Stat. 681 [hereinafter Shoshonee-Goship Treaty].
57. Id. art. I.
58. Id. arts. II–IV.
59. Id. art. VII.
60. See Nw. Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 343, 346 (1945)
(construing four contemporaneous treaties “similar in form” to the Goshutes’ treaty as
including no “cession or relinquishment”); see also Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at R
58 (noting that the treaty was an agreement of peace and amity and did not result in the
Goshutes giving up sovereignty over their land).
61. Shoshonee-Goship Treaty, supra note 56, art. IV. R
62. See Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 58–59 (describing the steps taken by the R
federal government to extinguish Indians’ title to land in Utah).
63. Id. at 45.
64. MAY, supra note 8, at 105–06 (quoting Young). R
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of the Goshutes “into Deep Creek.”65  Forney’s attempt failed, how-
ever, as the Skull Valley band refused to leave their ancestral home.66
The pattern would only repeat from there.
In 1864 and 1865, Congress tried again to remove the Goshutes,
variously, to the Uintah-Ouray Reservation, which the federal govern-
ment established in 1861 for many Ute bands, or to new Goshute res-
ervations to be created “at points as remote as may be practicable
from the present settlements.”67  Each time, the Goshutes resisted
vehemently:
[The Goshutes] have a decided objection to go to the Uintah
or any other place.  They are willing to do anything on their
own land, the land of their fathers . . . but they are not will-
ing to go to the land of the strangers.  The land of their fa-
thers is sacred to them.  On it they wish to live.  And in it they
wish their bodies laid when dead.68
Still, the government refused to abandon its efforts, no doubt in
part because white settlers increasingly sought Indian farmland for
themselves.69  By 1871, the government commissioned John Wesley
Powell and George W. Ingalls to travel to the Great Basin and “in-
duce” the Goshutes to remove to reservations.70  Powell and Ingalls’s
report recommended that the Goshutes, whom they estimated num-
bered approximately 256 in Utah and 204 in Nevada, be ordered to
relocate to Uintah-Ouray.71  Predictably, the Goshutes disagreed, and
the government backed down.72
65. Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 49 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, R
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS ACCOMPANYING
THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE YEAR 1859, at 363–64
(1860)); see also Steven J. Crum, The Skull Valley Band of the Goshute Tribe—Deeply Attached to
Their Native Homeland, 55 UTAH HIST. Q. 250, 252 (1987) (discussing the Bureau of Indian
Affairs’ removal and consolidation policies).
66. Crum, supra note 65, at 252; see also Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 167 (discuss- R
ing similar efforts to relocate natives to “reservations” by Forney’s successor, Benjamin
Davis).
67. Act of Feb. 20, 1865, ch. 45, 13 Stat. 432; see also Act of May 5, 1864, ch. 77, 13 Stat.
63; Crum, supra note 65, at 254–56 (detailing the 1870 effort of the Commissioner of In- R
dian Affairs to again remove the Goshutes from their homeland).  At one point in the
process, J.E. Tourtellotte, a sympathetic Superintendent for Indian Affairs for Utah, recom-
mended that the Goshutes remain on reservations in their homeland. Id. at 254.
68. Crum, supra note 65, at 256 (quoting a letter from William Lee to the Bureau of R
Indian Affairs).
69. See id. at 172.
70. Id. at 256; Defa, Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 64. R
71. Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 174–75. R
72. Crum, supra note 65, at 257. R
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Eventually, the government turned its attention to other matters,
and the United States’ policy toward the Goshutes gradually became
one of neglect.  For over twenty years after Powell and Ingalls’s report,
the Goshutes were consistently listed as occupants of the Uintah-
Ouray Reservation, even though they remained hundreds of miles to
the west.73  By 1900, the Goshutes thus were very much a “forgotten
people.”74  Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA” or the “Bureau”) corre-
spondence failed to make any real mention of them, and “no one
took the trouble even to enumerate them.”75  Powell and Ingalls’s 256
figure was repeated in every annual report from 1873 through 1895,
“after which the Gosiutes disappeared completely from these statisti-
cal summaries.”76
E. Shadows and Specters—Reservation and Revival
As the century turned, the government’s treatment of the
Goshutes began to change.  In 1911, the BIA finally sent an agent,
Lorenzo Creel, to assess Goshute conditions.77  Although white set-
tlers favored removal,78 Creel, recognizing the Goshutes’ “ardent[ ]”
attachment to “the particular localities which they . . . inhabit[ed],”79
ultimately recommended that the Goshutes be allowed to remain in
Deep Creek and Skull Valley and that the government facilitate this
course by providing agricultural and educational assistance.80  In re-
sponse, the government set aside two reservations exclusively for the
Goshutes: 80 acres in Skull Valley and 34,560 acres in Deep Creek.81
Shortly thereafter, in a series of executive orders, Woodrow Wilson
enlarged the Skull Valley Reservation to roughly 18,000 acres.82  The
73. See Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 176 (noting that reports from Uintah listed R
the Goshute tribe as living on the reservation when few, if any, actually lived there); Defa,
Gosiute History, supra note 10, at 64, 66 (finding that, rather than remove to Uintah, most R
Goshutes continued to live at Skull Valley and Deep Creek).
74. Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 176. R
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Crum, supra note 65, at 258. R
78. Id.
79. Id. at 258–59 (quoting Creel).
80. Id. at 259.
81. Exec. Order No. 1539 (May 29, 1912), reprinted in EXECUTIVE ORDERS RELATING TO
INDIAN RESERVATIONS 1855–1922, at 168 (1975); Exec. Order No. 1903 (Mar. 23, 1914),
reprinted in 4 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 1048 (1929) [hereinafter LAWS AND TREA-
TIES]; see also Allen & Warner, supra note 11, at 177 (discussing the size of each respective R
reservation).
82. Exec. Order No. 2699 (Sept. 7, 1917), reprinted in LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note
81, at 1049; Exec. Order No. 2809 (Feb. 15, 1918), reprinted in LAWS AND TREATIES, supra R
note 81, at 1049. R
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Bureau also built a number of wood-framed houses and a school in
Skull Valley, and assigned an agricultural agent to assist the band in its
continuing yet struggling farming efforts.83
The additional governmental attention did not last long.  Deter-
mining that the Goshutes were too few to justify funding, the BIA
quickly relinquished its efforts in the name of fiscal constraint.84
Mere years after its first class was held, the Bureau closed the Skull
Valley school and soon “completely abandoned” the reservation.85
Then, in yet one more ironic twist, the BIA in 1936 revitalized the
idea of removing the Skull Valley Goshutes to Deep Creek, this time
under the new name “consolidation.”86  Some Skull Valley Goshutes
in fact had already made this move to further their children’s educa-
tion,87 but those who remained in Skull Valley possessed no desire to
leave.  “[W]e are not going to move,” wrote Skull Valley leaders Little
Moon and Sam Moon.  “We want to stay here on Skull Valley Reserva-
tion.”88  Yet the Bureau was unrelenting.  It continued pushing re-
moval as late as 1942, and when those Goshutes living in Deep Creek
decided to establish a tribal government in 1940, the BIA saw that a
provision was included in the Deep Creek Constitution allowing affili-
ation by the Skull Valley Goshutes—despite that band’s professed de-
sire not to join and their repeated assertions that they were being
“forc[ed] . . . to sign the self government papers.”89
Ultimately, the Goshutes’ efforts to remain in Skull Valley pre-
vailed.  As World War II came and went, as their land increasingly
became surrounded by chemical weapons, military testing facilities,
and toxic waste, the Goshutes survived.90  That the band managed to
keep its homeland—even if what remained was a mere shadow of its
aboriginal domain—thus became not only a symbol of the tribe’s resil-
ience, but a specter of what was to come.  Indeed, more than anyone
could know, remote Skull Valley would eventually come to character-
ize, even epitomize, the crossroads that exists at the intersection of
federal, state, and tribal relations: a crossroads of native sovereignty
and the federal trust.
83. Crum, supra note 65, at 260. R
84. See id. at 261 (“[T]he BIA concluded that it was not cost-effective to spend money
on small, scattered groups of Indians living in isolated areas.”).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 263.
87. See id. at 264 (noting that, after World War I, some Goshutes were forced to move
to Deep Creek because the Skull Valley school closed).
88. Id. at 265 (quoting Moon and Moon’s letter to BIA officials).
89. Id. at 265–66 (quoting Moon and Moon).
90. See infra Part III.A.
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II. A TORTURED HISTORY, A CONFLICTED FUTURE: SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE TRUST DOCTRINE IN CONTEXT
The federal trust doctrine and native sovereignty, from the Euro-
American legal perspective at least,91 spring from a single origin—
Chief Justice Marshall’s decisions in the Cherokee Cases92 nearly two
centuries ago.  But the doctrines’ common genesis foreshadowed little
of what was to come.  Today, the federal trust doctrine stands divorced
in many ways from its original conception.  Where the trust once rep-
resented a federal duty to protect indigenous nations from state juris-
diction, the ways in which it is now enforced are limited, and it
cohabits with the converse rule that the federal duty to protect also
affords a federal power to destroy.  Sovereignty, which began as a prin-
ciple that native nations should self-govern within their territories,
somehow became the idea that native sovereignty is not bounded by
land, but, like a social club, by membership—and even then oft di-
minishes whenever it touches “mainstream” society.  The Supreme
Court of the United States once proudly declared that “Indian nations
ha[ve] always been considered . . . distinct, independent political com-
munities, retaining their original natural rights.”93  Mere shadows of
this perspective remain.
A. An Uneasy Marriage—The Cherokee Cases
The birth of native sovereignty and the trust doctrine came from
a place quite removed from Skull Valley, but the implications that
these ideas ultimately had for the Goshutes could not be more
profound.  The story begins in Georgia in 1828—the year before Pres-
ident Andrew Jackson would threaten in his Annual Message94 that
the Cherokees should “emigrate beyond the Mississippi” or “submit”
to state law,95 and only two years before Congress would pass the In-
dian Removal Act of 1830,96 effectively ordering this expulsion.97
91. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation
in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1777 (1997) [hereinafter Frickey, Adjudica-
tion and Its Discontents] (criticizing Indian law’s exclusion of Indian perspectives).
92. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
93. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
94. This was the former name for the State of the Union Address.  Gerard N. Mag-
liocca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v. Georgia and Dred Scott, 63 U.
PITT. L. REV. 487, 522 (2002).
95. THOMAS HART BENTON, THIRTY YEARS’ VIEW 164 (1865).
96. Indian Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
97. See VINE DELORIA JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 7,
33 (1983); Stacy L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal Perspective on
Taking Land, 41 TULSA L. REV. 51, 62–63 (2005).  The statute failed at pushing the Cher-
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Georgia started the fight, and the Cherokees took up arms to the
Supreme Court to settle it.  In 1828 and 1829, Georgia enacted two
laws purporting to “add” the Cherokees’ territory to the state and to
replace “all” Cherokee laws with Georgia’s.98  Displeased with such a
hostile overture, the Cherokees petitioned the Supreme Court for an
injunction in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.99  This raised a threshold con-
stitutional question: whether the Supreme Court had original jurisdic-
tion over the case as a dispute “between a state,” Georgia, “and [a]
foreign state[ ],” the Cherokees.100  Although the Cherokees had long
exercised sovereignty and, in fact, had recently adopted a constitution
structurally mirroring the federal model, the Court took up the
question.
Chief Justice Marshall’s astonishingly brief opinion negotiated a
compromise position.  He found that tribes were neither a domestic
state nor a foreign nation.  Instead, they occupied a twilight position,
conducting relations with the United States “marked by peculiar and
cardinal distinctions which exist no where else.”101  Accordingly, the
Cherokees did not qualify as a “foreign state” under Article III, thus
precluding jurisdiction.102  Marshall recognized that the Cherokees
had made “numerous treaties” with the United States, just as a distinct
political state would.103  However, he pointed to Court precedent
from eight years earlier holding that the so-called “discovery” of North
America by European nations gave each “discovering” sovereign title
over the claimed land to the “exclusion of all other Europeans.”104  In
the crosshairs of these competing factors, Marshall thus cast indige-
okees into “Indian Territory” as planned.  That did not occur until 1838 when the govern-
ment used military force to drive the tribe out of their homeland via the infamous “Trail of
Tears.”  Nearly a quarter of the 15,000-plus Cherokees in this forced migration died along
the way. MURIEL H. WRIGHT, A GUIDE TO THE INDIAN TRIBES OF OKLAHOMA 58 (1951).  For
more information on the Trail of Tears, see generally CAROLYN ROSS JOHNSTON, CHEROKEE
WOMEN IN CRISIS: TRAIL OF TEARS, CIVIL WAR, AND ALLOTMENT, 1838–1907 (2003).
98. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 7–8 (1831).
99. Id. at 2.
100. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  The case proceeded as a question of original jurisdiction
because general federal question jurisdiction in the district courts did not arise until 1875.
See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (describing the requirements for
federal question jurisdiction at that time).
101. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
102. Id. at 20.
103. Id. at 16.
104. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).  For more information on
the “discovery doctrine” and its criticisms, see Blake A. Watson, The Thrust and Parry of
Federal Indian Law, 23 U. Dayton L. Rev. 437, 443–47 (1998).  Of course, the very notion of
discovery by Europeans was false. See generally CHARLES C. MANN, 1491: NEW REVELATIONS
OF THE AMERICAS BEFORE COLUMBUS (2006).
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nous tribes into a previously non-existent netherworld.  In a single
stroke, he “denominated” them “domestic dependent nations.”105
It was this holding that created the idea of the federal trust.  Hav-
ing deemed tribes “domestic dependent nations,” Marshall likened
the Cherokees’ relationship with the United States to “that of a ward
to his guardian.”106  This “state of pupilage,” then, meant that al-
though tribes maintained the right to live on their land, it was the
federal government, as ultimate sovereign, that actually owned it,
holding tribal territory in trust to protect tribes from other European
claims.107
This rejection of the Cherokees’ claim, however, did not end the
matter.  While Cherokee Nation was pending, Georgia enacted another
law purporting to exercise jurisdiction over the Cherokees.  This time,
the statute declared it unlawful, among other things, for the Cher-
okees to assemble “any council or other pretended legislative body,”
to hold “any court or tribunal whatever,” or for any “white person[ ]”
to reside on Cherokee land “without a license” from Georgia’s gover-
nor.108  Four white Christian missionaries then sued to challenge the
law.
In Worcester v. Georgia,109 the Court addressed whether Georgia
had the authority to enforce its laws on a tribe.110  Identifying the case
as “of the deepest interest,” Chief Justice Marshall again wrote for the
Court.111  Marshall began with a lengthy historical account of Euro-
pean colonization, British-tribal relations, and the Cherokees’ various
treaties.  From this, he extracted a single principle: that tribes re-
mained “completely separate[ ]” political entities despite European
colonization, but that to remain as such they had accepted the protec-
tion of “more powerful” nations.112  But this acceptance of protection
did not divest tribal self-governance.  “A weak state, in order to pro-
vide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more
powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceas-
ing to be a state.”113  Accordingly, Marshall found the Cherokee Na-
105. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 17–18.
108. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S (6 Pet.) 515, 521–23 (1832) (quoting the statute
passed by the Georgia state legislature) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.
110. Id. at 541.
111. Id. at 536.
112. Id. at 555–59.
113. Id. at 561.
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tion to be “a distinct community occupying its own territory . . . in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force.”114
By these two cases, the Court thus wed native sovereignty and the
trust from the outset.  This may have been an uneasy marriage, but it
was a marriage nonetheless.  Not only did the federal government
have a duty to protect tribes from other nations and states under Cher-
okee Nation, but under Worcester it was clear that the purpose of that
protection was to ensure tribes’ ability to self-govern.115  In short, the
Cherokee Cases canonized the federal trust doctrine, but the trust they
created was all about protecting tribal autonomy.116
B. Protection or Power?—The Federal Trust Duty
Courts, commentators, and scholars struggle to clearly define the
federal trust doctrine.  Writers have called the doctrine “elusive and
confusing,”117 “vexing”118 and “vague,”119 “unsatisfactorily amor-
phous”120 and “unclear,”121 “schizophrenic,”122 “ill-defined,”123 a
“double-edged sword,”124 “lack[ing] any coherence,”125 and more
114. Id.
115. Id. at 554–56.
116. Although the Supreme Court thus created a sovereignty-based trust doctrine, it can
be fairly said that in the years after the Cherokee Cases, the doctrine existed more in princi-
ple than practice.  Just as the Goshutes experienced, those years featured continued west-
ward expansion, tribal disruption and removal, and reservation creation. See COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 45–75 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2005)
(1941) [hereinafter COHEN]; LAURENCE ARMAND FRENCH, LEGISLATING INDIAN COUNTRY:
SIGNIFICANT MILESTONES IN TRANSFORMING TRIBALISM 38–65 (2007) (describing the removal
and dissolution of Indian tribes during the nineteenth century).  For more background
about the Cherokee Cases, see JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: THE CONFRONTATION OF
LAW AND POLITICS (1996) and Magliocca, supra note 94, at 521–47. R
117. Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village
of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 96 (1999).
118. G. William Rice et al., Commentary, Federal Trust Responsibility and Conflicts of Inter-
est: Environmental Protection or Natural Resource Development?, 71 N.D. L. REV. 365, 379 (1995).
119. Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of Enlightened
Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, 31 (2000).
120. Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31
CATH. U. L. REV. 635, 644 (1982).
121. Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1495 [hereinafter Wood, Trust Doctrine Revisited].
122. Raymond Cross, The Federal Trust Duty in an Age of Indian Self-Determination: An Epi-
taph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 369, 375 (2003) (explaining that the Supreme
Court has made a schizophrenic distinction between “generalized” and “specific” trust
duties).
123. GILBERT L. HALL, THE FEDERAL INDIAN-TRUST RELATIONSHIP 9 (1979).
124. Janice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law: A Look at Its Development and
at How Its Analysis Under Social Contract Theory Might Expand Its Scope, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
115, 146 (1997) (explaining that the Court’s use of the trust doctrine has both given Con-
gress power over Indian affairs and allowed Indians to retain sovereignty).
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“conflicted” than any other concept in Indian law.126  Professor Nell
Jessup Newton cuts to the point: “Asserting the existence of the trust
relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government is far
easier than defining its contours.”127
Despite these definitional dilemmas, the trust’s importance to In-
dian law cannot be lost on even the field’s most casual observer.  The
doctrine has long been recognized as “basic,”128 “ageless,”129 “founda-
tional,”130 “fundamental,”131 “central,”132 “core,”133 and “principal”134
to United States-tribal relations—a “constant[ ],”135 “one of the pri-
mary cornerstones of Indian law.”136  Thus, although outlining the
meaning of the trust doctrine is problematic, it is also critical.
At its most basic level, the trust doctrine is precisely what it im-
plies, a duty of the federal government, acting as trustee, to protect a
res, a tribal property interest that has been placed in trust for benefi-
ciaries, namely, tribes and tribal members.137  In this context, the fed-
eral government has been found to owe a fiduciary duty to tribes and
Indians as a literal manager of the trust.138  More broadly, however,
the doctrine also has been characterized as imposing a moral obliga-
125. Rice et al., supra note 118, at 368. R
126. Id. at 367.
127. Nell Jessup Newton, Introduction, The Indian Trust Doctrine after the 2002–2003 Su-
preme Court Term, 39 TULSA L. REV. 237, 237 (2003).
128. COHEN, supra note 116, at 418. R
129. Cross, supra note 122, at 375. R
130. Christy McCann, Dammed if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: FERC’s Tribal Consultation
Requirement and the Hydropower Re-licensing at Post Falls Dam, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 411, 434
(2006).
131. Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1,
26 (2005).
132. Lynn H. Slade, The Federal Trust Responsibility and Tribal-Private Natural Resource Devel-
opment, 2005 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13B-1, 13B-5 [hereinafter Slade, Natural Resource
Development].
133. Robert A. Williams Jr., Columbus’s Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial Discrimina-
tion Against Indigenous Peoples’ Rights of Self-Determination, ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L., 1991, at
51, 67.
134. Robert Laurence, Thurgood Marshall’s Indian Law Opinions, 27 HOW. L.J. 3, 3 (1984).
135. HALL, supra note 123, at iii. R
136. FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221 (Rennard Strickland et al.
eds., 1982).
137. Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part I): Applying
Principles of Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife Populations, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 91–94
(2000).  The Department of the Interior defines the trust doctrine as the federal govern-
ment’s “legal obligation . . . to protect valuable Indian lands, water[,] minerals, and other
natural resources.” HALL, supra note 123, at 2 (citation and internal quotation marks R
omitted).
138. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942).
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tion on the federal government to protect tribes generally.139  Today,
the federal trust responsibility, “[r]educed to its essence,” represents
all these things.140  It is “a creature of the judiciary . . . used to harness
actions taken by the other two branches of government, and as a basis
for compensating wrongs committed by those branches against the
Indian people.”141  This is the inherent malleability that Marshall cre-
ated—a malleability that has allowed the doctrine to be repeatedly
transformed over the years, leaving a conflicted legacy for tribes and
their members.
1. The Trust as Power—Kagama and Lone Wolf
The trust doctrine’s metamorphosis from a shield for self-govern-
ance to a sword of cultural destruction transpired in two of the Su-
preme Court’s most infamous cases of all time: United States v. Kagama
and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.142
In United States v. Kagama,143 two Indians were accused of murder
on the Hoopa Valley reservation in California.  The federal courts as-
serted jurisdiction under a new statute making it a federal crime for
any Indian to commit eight different major crimes, including murder,
on or off the reservation.144  Ruling on appeal, the Supreme Court
found it self-evident that Congress had prerogative to regulate Indian-
committed crimes.  The Court acknowledged that tribes possessed in-
herent sovereignty but nevertheless found tribes’ “semi-independent
position” of “regulating their internal and social relations” of little mo-
139. Wood, Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 121, at 1509; see also Lone Wolf v. Hitch- R
cock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903) (observing that in its dealing with Indian tribes, “a
moral obligation rested upon Congress to act in good faith in performing the stipulations
entered into on its behalf”).
140. See Wood, Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 121, at 1495 (noting that the trust R
doctrine is “amorphous” and used both to harness the actions of Congress and compensate
Indians for wrongs committed against them by the government).
141. Id.
142. See Ediberto Roman, Coalitions and Collective Memories: A Search for Common Ground,
58 MERCER L. REV. 637, 649–50 (2007) (categorizing Kagama and Lone Wolf with Dred Scott
v. Sandford and Plessy v. Ferguson).  Numerous scholars have explained why Kagama and
Lone Wolf were wrongly decided. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy
Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 171–77, 184–87 (2002) (arguing that the
Kagama Court departed from norms of constitutional interpretation, misused precedent,
and disrespected tribal sovereignty in reaching its decision, and that the Lone Wolf Court
justified the plenary doctrine on false historical assertions and failed to differentiate be-
tween foreign nations and Indian tribes); Daniel L. Rotenberg, American Indian Tribal
Death—A Centennial Remembrance, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409, 414–21 (1986) (arguing that the
Kagama Court incorrectly analyzed the case and misconstrued constitutional policy).
143. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
144. Id. at 376–78.  Today, the list of such “major crimes” is longer. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(2006).
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ment.145  Instead, the Court unanimously held that because tribes, as
“wards of the nation,” are “dependent on the United States . . . for their
political rights,”146 the federal government’s “duty of protection” also
gave it a sweeping power to regulate their actions under federal law.147
If this twisting of the trust was not enough, the Court’s decision in
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock148 two decades later transformed the principle
even further.  There, the Kiowas and Comanches had entered into an
1867 treaty with the United States creating a reservation and declaring
invalid any later cession of that reservation without the signatures of at
least three-fourths of the reservation’s adult males.149  Subsequently,
the federal government entered into an agreement to pay the tribes
$2 million to allot approximately two million acres of the reservation
for settlement by non-Indians.150  When Congress ratified the agree-
ment, however, some of the terms were changed, and it became evi-
dent that far less than the required three-fourths of male members
had assented.151  The Supreme Court nevertheless had no trouble dis-
missing the tribes’ suit.  Citing Congress’s paramount authority over
Indian property, the Court cast aside its prior decisions recognizing
the occupation of tribal lands as sacred.152  Congress’s power was not
only paramount but plenary, and so the legislature necessarily had the
right to effect “mere change[s] in the form of investment of Indian
tribal property”—from actual land to money.153
In just a few pages, the Supreme Court thus entirely reshaped the
federal trust from a protective relationship to a power dynamic.154
This is precisely why commentators have described Kagama and Lone
Wolf as the “dark side” of the trust,155 “the Indians’ Dred Scott deci-
sion.”156  These cases “present[ ] a very different conception of the
trust responsibility from that of the Cherokee Cases—as a basis for con-
gressional power outside the enumerated provisions in Article I . . .
unconstrained by any requirement to protect tribal self-govern-
145. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381–82.
146. Id. at 383–84.
147. Id. at 384–85.
148. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
149. Id. at 554 (citing Treaty with the Kiowas and Comanches, U.S.-Kiowa-Comanche
Tribes of Indians, art. XII, Oct. 21, 1867, 15 Stat. 581, 585).
150. Id. at 555.
151. Id. at 556–57.
152. Id. at 564–65.
153. Id. at 565, 568.
154. COHEN, supra note 116, at 420. R
155. Slade, Natural Resource Development, supra note 132, at 13B-7. R
156. Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Nich-
ols, J., concurring), aff’d, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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ment.”157  Indeed, the Court’s initial conception of Congress’s new
trust power seemed completely unbridled: Congress’s moral obliga-
tion to protect tribes is largely hortatory because, as the Court wrote
in Lone Wolf, courts “must presume that Congress acted in perfect good
faith in the dealings with the Indians.”158
2. The Trust as Charade: Retreating from the Plenary, Sort of
As it turned out, the plenary power that the Court endorsed in
Kagama and Lone Wolf was not entirely unqualified.  Although cer-
tainly not disavowing the power side of the trust,159 the Court eventu-
ally began placing some limitations on this naked authority.
One series of cases repeatedly held that while the federal govern-
ment could take Indian land without tribal consent, it could not do so
without compensation.160  “That,” the Court held, “would not be an
exercise of guardianship, but an act of confiscation.”161  The Court,
though often deeming Indians “simple and uninformed people,”162
also has recognized that despite technical federal title, tribes “owned”
their lands “[f]or all practical purposes.”163  Furthermore, courts have
found that the trust responsibility applies not only to federal confisca-
tion of lands but also to federal mismanagement of funds.164
By 1946, the Court explicitly acknowledged the broader rule to
which these cases already had been pointing in principle.  The Court
observed, “The power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a ple-
157. Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust Responsibility with Self-Determi-
nation of Indian Tribes: Reflections on Development of the Federal Trust Responsibility in the Twenty-
First Century, 2005 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13A-1, 13A-10; see also Alex Tallchief Skibine,
Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal Self-Govern-
ment and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1132 [hereinafter Skibine,
Reconciling] (noting that the Lone Wolf Court inferred from Kagama that Congress’s duty to
protect tribes provides an additional source of congressional power beyond that provided
by the Constitution); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within “Our
Federalism”: Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 692–93 (2006) (arguing
that once Indian tribes are incorporated into the United States’ constitutional system, Con-
gress can only exercise power over commerce with Indian tribes).
158. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566, 568 (emphasis added).
159. See Chambers, supra note 157, at 13A-11. R
160. See, e.g., Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 111.
163. United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 115–16 (1938); see also
United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109–11 (1935) (holding that although the
tribal lands were under a guardianship of the United States, the government was required
to provide the tribe with just compensation for appropriating the land).  The Court has
also held that the trust obligation continued to apply even though an Indian may have
gained citizenship.  Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 232 (1923).
164. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942).
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nary nature; but it is not absolute.”165  Thus, the Court left open the
door for a possible return to a trust doctrine rooted more in Mar-
shall’s conception of self-determination and tribal separatism than
Kagama and Lone Wolf’s emphasis on power and cultural submis-
sion.166  As one commentator put it, “The twentieth century [saw] the
Court back away from the harshest elements of [the Kagama-Lone
Wolf] era cases and begin to define the contours of a legally enforcea-
ble federal trust obligation with respect to Indian land.”167  The pre-
cise shape of these contours, however, would prove far more complex
than might have been imagined.
3. The Trust as Modern Ideal: Weeks, Mitchell, and Marshall’s
Return?
The modern federal trust is riddled with the ironies and intrica-
cies its turbulent history portends.  Some scholars have argued that
the trust now signifies, at least to a degree, a return to Marshall’s origi-
nal conception,168 and thus, is “a major weapon in the arsenal of In-
dian rights.”169  The trust today “provides Indian litigants with legal
theories to overturn agency action, to obtain money damages against
private parties and the United States . . . and, at least theoretically, to
provide limits on the exercise of ‘plenary’ authority by Congress.”170
Still, courts have not left the power portion of the trust entirely aside,
and the doctrine’s conflicted legacy persists.  How that legacy plays,
the Supreme Court has held, turns largely on two factors: the branch
of the federal government at issue and, as to the Executive Branch,
the statutes in question.
a. The Trust and Congress
The trust remains perhaps the most inherently conflicted when
applied to Congress.  The Court’s original reconceptualization of the
trust was all about congressional authority, and courts today continue
165. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946) (citing Stephens
v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478 (1899)); see also Creek Nation, 295 U.S. at 109–10
(noting that the government’s power to control and manage the tribe’s lands was limited
by the requirement that the government provide the tribe with just compensation before
giving the land to others or appropriating it for its own purposes).
166. See Chambers, supra note 157, at 13A-12. R
167. Lynn H. Slade, The Federal Trust Responsibility in a Self-Determination Era, 1999 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 2A-1, 2A-8 [hereinafter Slade, Self-Determination Era].
168. Chambers, supra note 157, at 13A-19–20. R
169. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 195, 233 (1984).
170. Paul E. Frye, “A Travesty of a Mockery of a Sham”: The Federal Trust Duty and Indian Self-
Determination, 1999 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 2B-1, 2B-5.
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to recognize that the trust yields this extra-constitutional muscle.171
In its most recent precedent, however, the Court has established a test
limiting how far Congress may flex this trust power.
In Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,172 Congress had
adopted legislation providing for funds to redress the United States’
breach of an 1854 treaty with the Delaware Indians.  A subset of the
Delawares that, a century before, had chosen to remain in Kansas
when the main group was removed to Oklahoma challenged the stat-
ute for excluding them.  Assessing this claim, the Court noted that
even though Lone Wolf purported to make every congressional enact-
ment addressing Indians “‘always . . . a political one,’” the plenary
power was plenary no more.173  Instead, congressional acts were sub-
ject to judicial review, and the standard was that Congress’s “judgment
should not be disturbed ‘[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’[s] unique obligation toward
the Indians . . . .’”174
Based on Weeks, then, the trust appears to impose at least some
limits on Congress.  Granted, the kind of “rationality” standard that
Weeks articulated is in the family of the most deferential available, but
the Court’s recognition that there is at least some review is significant.
Furthermore, given that such review must take place under the lens of
Congress’s “ ‘unique obligation toward the Indians’”175 rather than
being justified by “any” legitimate public purpose,176 it is possible that
this standard is more akin to “rational basis plus” than the plain ra-
tionality review courts typically envision.177  Of course, even in the
face of Weeks, the Court has never used the trust to strike down a con-
171. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998) (“Congress
possesses plenary power over Indian affairs, including the power to modify or eliminate
tribal rights.”).
172. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
173. Id. at 84 (quoting Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903)).
174. Id. at 85 (alteration in original) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555
(1974)); see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 249 (1985)
(noting that Congress’s plenary power “does not mean that litigation involving such mat-
ters necessarily entails nonjusticiable political questions”).
175. Weeks, 430 U.S. at 85 (quoting Morton, 417 U.S. at 555).
176. See Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The law will be upheld if
the court can hypothesize any possible basis on which the legislature might have acted.”).
177. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine into the Constitution, 39
TULSA L. REV. 247, 253–54 (2003).  For more on the notion of “rationality plus” review, see
generally Jane S. Schacter, Lawrence v. Texas and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Democratic Aspi-
rations, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 733, 740–43, 747–48 (2004), which discusses
Justice O’Connor’s use of a “more searching” or “rational basis plus” standard of review in
her Lawrence v. Texas concurrence.
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gressional act.178  That fact alone urges questions of just how mean-
ingful the trust really can be in limiting Congress, although it also
bears noting that Congress today takes the trust very seriously.179  Yet,
as the Supreme Court would soon point out following Weeks, Con-
gress’s repeated acknowledgment of the trust is not enough to
restrain.
b. The Trust and the Executive
In 1980 and 1983, the Supreme Court issued two companion de-
cisions—United States v. Mitchell180 (“Mitchell I”) and United States v.
Mitchell181 (“Mitchell II”)—that together form the most important trust
doctrine case since Lone Wolf.  These decisions established the frame-
work for measuring trust claims against the Executive Branch.
At issue in Mitchell I and Mitchell II were the monetary claims of
the Quinault Tribe and individual allottee land owners.  The claim-
ants alleged that the United States Department of the Interior
(“DOI”) breached its trust obligation by failing, among other things,
to obtain fair market value for timber sold off the claimants’ land, to
collect payment on those sales, and to sustainably manage the land.182
The basis of the claim in Mitchell I was the General Allotment Act
of 1887, which declared that the United States would “hold the
land . . . in trust for the sole use and benefit of” Indian allottees to
whom tribal land had been assigned until, effectively, a fee patent is-
sued.183  The Court determined that a congressional act could create
two kinds of trust relationships: one that impresses a “bare” or “lim-
178. COHEN, supra note 116, at 423; Chambers, supra note 157, at 13A-12; Wood, Trust R
Doctrine Revisited, supra note 121, at 1508 (recognizing that despite many decisions from the R
Court describing Congress’s fiduciary duties to Indian tribes, the Court has never used the
doctrine to invalidate a federal statute).  Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to uphold
Congress’s authority to terminate the trust relationship in toto. See, e.g., Bd. of County
Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 718 (1943) (noting that Congress retains the power to end
the guardian relationship); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (noting that
Congress’s power to end the guardianship is settled doctrine (citing Tiger v. W. Inv. Co.,
221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911))).
179. COHEN, supra note 116, at 420–23 (finding that most modern statutes reaffirm the R
trust responsibility); Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 317, 340 (2006).
180. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535 (1980).  For a more in-depth
discussion of Mitchell I, see generally Newton, supra note 120. R
181. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
182. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 537.
183. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2006)). See generally Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Prop-
erty Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559 (2001) (arguing that
the General Allotment Act failed because it forced a property system on all Indian tribes
without allowing any tribe to change it); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ.
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ited” duty of care for a narrow purpose, such as against land divesti-
ture, and another that imposes a more searching “full fiduciary
responsibilit[y]” to actively manage a trust res.184  Consequently, be-
cause the General Allotment Act envisioned that “the Indian allottee,
and not a representative of the United States,” would bear responsibil-
ity for managing the allotted lands, the Court held that the right to
recover from the government “must be found in some source other
than [the General Allotment] Act,” and remanded the case.185
Mitchell II involved the claimants’ attempt to find that other
source referenced by the Court in Mitchell I.  The Court agreed that
the claimants found it in various timber management statutes giving
the DOI “pervasive” control over the Quinaults’ land.186  This type of
de facto management—from “literal[ ] daily supervision” to administra-
tion of “[v]irtually every stage” of harvesting and sales187—meant that
each of the “necessary elements of a common-law trust [we]re pre-
sent: a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees),
and a trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds).”188  Accordingly,
the Court ordered that the DOI would be held to an exacting fiduci-
ary standard and that the claimants could rightfully seek monetary
damages.189
The Mitchell decisions, therefore, created a decisional dichotomy
for trust claims against the Executive.190  Where the government in-
volves itself extensively in the management of Indian lands, as in
Mitchell II’s timber statutes, a higher trust standard applies and mone-
tary damages are available so long as sovereign immunity is waived.191
In contrast, where the government is less involved in the management
of Indian lands, as under the General Allotment Act in Mitchell I, a
lesser trust obligation controls and remuneration typically cannot be
ST. L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing the legacy of the General Allotment Act from its origins
through recent Supreme Court opinions that directly and indirectly interpret the Act).
184. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 542; Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224.
185. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 542–43, 546.
186. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 219, 224.
187. Id. at 222 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Id. at 225.
189. Id. at 224–26, 28.
190. See COHEN, supra note 116, at 428–29; Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict Between the “Public R
Trust” and the “Indian Trust” Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA
L. REV. 271, 276–77 (2003) (arguing that the federal government’s trust relationship with
Indian tribes consists of a “general” trust relationship, a relationship of specific duties cre-
ated by statutes, or a full fiduciary relationship that results from the government’s manage-
ment of tribal assets).
191. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 218–19 (finding that the government waived its sovereign
immunity under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006), and could be found liable for
monetary damages if the substantive laws at issue allowed for monetary recovery).
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obtained.  In short, “the applicable statutes, regulations, treaties, and
executive orders ‘define the contours of the United States’ fiduciary
responsibilities.’”192  The upside of this dichotomy is that it is now
clear that both tribes and individual Indians may rely on the trust to
seek compensation.  The downside is that federal law dictates when
that duty arises in the first place.  Moreover, drawing the line between
what is “narrow” and “comprehensive” is not always particularly
easy.193
The picture is yet muddier still when a party seeks prescriptive
relief rather than monetary damages.  Some commentators have ar-
gued that the Mitchell cases’ logic should not bleed from the Indian
Tucker Act194 context in which those decisions were rendered,195 but
the fact is that the Mitchell cases’ schema has influenced courts’ con-
sideration of other trust-based claims.196  By default, “courts tend to
read Mitchell [II] broadly as requiring that the trust doctrine be lim-
ited to obligations specifically stated in statutes.”197  Consequently, al-
though there are some cases in which courts have found that an extra-
statutory trust obligation must guide or influence agency decisionmak-
ing,198 the bulk of precedent weighs against the trend.  When an
192. COHEN, supra note 116, at 433 (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224). R
193. See Aitken, supra note 124, at 137–38 (arguing that the Supreme Court has failed to R
define the parameters of the Mitchell II idea of “comprehensiveness” of federal control,
leaving future courts room to construe it in a manner favorable to the outcome they de-
sire).  A relatively easy case in this respect was United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,
537 U.S. 465 (2003), which ruled that where the United States held land under a statutory
trust that did not impose duties of management and conservation, the government’s daily
occupation of the land nevertheless subjected it to an obligation to preserve the property
improvements. Id. at 474–76.  Filling the interstices between cases like White Mountain
Apache Tribe and Mitchell I is the more difficult task.
194. Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1055 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1505
(2000)).
195. See Wood, Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 121, at 1522 (arguing that the holdings R
of the Mitchell cases are limited to the Tucker Act context and should not apply to common
law claims). But see Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1226–27 (D.
Mont. 2004) (criticizing this view).
196. See, e.g., Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 574 (9th Cir.
1998); N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 611–12 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Gros Ventre
Tribe, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1226–27; see also Wood, Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 121, at R
1522 n.234 (providing examples of courts that have relied on Mitchell II).
197. COHEN, supra note 116, at 438. R
198. See, e.g., N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding
that social, cultural, and economic costs to the tribe must be considered); United States v.
Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding tribe’s right to take fish,
regardless of whether natural or stocked); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp.,
728 F.2d 1555, 1567 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[S]tricter standards apply to federal agencies when
administering Indian programs.”); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F.
Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C. 1972) (commenting that DOI’s “duty was not to determine” water
allocation that “hopefully everyone could live with”).
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agency has satisfied its specific statutory mandates, courts repeatedly
have found the trust obligation thereby fulfilled as well.199  In fact,
when a generally applicable statute, such as federal environmental
law, is in question, some courts have found sufficient the agency’s
mere consideration of the Indian interest along with the statute’s
other public considerations.200
Where this leaves the trust is in a place far removed from Mar-
shall’s original conception.  Despite the great hope of many advocates
and commentators, the trust doctrine—though certainly a useful tool
in some respects—simply is not the robust vehicle of self-determina-
tion it could be.  Perhaps even more troubling, the Supreme Court’s
current vision of tribal sovereignty also has become increasingly
lacking.
199. See, e.g., Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 479 (9th Cir.
2000) (finding that when an agency does not have a specific duty to a tribe, it fulfills its
fiduciary responsibility to the tribe by complying with its general regulations); Skokomish
Indian Tribe v. FERC, 121 F.3d 1303, 1308–09 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the federal
trust did not compel FERC to grant a tribe’s application to build a hydropower facility
when such permit was barred by FERC’s generally applicable regulations); Nance v. EPA,
645 F.2d 701, 710–11 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that absent specific provisions, the Clear Air
Act and EPA regulations provided adequate procedures to fulfill the federal trust obliga-
tion); N. Slope Borough, 642 F.2d at 611–13 (noting that trust responsibilities are only cre-
ated by statute, treaty, or executive order, and that, barring such specific responsibilities,
no fiduciary responsibilities exist beyond those required by agency regulations); Gros Ventre
Tribe, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (noting that where there is no specified duty or control over
tribal property, the agency satisfies the federal trust by complying with the applicable laws
or regulations); Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1489 (D. Ariz. 1990)
(finding that the government fulfilled its general fiduciary duty in the absence of specific
duties by complying with the underlying statute and regulations); cf. Dep’t of Interior v.
Klamath Water Users Prot. Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 15–16 (2001) (declining to create a Freedom
of Information Act exemption based on the trust).
200. See, e.g., Morongo Band of Mission Indians, 161 F.3d at 574 (noting that in the absence
of a specific duty, the federal trust responsibility is satisfied by compliance with general
regulations); N. Slope Borough, 642 F.2d at 593 (stating that an Indian tribe’s reliance on
whale hunting was to be considered along with the country’s need for increased oil capac-
ity); see also Okanogan Highlands Alliance, 236 F.3d at 472–73, 478–80 (ruling in the context
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370d (2000)).  Such
holdings are largely due to the inherent conflict of interest under the trust—the govern-
ment’s obligation to Indian beneficiaries, but also to the public. See Ann C. Juliano, Con-
flicted Justice: The Department of Justice’s Conflict of Interest in Representing Native American Tribes,
37 GA. L. REV. 1307, 1329–36 (2003) (outlining the various conflicts of interest that may
arise over government management of Indian land); Judith V. Royster, Equivocal Obliga-
tions: The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral
Resources, 71 N.D. L. REV. 327, 348–58 (1995) (discussing the conflict of interests present
when the federal government manages water resources for the benefit of both the tribe
and federal interests).
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C. Power or Paucity?—Native Sovereignty
When tribes speak of sovereignty, they typically mean inherent sov-
ereignty.  Indeed, this is the sovereignty that tribes long have pos-
sessed.  Before European contact, “[m]ost Indian tribes were
independent, self-governing societies” with their own laws, social
norms, and enforcement mechanisms.201  Although these forms of
government varied, the colonizing European nations, first, and the
United States, subsequently, entered into over 800 treaties with Native
American nations.202  Because treaty-making is exclusively a power of
the state,203 “[t]he fact that Europeans and the United States made
treaties with Indian nations demonstrates that they recognized the
sovereignty of Indian nations.”204
Sovereignty has a thousand shades, but at its core, sovereignty
means power: the power to govern, the power to determine the shape
of a society.205  Sovereignty thus might be thought of as a bundle of
rights, or powers.206  Historically, “In the technical language of the
201. COHEN, supra note 116, at 204. R
202. KIRKE KICKINGBIRD ET AL., INDIAN TREATIES 2, 10 (1980); see also Hope M. Babcock,
A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sov-
ereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 458–59 (not-
ing that the rights Indians have acquired through treaties create a distinct legal
relationship between the tribes and the federal government); Alex Tallchief Skibine,
United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 TULSA L. REV. 47, 48
(2004) (noting that the United States began signing treaties with Indian tribes in 1778 and
continued doing so throughout much of the nineteenth century).  For more information
about the European legal treatment of tribes, see COHEN, supra note 116, at 10–20, and for R
a discussion of the early treaties between Indians and the United States, see 1 FRANCIS PAUL
PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS
44–50 (1984).
203. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 822 (2007).
204. Kirke Kickingbird, What’s Past Is Prologue: The Status and Contemporary Relevance of
American Indian Treaties, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 603, 604 (1995).
205. See Babcock, supra note 202, at 453–54 (arguing that essential aspects of tribal sov- R
ereignty are the right to protect its collective identity and the right to structure its govern-
ment); Ray Halbritter & Steven Paul McSloy, Empowerment or Dependence? The Practical Value
and Meaning of Native American Sovereignty, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 531, 570 (1994)
(arguing that sovereignty for Indian tribes stems from not being dependent upon any en-
tity, including inter alia federal, state, and local governments); Patrick Macklem, Distributing
Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1348 (1993) (noting
that sovereignty’s value results from “the fact that it creates a legal space in which a com-
munity can negotiate, construct, and protect a collective identity”).
206. Sarah Krakoff, The Virtues and Vices of Sovereignty, 38 CONN. L. REV. 797, 801 (2006)
[hereinafter Krakoff, Virtues and Vices]; see Kirke Kickingbird et al., Indian Sovereignty, in
NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW: NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 1, 8–12 (John R. Wunder
ed., 1996) [hereinafter NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW] (defining the bundle of sovereign
powers to include government formation, membership definition, legislation, law enforce-
ment, taxation, and property and social regulation); cf. Babcock, supra note 202, at 450–51 R
(describing sovereignty as a fluid, flexible concept).
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, sovereignty was the absolute
power of a nation to determine its own course of action with respect
to other nations.”207  In the modern context, however, tribal sover-
eignty is no longer absolute.
European contact began transforming tribal sovereignty almost
instantly; Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in Cherokee Nation was only
an early call in this unyielding erosion.  In 1871, the United States
announced that it would no longer enter into treaties with tribes,208
and the trajectory was only downhill from there.  As the Goshutes had
seen, earlier treaties already had instituted the era of forcibly “remov-
ing” tribes to make way for the continuing colonial encroachment of
tribal lands,209 and the coming shifts in federal policy would prove
even more problematic.
The General Allotment, or Dawes, Act of 1887210 affirmatively
sought to serve, as Theodore Roosevelt later put it, as “a mighty pul-
verizing engine to break up the tribal mass” and assimilate Indians
into the purportedly superior mainstream society.211  Indeed, the re-
sult of this policy, in which the government chopped up reservations
into individual parcels to be “allotted” to tribal members and then
sold off so-called “surplus” lands to non-Indians, was nothing short of
crushing.212  When Congress passed the law, “the indigenous peoples
of what is now the United States had already lost more than 90 per-
cent of their land . . . . By 1934, when the [f]ederal government ended
allotment, the policy had cost Indians almost 90 million acres—two-
thirds of the land they owned fifty years earlier.”213
It was not until 1934 that the federal government finally recog-
nized the utter failure of its social experiment to push foreign cultural
207. Vine Deloria Jr., Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty, in NATIVE AMERICANS
AND THE LAW, supra note 206, at 118, 118. R
208. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
209. COHEN, supra note 116, at 45.  For a unique look at the Indian Removal Era, see R
TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 13–33 (2002), which charts the history of re-
moval from 1767 and suggests that a desire for more land for settlement and agriculture
led the English colonialists to relocate Indian tribes.
210. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
211. Gavin Clarkson, Not Because They Are Brown, But Because of Ea: Why the Good Guys Lost
in Rice v. Cayetano, and Why They Didn’t Have to Lose, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317, 325–26
(2002) (emphasis removed) (quoting 15 MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 6674
(1901)).
212. See Royster, supra note 183, at 70–78; Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural R
Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1656 (2000).
213. Bobroff, supra note 183, at 1560–61. R
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norms onto tribes and “turn Indians into farmers.”214  Accordingly,
the ensuing Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”),215 among other
things, prohibited additional allotment, restricted the alienation of In-
dian land, and permitted tribes to “organize and adopt constitutions
with a congressional sanction of self-government.”216  Given the neces-
sity of land to any exercise of sovereignty,217 and the impunity with
which allotment had stripped tribes of their territorial base, the im-
portance of the IRA’s halting of this practice could not be
exaggerated.
The IRA, though, was no panacea.218  The IRA’s very premise was
that the federal government would decide when to “recognize” ac-
ceptable tribal governments.219  And, because the Act envisioned con-
stitutions that mimicked the federal system, it necessarily imprinted
Anglo-American governance norms, which often did not conform to
traditional tribal governance, upon tribes.220
Whether or not the IRA promoted native sovereignty as well as
possible, far more vexing for tribes was the sharp turn Congress took
214. Charles Wilkinson, Filling in the Blank Spots on Powell’s and Stegner’s Maps: The Role of
Modern Indian Tribes in Western Watersheds, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 41, 43–44
(2003).  That anyone believed tribes needed such turning was highly ironic. See Robert J.
Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism Succeed, 80 OR. L.
REV. 757, 767 (2001) (noting that at the time of European contact “the majority of Indians
lived . . . in small towns and villages” supported primarily by farming).
215. Wheeler-Howard (Indian Reorganization) Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codi-
fied as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006)). See generally INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE
INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: THE TWENTY YEAR RECORD (William H. Kelley ed., 1954) (dis-
cussing the effects, strengths, and weaknesses of the IRA on tribal life).
216. COHEN, supra note 116, at 86. R
217. Eduardo Moise`s Pen˜alver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership
in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 265 (2004); Mary Christina Wood, Protect-
ing the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal
Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109, 113 [hereinafter Wood, Protecting Native Sover-
eignty]. But cf. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 748–53 (Alaska 1999) (holding that a native
Alaskan village possesses non-territorial sovereignty unless divested by Congress).
218. See COHEN, supra note 116, at 89–97; David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal R
Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759, 862 (1991) (noting that although
the IRA introduced a “scheme for expressing tribal sovereignty,” a number of tribes re-
jected the IRA scheme and maintain traditional tribal governments).
219. Indian Reorganization Act §§ 16–17.
220. See, e.g., George S. Esber Jr., Shortcomings of the Indian Self-Determination Policy, in
STATE AND RESERVATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 212, 218–19
(George Pierre Castile & Robert L. Bee eds., 1992) (discussing the fact that many tribal
governments do not conform to the democratic one-person, one-vote system envisioned by
the federal government and the IRA); Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A
Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 104–05 (1993) (discuss-
ing the tension between autonomous tribal governments and the tribal constitutions
drafted under the requirements of the IRA, many of which required tribal laws to be ap-
proved by the Secretary of the Interior).
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next.  Less than two decades after the IRA was adopted, Congress ab-
ruptly announced an end to tribal self-governance.  Although this dec-
laration wrapped itself in an equitable banner of “grant[ing Indians]
all of the rights and prerogatives” of other American citizens,221 the
real message was clear: “[A]s rapidly as possible”—“at the earliest pos-
sible time”222—Congress wanted tribes, and all the notions of sover-
eignty bound up in them, to vanish.  Like allotment before it, the
effect of this “termination” policy was by all accounts “devastating”223
and “tragic,”224 “[s]weepingly destructive,”225 “harrowing,”226 and “ne-
farious.”227  Congress’s half-page termination resolution initially
targeted only five tribes,228 but the broader policy affected all Indian
nations.229  In the next decade, Congress passed numerous additional
termination acts affecting approximately 12,450 Native Americans,
110 tribes and bands, and 1.5 million acres of native lands.230  Still,
the true impact came from the symbolism of these acts.  Even tribes
who did not have their legal and political status eliminated felt they
“lost their ability to exist as distinct sovereign people,”231 because what
221. Freedom from Federal Supervision Act, 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
222. Id.  Perhaps tellingly, Dillon S. Myer, the government official who oversaw Japanese
American internment camps in World War II, also was charged with executing tribal termi-
nation.  Robert A. Williams Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decoloniz-
ing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 221. See
generally RICHARD DRINNON, KEEPER OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS: DILLON S. MYER AND AMERI-
CAN RACISM (1987) (detailing Myer’s involvement in “termination” of tribal rights and
identities).
223. Michael C. Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REV.
1181, 1181 (1983).
224. COHEN, supra note 116, at 95. R
225. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights,
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 355 (2001).
226. Krakoff, Virtues and Vices, supra note 206, at 806. R
227. John P. LaVelle, Sanctioning a Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex Parte Young, Expan-
sion of Hans Immunity, and Denial of Indian Rights in Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
787, 790 (1999).  For more information on termination, see generally KENNETH R. PHILP,
TERMINATION REVISITED: AMERICAN INDIANS ON THE TRAIL TO SELF-DETERMINATION,
1933–1953 (1999), and Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termina-
tion Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1977).
228. Freedom from Federal Supervision Act, 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
229. John Fredericks III, America’s First Nations: The Origins, History and Future of American
Indian Sovereignty, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 347, 377–78 (1999).
230. Walch, supra note 223, at 1187. R
231. Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction over Matters Arising in Indian Coun-
try: A Roadmap for Improving Interaction Among Tribal, State and Federal Governments, 31 MC-
GEORGE L. REV. 973, 983 (2000). But see Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391
U.S. 404, 412–13 (1968) (holding that termination ended only the trust relationship, not
treaty rights).
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Congress was saying was that it could inflict such a fate on any tribe it
wished.232
Termination’s inherent flaws, and native resistance to it, became
increasingly apparent, and by the late 1950s, the federal government
abdicated the stance and returned to an IRA-like vision of tribal self-
governance.233  The official federal policy thenceforth was one of tri-
bal “self-determination”—in a word, native “sovereignty.”  Indeed,
“every president since 1960” has reaffirmed the concepts of tribal self-
determination.234  As President Nixon announced in 1970, “The time
has come to break decisively with the past and to create the conditions
for a new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts
and Indian decisions.”235
Congress also repeatedly reaffirmed tribal self-governance.  The
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,236
for instance, created a process for tribes to contract with the federal
government to administer various health, education, and other social
programs previously provided by the BIA.237  Likewise, the Tribal Self-
Governance Act of 1994 (“TSGA”)238 relied on a policy of “perma-
nently establish[ing] and implement[ing] tribal self-governance” by
232. See Daniel H. Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and Its Impact on Reservation
Resource Development, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 617, 622 (1976) (noting that during the Termina-
tion Era, tribes lived in fear that any exercise of self-government would result in Congress
issuing a new act of termination).  Other Termination Era initiatives included officially
promoting “relocation” of nearly half the entire Indian population from reservations to
urban centers by 1980, and Public Law 280, which began transferring criminal and civil
jurisdiction over Indian lands to states.  Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat.
588. See also Act of Aug. 3, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-959, 70 Stat. 986, amended by Act of Dec. 23,
1963, Pub. L. No. 88-230, 77 Stat. 471 (instituting vocational programs to provide Indians
who lived on a reservation with job training and skills). See generally Joan Ablon, American
Indian Relocation: Problems of Dependency and Management in the City, 26 PHYLON 362 (1965)
(analyzing the dependency and survival issues for Indians that relocate to urban areas);
Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22
UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975) (examining the jurisdictional disputes between states and Indian
tribes before and after Public Law 280).
233. See Fred A. Seaton, U.S. Sec’y of the Interior, Remarks (KCLS, Flagstaff, Arizona, radio
broadcast Sept. 18, 1958), in 105 CONG. REC. 3105 (1959) (discussing the success of certain
Indian tribes as evidence they have the desire and capacity to self-govern their affairs).
234. See COHEN, supra note 116, at 98; David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpreta- R
tion: Conquest, Consent, and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403, 419–20
(1994).
235. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations
for Federal Indian Policy, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-363, at 1 (1970), reprinted in DAVID H. GETCHES
ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 218 (5th ed. 2005).
236. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 450–458bbb-2 (2006)).
237. Id. § 2(a)(2).
238. Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4270 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 458aa–458hh (2006)).
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giving tribes block grants and entering into tribal-federal agreements
for what would otherwise be DOI-delivered programs and services.239
These executive and congressional strides meant much for tribes.
But they were not the whole story.  Looming in the background was
the Judicial Branch, and to say that the Supreme Court did not pro-
ceed in lockstep with its counterparts would be an understatement.240
Beginning in the 1970s, the Court slowly but clearly began converting
tribal sovereignty from a relatively firm principle of governance based
on territorial control to a far more malleable concept of authority
based on consent.  Even in the context of congressional acts promot-
ing tribal sovereignty, this transformation—what some have termed
“judicial termination”241—had serious ramifications.  They are ramifi-
cations that not only show modern Indian law as a “morass of doctri-
nal and normative incoherence,”242 but that also illuminate the
struggles tribes face in seeking to meaningfully exercise sovereignty at
all.
1. Sovereignty as Territory—Williams and McClanahan
Two cases from the middle of last century illustrate the shift tribal
sovereignty has undergone in the Supreme Court’s view.  Both in-
volved comparable facts, both reached the same result, but neither
moored itself to the same conception of sovereignty.
239. Id. §§ 202–203.  For an assessment of such agreements in a non-BIA administered
arena, see generally Mary Ann King, Co-Management or Contracting?: Agreements Between Na-
tive American Tribes and the U.S. National Park Service Pursuant to the 1994 Tribal Self-Govern-
ance Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 475 (2007), which analyzes the relationships between
tribes and federal land management agencies under the TSGA through a case study of the
National Park Service.
240. See Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and
Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (2001) [hereinafter Krakoff, Undoing Indian
Law] (noting that the Supreme Court has consistently ruled against tribal litigants in dis-
putes involving federal Indian law).
241. Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 431, 481 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism]; see also L. Scott
Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 814
(1996) [hereinafter Gould, The Consent Paradigm] (describing the consequences of the Su-
preme Court’s embrace of consent-based sovereignty in place of inherent sovereignty);
Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37
NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 643 (2003) (explaining how the Supreme Court has stripped tribes
of government authority while giving more power to the states, contradicting recent con-
gressional and executive policies toward tribal governments). But cf. Philip P. Frickey, A
Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over
Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1999) [hereinafter Frickey, Judicial Divestiture] (explaining
that recent Court decisions are more indicative of uneasiness with tribal authority than a
“paradigmatic . . . doctrinal shift”).
242. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents, supra note 91, at 1754. R
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In Williams v. Lee,243 a non-Indian operating a general store on
the Navajo reservation filed a state court action to collect for goods he
had sold to tribal members.244  The Indians challenged jurisdiction,
and a sovereignty battle ensued.  On appeal, the Supreme Court ad-
mitted frankly that its sovereignty jurisprudence had not been static
over time.245  Still, the starting point was Worcester’s rule that states
lacked jurisdiction except in limited circumstances.246  “[A]bsent gov-
erning Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the
state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them.”247  Under this standard, the jurisdic-
tional answer was plain.  The Navajo Nation—not Arizona—had au-
thority over its reservation, and that was the end of the matter.  As the
Court stated, “It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He
was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place
there.”248  Territory, in short, controlled.
Decided just fourteen years later, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commission249 involved a Navajo tribal member’s attempt to reclaim
$16.20 in state taxes that had been withheld from her income, all of
which she earned on the reservation.250  Although Williams’s territo-
rial-based rule would have seemed to offer an easy resolution, the
Court took great pains to distinguish its prior holding.  The Court
pointed on the one hand to the “‘policy of leaving Indians free from
state jurisdiction’” as “ ‘deeply rooted in the Nation’s history,’”251 but
then noted on the other hand that “it would vastly oversimplify the
problem” to consequently find that “state tax legislation[ ] may not
extend.”252  Rather, the Court now saw tribal sovereignty ultimately as
a guide, not a rule:
The modern cases . . . tend to avoid reliance on platonic
notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the ap-
plicable treaties and statutes . . . .
. . . [S]overeignty . . . is relevant, then, not because it
provides a definitive resolution . . . but because it provides a
243. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
244. Id. at 217–18.
245. Id. at 219.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 220.
248. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
249. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
250. Id. at 165–66.
251. Id. at 168 (quoting Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945)).
252. Id. at 170.
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backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal
statutes must be read.253
In this new construct, the fact that the taxed activities had occurred
on the reservation was no longer controlling.  What governed instead
was whom the state had taxed, because it was, purportedly, tribal mem-
bers, and not the tribe itself, that the treaties and statutes protected.254
The Court thus held that the Williams test did not apply because it was
for “situations involving non-Indians,” where “both the tribe and the
State could fairly claim” a jurisdictional interest.255  Nevertheless, be-
cause the appellant was Navajo and had earned her income on Navajo
land, the Court deemed the dispute “totally within the sphere” of Nav-
ajo jurisdiction.256
2. Sovereignty as Consent—Oliphant, Montana, and Brendale
Initially, McClanahan’s shift in sovereignty may have seemed sub-
tle.  In both Williams and McClanahan, state jurisdiction was pre-
cluded, and the rationale was sovereignty.  But what first appeared to
be a mere tremor ultimately proved tectonic.257  The change from Wil-
liams’s territory-focused sovereignty to McClanahan’s membership-cen-
tered vision soon infected virtually every area in which the Court
addresses native rights.258  The change was most stark for criminal ju-
253. Id. at 172 (emphasis added). But cf. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 377,
387–90 (1976) (finding no room for state tax jurisdiction over tribal member’s tangible
property on a reservation where federal statute did not clearly delegate authority to the
state).
254. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179–81.  One aspect that made this holding so strange was
that, in the very next year, the Court emphasized that Congress’s trust authority emanates
from its constitutional treaty and commerce powers to deal with tribes. Compare Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974) (noting that Congress’ power to deal with tribes
comes from the Constitution itself), with Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416,
422–23 (Alaska 2003) (explaining that the Alaska Constitution grants the state no powers
for dealing with Indian disputes).
255. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179.
256. Id. at 179–80.
257. Professor Pommersheim has noted the geologic nature of American Indian juris-
prudence in this way, or what he referred to as “the shifting tectonic plates of tribal sover-
eignty”—as such decisions unquestionably send shockwaves through native life and tribal
culture. FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPO-
RARY TRIBAL LIFE 100 (1995); cf. Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the
Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (2004) [hereinafter
Krakoff, Illuminating the Paradox] (describing tribal governance adaptation in light of
changing federal Indian law).
258. See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian
Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 4, 17–18, 86
(1993) (noting that the Court has applied either geographically based sovereignty or mem-
bership-based sovereignty according to the nature of the case before the Court); L. Scott
Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty After Atkinson and Hicks, 37 NEW ENG. L.
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risdiction,259 but the other critical areas—civil jurisdiction and land
regulation—also were profoundly touched.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe260 is perhaps most indicative of
the criminal arena.261  There, two non-Indians sought a writ of habeas
corpus after their tribal court arraignment for allegedly assaulting a
tribal officer and engaging in a high-speed chase with tribal police.262
Addressing this jurisdictional challenge, the Supreme Court ruled
that the tribe’s inherent sovereignty must be weighed with a “great
solicitude” for both defendants’ right to full constitutional protection
and the fact that tribal attempts to prosecute nonmembers were not a
historical regularity, but a “relatively new phenomenon.”263  In that
calculus, individual federal constitutional rights could only weigh
more heavily than tribes’ “ ‘quasi-sovereign’ authority”264 because Con-
gress had hinted strongly enough to find tribes divested of
prosecutorial power over non-Indians.265  This constitutional subordi-
nation applied, moreover, even if it interfered with a tribe’s ability to
keep order on its reservation.266 McClanahan’s shift to consent-based
sovereignty thus became increasingly apparent.  Where a territory-
based version of sovereignty would have ensured the tribe’s right to
prosecute because of where these crimes took place, its new member-
ship-based brand precluded enforcement because of who was in
question.267
REV. 669, 669 (2003) [hereinafter Gould, Tough Love] (explaining that tribes do not have
power over nonmembers unless Congress has delegated such power to the tribe).
259. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (“[I]n the criminal sphere mem-
bership marks the bounds of tribal authority.”).
260. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
261. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents, supra note 91, at 1769. R
262. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
263. Id. at 196–97, 210.
264. Id. at 208 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831)).
265. Id. at 208–12.
266. Id. at 210.  The lack of full tribal criminal jurisdiction has reached near-crisis levels.
Violent crimes against Indians occur at more than twice the national rate. LAWRENCE A.
GREENFELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE NCJ
173386, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 2–3 (1999), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/aic.pdf.  One in three Indian women—2.5 times the national rate—will be raped or
sexually assaulted during their lifetimes; eighty-six percent of the time these crimes are
committed by non-Indians. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT
INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 2, 4 (2007), http://
www.amnestyusa.org/women/maze/report.pdf. The Oliphant Court, however, found these
trends irrelevant. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212 (“[W]e are not unaware of the prevalence of
non-Indian crime on today’s reservations . . . . But these are considerations for
Congress . . . .”).
267. See Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REV. 75, 94–95 (2003)
(explaining that without congressional authorization, a tribe has no inherent authority
over nonmember activities on the reservation).
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By the time the Court issued its self-proclaimed “pathmarking”268
decision in Montana v. United States269 three years later, membership’s
importance over territory was cemented.  The Court couched Mon-
tana’s question as tribal authority “to regulate hunting and fishing by
non-Indians” on reservation lands “owned in fee simple by non-Indi-
ans.”270  That authority, the Court held, hinged on power over per-
sons—not land.  The Court declared that absent a congressional act,
inherent tribal sovereignty does “not extend to the activities of non-
members” except in two limited circumstances: (1) where the non-
members “enter consensual relationships . . . through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements;” or (2) where the
nonmembers’ conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the po-
litical integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.”271  Sovereignty under Montana thus became as much paucity of
power as an affirmation of it.  Although the Court seemed to blend
territory and consent by acknowledging tribal jurisdiction over non-
members on tribal and trust lands,272 its actual holding was far
broader, reconceptualizing sovereignty altogether.  The Court ruled
that all that tribes had left was the authority “necessary to protect tri-
bal self-government or to control internal relations.”273  Unless
granted by Congress, they no longer possessed any other power.274
Indeed, although the Montana Court carved exceptions to its new
rule, later cases demonstrated just how narrow the exceptions were.
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion,275 for instance, the Court ruled that the Yakima could rightfully
impose their zoning laws on the “closed” area of their reservation
where the public was not allowed, but could not do so on the “open”
portion where there was a large non-native presence.276  This ratio-
nale effectively used the land’s “Indian-ness” as a proxy for consent.277
268. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
269. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
270. Id. at 547 (emphasis added).
271. Id. at 565–66.
272. Id. at 557.
273. Id. at 564.
274. Id. at 564–65 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
But cf. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987) (affirming the exhaustion
principle for tribal courts); Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471
U.S. 845, 856–57 (1985) (noting that the question of tribal judicial jurisdiction must be
exhausted in tribal court before challenging in federal forum).
275. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
276. Id. at 415–16, 425, 428.
277. Dussias, supra note 258, at 72–78; Frickey, Judicial Divestiture, supra note 241, at 78; R
Gould, The Consent Paradigm, supra note 241, at 876–77; see also City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. R
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 215–17 (2005) (comparing the permissible
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-2\MLR202.txt unknown Seq: 39 26-FEB-09 11:15
328 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68:290
For the closed land, Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, lik-
ened the tribe’s zoning to an “equitable servitude,” whereas he saw no
such restriction on lands in the open portion.278  Moreover, the need
to uniformly regulate reservation land use could not satisfy Montana’s
exceptions because holding title did not constitute a consensual com-
mercial relationship, nor had the Yakimas made a showing that con-
trolling “every use of fee land” threatened their political integrity,
economic security, or welfare.279
In the era, then, when Congress and the Executive arguably have
become more solicitous of tribal rights than at any other time in our
history, the trust doctrine and native sovereignty appear at odds.  As
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the trust is today as much a source
of federal power as a limitation upon it, and tribal sovereignty, the
more it butts up against non-tribal players and the rights they assert,
only continues to diminish.280  Whether this means that the courts
truly are the “final agent[s] of colonization,”281 the apparent conflict
between official federal policy and how the courts actually interpret it
makes one thing very clear: The shape of tribal survival very much
depends on how the law reconciles a rule that at its core gives the
federal government authority over tribes as their purported protec-
tor—the trust—and another that seeks to allow tribes to mark their
own path—sovereignty.
exercise of state jurisdiction over tribal land that is over ninety percent non-Indian with
New York’s continued jurisdiction over tribal land reacquired from the state by the Oneida
tribe after 200 years).
278. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 442, 446 (Stevens, J., concurring).
279. Id. at 428, 430–31 (majority opinion). See also Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532
U.S. 645, 659 (2001) (holding that a hotel occupancy tax imposed against nonmembers
located on non-Indian fee land within a reservation was invalid because the tax was not
related to a consensual relationship with the tribe); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,
457–58 (1997) (finding that Montana’s exceptions were not met by tribal jurisdiction over
a nonmember car accident on a public highway running through reservation).
280. See Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents, supra note 91, at 1775 (noting the R
Court’s tendency to favor nonmember rights of liberty in criminal cases over considera-
tions stemming from tribal sovereignty); Gould, Tough Love, supra note 258, at 669, 674 R
(noting that where tribes attempt to exert authority over nonmembers, the nonmembers’
rights to due process and equal protection usually trump claims of tribal sovereignty);
Krakoff, Illuminating the Paradox, supra note 257, at 1195 (arguing that federal doctrines R
that limit tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers erode tribal sovereignty).
281. Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law, supra note 240, at 1214–15; see also Frickey, Judicial R
Divestiture, supra note 241, at 7 (accusing the Court of usurping a legislative function by R
“implementing the ongoing colonial process”).
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III. BATTLE IN THE DESERT: PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE, THE GOSHUTES,
AND NUCLEAR WASTE
Perhaps more than any other example in recent memory, the
Skull Valley Goshutes, this tiny tribe dwelling in the desert, have come
to epitomize the conflict between native sovereignty and the federal
trust.  After decades of colonial encroachment and hostility, of gov-
ernment disregard and neglect, the Goshutes were a fragment of their
former selves.  Dwindled in numbers, ignored by society, and stalled
in abject poverty, only a handful of band members persisted on the
reservation.282  It was hardly surprising, then, that when the federal
government announced that it was looking for a place to temporarily
store nuclear waste, the Goshutes, already surrounded by a host of
other toxic sources and scars, were willing to listen.  Ultimately, the
Goshutes decided that nuclear storage could benefit the tribe.  This
decision tested the tribe’s resiliency, resulting in a collision between
sovereignty and the trust.
A. The “Vexing Problem”
The roots of the Goshutes’ plan283 to store nuclear waste trace to
1954—long before the tribe was involved at all.  In that year, Congress
adopted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,284 which encouraged private
development of nuclear power “under a program of federal regula-
tion and licensing.”285  This proverbial “turning of swords into plow-
282. See H. Josef Hebert, N-waste Bitterly Divides Utah Tribe, DESERET MORNING NEWS, June
25, 2006, at A10.
283. In referring throughout this Article to a “Goshute” plan, position, or decision on
nuclear waste, I recognize that no tribe, no group, ever speaks with a single voice—particu-
larly here, where there was much internal dissent among tribal members. See infra Part
III.B–C.  Nevertheless, recognizing that any exercise of sovereignty will reflect the views of
one part of a group while simultaneously quelling those of another, I employ this rhetori-
cal convenience to refer to the position ultimately adopted by the majority of the band:
According to tribal leaders, two-thirds of adult members voted in favor of the project.
Telephone Interview with Lawrence Bear, Chairman, Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians
(Aug. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Lawrence Bear Telephone Interview]; see also Lewis, supra
note 3, at 321 (noting that Skull Valley leaders see the storage project as a necessary sur- R
vival tool for the tribe).  Indeed, the notion that a tribe might decide to push against the
grain of not only some of its own members, but modern society at large, is hardly unique to
the Goshutes. See generally Riley, supra note 203 (advocating against federal involvement R
with tribal decisionmaking even though those decisions may often not conform to Western
ideals).
284. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297h-13 (2000)).  Congress first authorized civilian development of
nuclear power in 1946. See generally Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 585, 60 Stat.
755.
285. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation &  Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 206–07 (1983).
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shares . . . symbolized the transformation of atomic power into a
source of energy in American society.”286  Today, 103 commercial nu-
clear reactors operate in the United States,287 together providing
nearly twenty percent of the nation’s electricity,288 or power for over
fifty million Americans.
Nuclear power carries significant benefits.  Once online, its mar-
ginal operating costs are low, making it “baseload” generation, or fa-
cilities that utilities run even when system demand is light.289  Its
“capacity factor,” or the percentage of time it actually runs, is high.290
And its associated contribution to global warming is comparatively
meager.291  Every energy source has disadvantages, however, and nu-
clear power’s are undeniably large.  The toxic legacy of atomic testing
and uranium mining has long plagued the American West.292  The
1979 accident at Three Mile Island and the disaster at Chernobyl
raised serious questions about the technology’s safety.293  President
Carter’s concern over the risk of spent nuclear fuel falling into the
wrong hands caused him to ban reprocessing for commercial use.294
And, because a typical commercial nuclear reactor produces twenty-
three tons of intensely radioactive waste every year,295 ultimate disposi-
tion of this waste is a glaring constraint on the technology’s future.
286. Id. at 193–94.
287. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Nuclear Generation of Electricity, http://www.eia.doe.
gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/nuc_generation/gensum.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
288. Energy Info. Admin., How Is My Electricity Generated, Delivered, and Priced?,
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/electricity.cfm (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
289. RONALD E. HAGEN ET AL., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, IMPACT OF
U.S. NUCLEAR GENERATION ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 22 (2001), http://tonto.eia.
doe.gov/ftproot/nuclear/ghg.pdf.
290. Id. at 21–22.
291. Id. at 5 (comparing zero carbon emissions during a nuclear plant’s operation ver-
sus 0.266 metric tons of carbon emissions per megawatt-hour from coal).
292. See generally MICHAEL A. AMUNDSON, YELLOWCAKE TOWNS: URANIUM MINING COMMU-
NITIES IN THE AMERICAN WEST (2002) (analyzing the effects of nuclear testing and uranium
mining on four communities in the West); THE ATOMIC WEST (Bruce Hevly & John M.
Findlay eds., 1998) (exploring the impact of atomic power on the West through a series of
interdisciplinary essays); CHIP WARD, CANARIES ON THE RIM: LIVING DOWNWIND IN THE WEST
(1999) (describing the harsh environmental conditions in the West caused by toxic condi-
tions and the effect it has had on those who inhabit the area).
293. The Three Mile Island incident led to sweeping nuclear regulatory reform.  Eric R.
Pogue, The Catastrophe Model of Risk Regulation and the Regulatory Legacy of Three Mile Island
and Love Canal, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 470–72 (2007).
294. DONALD L. BARLETT & JAMES B. STEELE, FOREVERMORE: NUCLEAR WASTE IN AMERICA
92–94 (1985).
295. Energy Info. Admin., Nuclear Power and the Environment, http://www.eia.doe.
gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/nuclearenvissues.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
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This final question is nuclear power’s Achilles’ heel, its most “vex-
ing problem”296—what to do with all the waste?  Indeed, as of April
2008, the United States had stockpiled over 56,000 metric tons of
spent nuclear fuel, an amount predicted to increase to 119,000 metric
tons by 2035.297  All of this waste keeps accumulating, but no one has
a place to permanently store it.  A recent multi-expert report summa-
rized: “[D]isposal of high-level radioactive spent fuel . . . is one of the
most intractable problems facing the nuclear power industry through-
out the world.  No country has yet successfully implemented a system
for disposing of this waste.”298
Recognizing this mounting dilemma, in 1982 Congress passed
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (“NWPA”),299 which with respect to
“high-level,” or nuclear reactor, waste,300 had three key components.
First, the NWPA created a program to establish permanent geologic
nuclear waste “repositories,” owned and operated by the federal gov-
ernment and funded by a special fee on nuclear generation.301  Sec-
ond, the NWPA specified that once waste was delivered to a federal
repository, the government would assume title to and responsibility
for managing the waste.302  Third, it required the Department of En-
ergy (“DOE”) to complete “a detailed study” no later than June 1,
1985, on the need and feasibility of “one or more monitored retrieva-
ble storage [(“MRS”)] facilities”—storage sites where high-level nu-
clear waste could be continuously observed and readily retrieved.303
Although the NWPA tilled much new regulatory ground, Con-
gress overhauled the statute only five years later.  Those amendments
reduced the locations being studied for a permanent repository to
one: Yucca Mountain, Nevada.304  They also revamped the former
296. Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir.
2004).
297. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, How Much Nuclear Waste Is In The United States?, http://
www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ym_repository/about_project/waste_explained/howmuch.shtml
(last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
298. MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER 10 (2003).
299. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2000)).
300. 42 U.S.C. § 10101(12).
301. Id. §§ 10131–10135.
302. Id. §§ 10143, 10222.
303. Id. § 10161.
304. Id. § 10172(a)(1).  Development of the Yucca Mountain facility, approximately 100
miles north of Las Vegas, has incurred staggering delays.  The DOE missed its initial 1998
deadline, only to announce in 2004 that it would not meet its goal of 2010.  Recently, the
DOE announced a “best achievable” construction date of 2017, though many doubt any-
thing sooner than 2025 is possible, and even that is unlikely. See Elaine Hiruo, Repository
Operations in 2017 is DOE’s Latest Schedule Estimate, INSIDE NRC, July 24, 2006, at 1 (describ-
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MRS provisions, nixing the DOE’s plans for a site in Oak Ridge, Ten-
nessee, and establishing a new entity, the Office of Nuclear Waste Ne-
gotiator, to find other locations.305  In 1991, the Nuclear Waste
Negotiator sent a letter inviting states, localities, and Indian tribes to
apply for $100,000 grants to study the possibility of siting an MRS in
their communities.306  Sixteen tribes and four counties applied.307
One was the Skull Valley Goshutes.308
B. “Sovereignty Equals Survival”
Listen to why the Goshutes want to bring nuclear waste to their
land and one of the first things they mention is the future.  Mary Al-
len, a former vice chair of the band, explains: “A long time ago . . .
everybody would do things together; it was like a big family.  Every-
body would speak their native language and right now that’s disap-
pearing.  So, that’s what we need to bring back for our future and the
children.”309  To many this might seem a strange thing, to argue that
placing one of the deadliest wastes in the world in the center of your
homeland will be a boon to posterity.  But for the Skull Valley
Goshutes, it was not a decision made lightly.
Surrounded by the government’s toxic waste, still fighting, even,
to remove from their land the 1,500-plus sheep that had been buried
there since Army nerve gas killed more than 6,000 sheep three de-
cades earlier,310 the Goshutes were skeptical when they heard of the
search for MRS locations.  “Well at first we [were] kind of [leery] of
the federal government,” said Leon Bear, the former tribal chairman
who spearheaded the storage effort.311  “[W]e were [leery] of the fed-
eral government and their offer, thinking it was . . . some way to tie us
into this and get us to take this waste . . . .”312
ing DOE’s failed deadlines and the latest proposals for the beginning of a functioning
repository at Yucca Mountain).
305. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10162(a), 10241–10251.  For more information on the Oak Ridge site,
see Jon D. Erickson et al., Monitored Retrievable Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel in Indian Country:
Liability, Sovereignty, and Socioeconomics, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 73, 77–78 (1994).
306. Erickson et al., supra note 305, at 79–80. R
307. Id. at 81.
308. Id.
309. Private Fuel Storage, Voices For PFS: Mary Allen, http://www.privatefuelstorage.
com/voices/allen.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter PFS, Mary Allen].
310. Gumbel, supra note 6; Norrell, supra note 6; Roy Reed, Army Admits Its Nerve Gas R
Killed 6,000 Sheep, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1969, at 14.
311. KUED, Skull Valley: The Documentary: Interview with Leon Bear, http://
www.kued.org/productions/skullvalley/documentary/interviews/bear.html (last visited
Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter KUED, Leon Bear].
312. Id.
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The Nuclear Waste Negotiator, however, awarded the Goshutes
the $100,000 study grant they requested, as well as a $200,000 “Phase
II-A” study grant that eight other tribes also sought.313  The Goshutes
used the money to evaluate the nuclear possibility, studying the “dry
cask” storage system that would be used to encase the spent fuel rods
on their land.  Before they were done, band members traveled to
France, England, Sweden, and Japan to see the system in use.314  They
met with scientists from Harvard and the DOE’s lead laboratory on
nuclear energy.315  They toured Yucca Mountain, and Bear even took
a month-long internship at Xcel Energy’s Prairie Island nuclear facil-
ity in Minnesota.316  “At the beginning we didn’t know anything about
spent fuel,” said Bear.317  But after the tribe educated itself on the
subject for more than half a decade, it held itself out as understanding
spent nuclear fuel better than virtually any other governmental entity
in the United States outside the DOE.  “The Skull Valley Tribal Coun-
cil has done everything,” Danny Quintana, the tribe’s former lawyer,
told one journalist, “with the exception of getting their physics de-
grees at MIT . . . .”318
Knowledge gave the tribe confidence.  In the years between the
initial study grants and the Goshutes’ decision to accept the waste,
Congress canceled funding for the federal MRS program.319  A con-
sortium of thirty-three electric utilities then floated a proposal to build
a private facility instead, and a tribe in Arizona, the Mescalero
Apaches, appeared poised to take it.320  When opposition within that
tribe resulted in capitulation, however, eight of the utilities still inter-
313. Erickson et al., supra note 305, at 80–81. R
314. KUED, Leon Bear, supra note 311. R
315. Gumbel, supra note 6; KUED, Leon Bear, supra note 311; see also Charles Seabrook, R
Utilities Offer Millions: Poor Utah Tribe Gambles on Nuclear Waste, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept. 22,
2002, at 1A.
316. KUED, Leon Bear, supra note 311; Peter Ritter, Nuke ‘Em! Xcel Energy Spearheads a R
High-Stakes Plan to Store Nuclear Waste on a Tiny, Dirt-Poor Indian Reservation in the Utah Desert,
CITY PAGES MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, May 12, 2004, http://www.citypages.com/content/
printVersion/14839.
317. KUED, Leon Bear, supra note 311. R
318. KUED, Skull Valley: The Documentary: Interview with Danny Quintana, http://
www.kued.org/productions/skullvalley/documentary/interviews/quintana.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2009).
319. M.V. Rajeev Gowda & Doug Easterling, Nuclear Waste and Native America: The MRS
Siting Exercise, 9 RISK 229, 235–36 (1998).
320. Noah Sachs, The Mescalero Apache Indians and Monitored Retrievable Storage of Spent
Nuclear Fuel: A Study in Environmental Ethics, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 881, 885–86 (1996). See
generally Wendell Chino, Comment, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 913 (1996) (responding to Sachs,
supra); Louis G. Leonard III, Comment, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environmental
Justice in the Mescalero Apache’s Decision to Store Nuclear Waste, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 651
(1997) (analyzing the attempt of the Mescalero Apache Tribe to site an MRS facility).
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ested in proceeding began negotiations anew when the Skull Valley
Goshutes approached them.321  On May 20, 1997, the tribe entered
into a lease agreement with the corporate entity, Private Fuel Storage,
L.L.C. (“PFS”), representing the utility consortium.  Three days later,
the BIA conditionally approved the lease.322
The reasons the Goshutes wanted the waste were as plain as their
intent to seek it out.  Repeatedly, tribal members pointed to what an
infusion of money could provide for the dwindling band.  The PFS
facility “will benefit us with education, schools, housing and health for
our people,” noted Mary Allen.323  Indeed, the Goshutes planned to
use the PFS money not simply for services, but to revitalize their na-
tion as “a bottom-line tool for cultural survival.”324  “A lot of people
have been away from the reservation because there’s not many jobs.
So, this would be a good opportunity for many to come and live on
the reservation . . . .”325  The PFS project would create jobs, and the
money it would give the tribe also would pay for houses, roads, schol-
arships, a school, health insurance, and a health clinic.326  In other
words, the Goshutes saw in the PFS project not just the possibility of
helping members return, but also of “keep[ing] them there.”327
That storing nuclear waste on their land could deliver such a tri-
bal regathering is perhaps why Goshutes are so quick to mention the
future when asked about the project.  It is also likely the reason why
the adult members of the tribe voted by a two-to-one margin to bring
PFS’s waste to Skull Valley.328  “[A]ctually what we’re doing [is] for
the next generation, next couple of generations . . . [s]o they can have
the sovereignty, the knowledge to make decisions for the tribe,” says
Bear.329  “The reservation is a hard life . . . . But we survived.”330  Con-
tinuing this survival, of course, ultimately depends on the Goshutes’
right to define who they are—their right to sovereignty.  And the tribe
very much sees that sovereignty as bound up in their choice to accept
321. Sachs, supra note 320, at 888–90; Seabrook, supra note 315. R
322. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Approval of Lease (May 23, 1997)
(on file with author).
323. PFS, Mary Allen, supra note 309. R
324. Lewis, supra note 3, at 321. R
325. PFS, Mary Allen, supra note 309. R
326. Lewis, supra note 3, at 321; Private Fuel Storage, Voices For PFS: Leon Bear, http:// R
www.privatefuelstorage.com/voices/bear.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
327. Lewis, supra note 3, at 321. R
328. Id. at 319; Lawrence Bear Telephone Interview, supra note 283; KUED, Leon Bear, R
supra note 311. R
329. Id.
330. Dennis Romboy & Lucinda Dillon Kinkead, A Time of Change—Industry Plans Cause
Discord in, out of Tribes, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Sept. 26, 2006, at A1.
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nuclear waste.  “[S]overeignty,” one writer visiting Skull Valley suc-
cinctly observed, “equals survival.”331  Bear concurs.  “Sovereignty—
that’s what we’ve held onto.”332
C. “Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia”
Despite general tribal support, the decision to go forward with
the PFS project was not without dissent.  Margene Bullcreek, one of
the few Goshutes actually living on the reservation, was so strongly
opposed that she formed a grassroots group, Ohngo Guadadeh Devia,
meaning “timber setting community,” in an effort to put brakes on
the plans.333  That group saw the possibility of a PFS facility as too
risky, the presence of nuclear waste in Skull Valley as inconsistent with
Goshute tradition, the tribal leadership as unyielding and corrupt,
and the very idea of the project as smacking of environmental ra-
cism.334  “Why are they sacrificing our lives and our future lives for
331. Timothy Egan, New Prosperity Brings New Conflict to Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
8, 1998, at 1.
332. Id.
333. Margene Bullcreek, Skull Valley Goshutes, 8 VOICES FROM THE EARTH No. 2 (2007),
available at http://www.sric.org/voices/2007/v8n2/skull_valley_goshutes.html.
334. Charges of environmental racism, or environmental injustice, surrounding the
Goshute-PFS dispute are manifold.  The first attack is that the very scheme of monitored
retrievable storage was structurally racist from the outset, as it was designed to prey upon
tribes’ often dire economic situations.  Another level of criticism is that utilities, including
the PFS coalition, expressly targeted tribes, seeing their sovereignty as a loophole around
what was sure to be “not in my backyard” activism in non-native localities and states. See,
e.g., Margene Bullcreek, Guest Lecture at S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah,
Environmental Justice Seminar (Nov. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Bullcreek Lecture] (“It was
environmental racism, genocide . . . . The economic development was a carrot to say [to]
any tribe, ‘We’re going to bring prosperity to your land with nuclear waste . . . . They knew
that we had sovereignty, and they knew that would be an easy way to get the project on our
land.”).
Another layer of environmental justice critique is that regardless of whether the PFS
dispute is indicative of typical distributional environmental justice problems, it represents a
kind of “procedural environmental injustice” presaged by “a prolonged process of histori-
cal colonialism over [the Goshute] people and land [that] has produced a landscape of
injustice in which the tribe’s choices have been severely structurally limited.”  Noriko
Ishiyama, Environmental Justice and American Indian Tribal Sovereignty: Case Study of a Land-Use
Conflict in Skull Valley, Utah, 35 ANTIPODE 119, 135 (2003) [hereinafter Ishiyama, Case
Study]; accord Noriko Ishiyama, Environmental Justice and American-Indian Sovereignty:
Political, Economic, and Ethnic Struggles Regarding the Storage of Radioactive Waste
12–18, 226–35 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file with
Rutgers Library, Rutgers University).  In this view, “Even if the tribe makes an informed
decision to host the PFS facility . . . they never participated in the decision-making process
leading to production of nuclear waste or to the absence of alternate means of economic
survival in the desert landscape.”  Ishiyama, Case Study, supra, at 135.
Further still, some charge that the very possibility of nuclear waste on native lands is
environmental injustice because such waste is inconsistent with traditional Indian ways.
See, e.g., Annie Gracie Ross, One Mother Earth, One Doctor Water: A Story About Environ-
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their own greed[?],” Bullcreek lamented.335  “Yet again, like the Mes-
calero Apache in New Mexico . . . our sovereign reservation is being
targeted by aggressive, giant energy corporations and complicit gov-
ernment agencies . . . . We do not want this radioactive waste dump on
our sacred land.”336
Sammy Blackbear, another tribal member, agreed with this tradi-
tionalist critique.  He viewed the PFS plan not only as corrupting tri-
bal custom but as corroding the band’s future:
[W]hether or not people like it . . . the land is not ours.  It
never was ours and never will be.  We’re caretakers of the
land.  We’re [supposed] to take care of it for the next gener-
ation and I don’t see us doing that [by] putting a nuclear
facility there.337
The prospect of nuclear waste so troubled Blackbear that he al-
leged the project would “diminish[ ] who we are,”338 even accusing
Bear—his cousin—of “trying to use our own sovereignty against
us.”339  “[Our] tribal sovereignty has been waived,” Blackbear de-
clared.340  “Leon sold it to them . . . . He can’t do that but he did it
anyway.”341
Blackbear’s accusations, it turned out, ran deep indeed.  He ar-
gued that entering into the PFS lease was not just improvident, but
“illegal.”342  Some tribal members also alleged that Bear had shut out
those members who disagreed with the waste plan, depriving them of
mental Justice in the Age of Nuclearism, a Native American View 451 (2002) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Davis) (on file with University of California at
Davis Library, University of California at Davis) (“Nuclearism is the opposite of eco-philo-
sophic community principles of maintenance of Mother Earth ecological integrity . . . .”);
Bullcreek Lecture, supra (arguing that accepting the waste was inconsistent with Goshute
tradition and not worth “losing what little we have left”). But see Lewis, supra note 3, at R
333–35 (contending that such views oversimplify the complexities of the dispute in the
context of modern realities and native self-determination).
335. Brent Israelsen, Nuclear Panel Begins Hearings on Skull Valley Plan, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
June 3, 1998, at B3.
336. Press Release, Public Citizen, Opposition to Private Fuel Storage Mounts from Pub-
lic Interest Groups and Tribes (Apr. 4, 2005), available at http://www.citizen.org/press-
room/print_release.cfm?ID=1911.
337. KUED, Skull Valley: The Documentary: Interview with Sammy Blackbear, http://
www.kued.org/productions/skullvalley/documentary/interviews/blackbear.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter KUED, Sammy Blackbear].
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Tracylee Clarke, An Ideographic Analysis of Native American Sovereignty in the State of
Utah: Enabling Denotative Dissonance and Constructing Irreconcilable Conflict, 17 WICAZO SA REV.
43, 57 (2002).
341. KUED, Sammy Blackbear, supra note 337. R
342. Id.
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project monies and a forum to be heard.343  The way Goshute govern-
ance traditionally had been carried out was through consensus-build-
ing and agreement, not majoritarian division, and Bear had broken
with that tradition here.344  Bear’s term as chairman, in fact, was set to
expire in 2004, but he canceled seven straight elections on the
grounds of an insufficient quorum, thus keeping himself in power as
acting chairman.345  In response, Blackbear claimed the chairmanship
via a September 2001 election that was not recognized by the BIA.
Ultimately, Blackbear and those who claimed tribal leadership with
him pled guilty to criminal charges of theft for withdrawing and
spending over $40,000 from tribal accounts.346  Bear, for his part, also
was investigated and, facing federal embezzlement charges, pled guilty
to tax evasion.347  He received three years of probation, an order to
pay $13,101 in back taxes, and agreed to return over $30,000 to the
tribe.348
As intratribal political strife swirled, Bullcreek’s Ohngo
Guadadeh Devia only garnered further strength.  Support for their
cause poured in.  The Confederated Goshute Tribe in Deep Creek
loudly voiced opposition to the PFS plan.  They intervened in the pro-
ject’s ongoing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) licensing
proceeding,349 worrying that the project would “irreparabl[y] dam-
age” the character of the area.350  Other tribal forces also joined the
fight.  Winona LaDuke, a nationally known Native American and envi-
343. Judy Fahys, The High Price of Dissent, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 6, 2003, at B1.  That Bear
rewarded those who sided with him on the PFS debate, such as through the purchase of
new prefabricated homes or cars, and punished those who opposed him, by consistently
withholding such benefits or otherwise selectively targeting them with tribal governmental
action, was a recurring theme throughout the dispute. See Lewis, supra note 3, at 326–29; R
Bullcreek Lecture, supra note 334. R
344. Interview with Margene Bullcreek, Chairperson, Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia, in Salt
Lake City, Utah (Mar. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Bullcreek Interview].  Indeed, apparently be-
cause Bear previously had been authorized to enter into business agreements on the tribe’s
behalf as a general matter, some members reported learning about the PFS deal from the
morning newspaper.  Bullcreek Lecture, supra note 334. R
345. Deborah Bulkeley, Goshute Elections Are Contested, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Nov. 3,
2006, at B4.
346. Geoffrey Fattah, Goshute Is Ordered to Repay Stolen Funds, DESERET MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 29, 2005, at B3; Goshute Sentenced, Ordered to Repay Funds, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Jan.
5, 2006, at B2.
347. Roosevelt, supra note 2, at A11. R
348. Id.
349. Brief of the Confederated Tribes of the Goshute Reservation on Standing, Private
Fuel Storage, No. 72-22 (NRC May 8, 1998) (on file with author).
350. Letter from John Paul Kennedy, Counsel for Confederated Tribes of the Goshute
Reservation, to Mark S. Delligatti, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Dec. 8, 2000) (on file
with author).
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ronmental justice advocate, brought her group’s heft to the table.
“The problem of nuclear waste is not solved when the ‘solution’ is to
dump it on Indian lands,” LaDuke urged.351  But concern was not lim-
ited to those espousing traditional tribal culture and interests.
Churches,352 including the Mormons, environmental groups,353 and
many others weighed in vociferously against the project.354
Soon, the groundswell of opposition was overwhelming.  Only a
few years earlier, most Utahns had never heard of Skull Valley.  Now
the Goshutes were an international news item.  From a political stand-
point, that did not bode well for the tribe’s nuclear proposal.
D. “Over My Dead Body”
Utah’s governor at the time, Michael Leavitt, wanted to stop the
Goshutes’ plan before it was even set.  When the idea of a federal MRS
was still alive, the Goshutes had sought a third federal study grant, this
time for $2.8 million.355  Leavitt’s reaction when he caught wind of
this was unequivocal.  “This is an over-my-dead-body issue,” he an-
nounced to reporters.  “They may be able to get a grant, but I guaran-
tee they’ll never get a permit to move waste over our borders.”356
Of course, by the time the Goshutes inked their deal with PFS,
they were already seeking just such a permit.  Shortly after the lease
was signed, PFS filed an application with the NRC for a license to store
waste for up to forty years on Goshute land.357  Under longstanding
law, it was this federal agency—not Utah—that would decide whether
351. Brenda Norrell, Federal Energy Bill, Economic Opportunity or Bush’s Fire Sale?, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Aug. 17, 2005.
352. Joe Bauman, No to N-storage, LDS Say, DESERET MORNING NEWS, May 5, 2006, at A1;
Judy Fahys, Unitarian Congregation Throws Weight Behind Anti-N-Waste Campaign, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Dec. 15, 2001, at A8.
353. See, e.g., Joe Bauman, NRC Chief’s Comments Anger Foes of N-Waste, DESERET MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 16, 2005, at B1 (Sierra Club); Patty Henetz, N-Waste Protesters Rally at Skull Val-
ley, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 10, 2004, at B3 (Health Environment Alliance of Utah, or HEAL
Utah).
354. See, e.g., Brent Israelsen, Leavitt Leads Angry Opposition to N-Waste on Goshute Reserva-
tion, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 28, 2000, at A1 (Utah Downwinders, an anti-nuclear group);
Donna M. Kemp, Utahns Unite to Fight N-Site, DESERET NEWS, July 26, 2000, at B1 (Citizens
Against Nuclear Waste, an activist group whose members include a group of mayors and
former politicians).  Even cultural icons like the musical group the Indigo Girls, rock star
Ani DiFranco, and actor James Cromwell, star of the movie Babe, joined the opposition.
Robert Gehrke, Nuclear Dump’s Foes Enlisting Star Power, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 26, 2005, at
B4.
355. Jim Woolf, E. Utah Goshutes Seek Funds for N-Dump Study, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 12,
1993, at A1.
356. Id.
357. Wilson Dizard III, License Sought for Private Storage Site, as Opponents Seek Law to Block
Project, NUCLEAR FUEL, June 30, 1997, at 1.
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the storage proposal was safe.358  Still, Governor Leavitt was unmoved:
“We don’t produce it.  We don’t benefit from it and we don’t want to
store it for those who do.  We think it’s unsafe in the context of our
community . . . [and] inconsistent with our vision of what we want this
state to be.”359
The Goshutes, however, had arrived at their own vision of what
they wanted their nation to be and, dissenters aside, were certain the
project was safe.  “[We] would never compromise . . . to harm any of
our children, the tribe, the land or the territory around it,” Bear
promised.360  Slowly, the federal government appeared to be conclud-
ing this was true.  As part of its review of the proposed license, the
NRC prepared an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) as re-
quired under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).361
The BIA, because it bore responsibility for the lease approval, and the
Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), because the project called for
rights-of-way on federal land for rail facilities, also participated in the
evaluation.362  When the EIS was complete, the NRC recommended
that the storage plan proceed.363
The EIS evaluated a number of possibilities in which nuclear
waste might be stored on Goshute land, including two different sites
on the reservation and a separate non-Goshute site in Wyoming.364
Another possibility the EIS explored was a “no action” alternative in
which the PFS facility would not be built at all, just as Governor Leavitt
asked.365  Despite these options, the EIS found that construction, op-
eration, and shipping to the waste facility was likely to have minimal
358. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297h-13 (2000)) (giving the NRC authority to regulate the
safety aspects of the construction and operation of nuclear plants); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983) (construing the
Atomic Energy Act as giving the NRC exclusive authority over safety aspects of nuclear
plant construction and operation, but reserving to states “their traditional responsibil-
ity . . . for determining questions of need, reliability, [and] cost” for such facilities); see also
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 80–82 (1990) (applying Pacific Gas & Electric Co.’s
reading of the Atomic Energy Act in the tort liability context); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1984) (same).
359. KUED, Skull Valley: The Documentary: Interview with Governor Michael Leavitt,
http://www.kued.org/productions/skullvalley/documentary/interviews/leavitt.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter KUED, Michael Leavitt].
360. Christopher Smith, Tribes Still Considering Storing Radioactive Fuel, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Dec. 28, 1993, at D3.
361. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2000).
362. FEIS, supra note 4, at i.  The Surface Transportation Board also participated. Id. R
363. Id. at liv.
364. Id. at xxxiii.
365. Id.; KUED, Michael Leavitt, supra note 359. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-2\MLR202.txt unknown Seq: 51 26-FEB-09 11:15
340 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68:290
environmental impacts.  Indeed, the EIS specifically deemed the risk
of radiological harm both to the public and workers as “small.”366
“The potential impacts of accidents” from the waste’s shipment, the
EIS reported, for example, “are . . . no greater than the equivalent
of . . . 0.042 [fatalities] among members of the public along the [ship-
ment’s] rail routes . . . over a 20-year period.”367  Thus, the NRC
green-lighted the project from an environmental perspective.  “The
preferred alternative of the NRC staff is the proposed action . . . .”368
The other agencies concurred.  As the EIS stated for the BIA, “the BIA
preferred alternative is the proposed action.  The proposed action . . .
would have no significant adverse impacts but would have significant
economic benefits for the Skull Valley Band.”369
Fearing where federal decisionmakers were headed, the Utah
state government sprung into action.  The NRC issued its draft EIS in
June 2000.370  By March 2001, Leavitt had delivered on his promise.
He signed into law a series of bills attempting to prevent the delivery
of high-level nuclear waste into the state.371  The bills specifically
targeted PFS.  Among other things, they presumptively “prohibited”
the siting of high-level nuclear waste transfer, storage, treatment, or
disposal facilities within the state’s “exterior boundaries”;372 erected a
complex state permitting scheme should the NRC license such a facil-
ity; and barred localities from providing municipal services to any
such site.373  PFS and the Goshutes immediately responded in kind.
They filed a federal lawsuit urging invalidation of these new laws.  The
courts sided with the Goshutes, striking down much of the statutes as
366. FEIS, supra note 4, at xxxvii.  The EIS defined “small” as effects that “are not detect- R
able or are so minor that they will neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important
attribute of the resource.” Id. at xxxviii.
367. Id. at lxxx.
368. Id. at liv.
369. Id. at lv.
370. News Release, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, NRC Requests Comments on
Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Proposed Spent Fuel Facility in Utah; Sched-
ules Meetings (June 20, 2000), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/
2000/00-099.html.  The FEIS was issued in December 2001.  FEIS, supra note 4, at i. R
371. See Judy Fahys, Lawmakers Sit on Anti-Nuke Bills, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 28, 2001, at D1
(explaining Governor Leavitt’s efforts to obtain approval of anti-nuclear bills).
372. UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-3-301(1) (2007).
373. See Act of Feb. 16, 2001, 2001 Utah Laws 107 (prohibiting a county from providing
municipal-type services to a site under consideration for a high-level nuclear storage facility
and mandating planning by the county if the federal government authorizes such place-
ment); Act of Feb. 16, 2001, 2001 Utah Laws 269 (requiring a study on and “long-term
strategic plan” for “economic development on the Native American reservations within the
state” as part of the state’s efforts “to prevent siting of any nuclear waste facility . . . within
the state”).
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preempted by federal regulation.374  Leavitt, however, was not done.
“I’m shooting every bullet I can muster, at every target I can find when
it comes to this matter,” he stated.375  “We’re going to use every legis-
lative tool, every political tool, every environmental tool, and every
litigation tool we can find to keep this high level nuclear waste out of
our state,” he vowed.  “We don’t want it here.  We don’t want it here
now.  We don’t want it in the future.  We don’t ever want it here.”376
E. “Another Nail in the Coffin”
It perhaps was not a coincidence, but the political discourse over
the Goshutes’ proposal dealt heavily in a rhetoric of death.  Leavitt
first said that nuclear waste would come over his “dead body,” and
Utah’s other prominent politicians, now sounding in a chorus of op-
position, followed his lead.
Facing the prospect of imminent NRC licensure, Utah’s five-
member congressional delegation wrote the NRC urging disapproval.
The delegation was particularly troubled by the reservation’s proxim-
ity to Hill Air Force Base and the 7,000 F-16 fighter jets making train-
ing flights over the area each year, as well as the broader post-
September 11 terrorism concerns from having so much spent fuel
stored above ground in one place.  “[W]e find it inconceivable,” the
delegation wrote, “that a government entity would consider giving its
endorsement of the PFS plan without thoroughly taking into account
this added terrorist threat.”377  Orrin Hatch, Utah’s senior senator,
elaborated: “In my view, the plan is already dead on arrival . . . . This is
a reckless, dangerous proposal, and I am pulling out all the stops to
make sure this waste never makes a home in Utah.”378
374. Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Leavitt, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1250 (D.
Utah 2002), aff’d, Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1254
(10th Cir. 2004).  The Goshutes’ challenge was only one in a bevy of litigation surrounding
the dispute. See, e.g., Ohngo Gaudadeh Devia v. NRC, 492 F.3d 421, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(appealing the NRC license); Bullcreek v. NRC, 359 F.3d 536, 537 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (ques-
tioning the NRC’s authority to issue a license); Utah v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 256 F.3d
967, 969 (10th Cir. 2001) (challenging the DOI’s redaction of the lease agreement); Utah
v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 210 F.3d 1193, 1194–95 (10th Cir. 2000) (appealing the de-
nial of intervention in a lease approval proceeding).
375. KUED, Michael Leavitt, supra note 359. R
376. Id.
377. Letter from Robert F. Bennett, U.S. Senator, to Nils J. Diaz, Chairman, NRC (Mar.
17, 2005) (on file with author).
378. Press Release, Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator, Skull Valley Fight Just Beginning
(Sept. 9, 2005), http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.
Home.
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The delegation, and Hatch in particular, began exerting all kinds
of political pressure indicative of just how controversial the Goshute
proposal had become.  The first step was to push investors out of PFS.
It did not take long.  By December 2005, two of PFS’s biggest backers,
the Southern Company and Xcel Energy, PFS’s majority stockholder,
announced that they would no longer support the project.379  Given
that five of the other six investors previously had halted funding,
Hatch saw this as the beginning of the end.  ‘“This marks the first nail
in the coffin for PFS,’” Hatch said.  “ ‘The PFS plan has been on life
support for some time, and we’re removing the feeding tubes.’”380
As 2005 ground to a close, it appeared that the Utah political
strategy might be slowing any momentum the project had achieved.
On September 9, 2005—more than eight years after PFS had submit-
ted its application—the NRC cleared the way for issuance of a li-
cense.381  That decision affirmed a two-to-one ruling by the NRC’s
adjudicative arm, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, that
there was a less than one-in-a-million chance per year that an F-16
would crash into the site and breach a storage cask.382
Spurred on by this result, Utah’s political leaders redoubled their
efforts.  Hatch convinced the DOI to take the admittedly “rare move”
of reopening the public comment period on the proposed rail facility
rights-of-way proposal.383  Utah’s new governor, Jon M. Huntsman Jr.,
also repeatedly pronounced his opposition, promising to “lie prostrate
on the train tracks to keep this out of our state.”384  And, in one of the
most worrying maneuvers to that point for PFS proponents, Utah
379. Letter from J. Barnie Beasley Jr., President & CEO, Southern Co., to Orrin G.
Hatch, U.S. Senator (Dec. 7, 2005) (on file with author); Letter from Richard C. Kelly,
President & CEO, Xcel Energy, to Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator (Dec. 8, 2005) (on file
with author).
380. Press Release, Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator, Major PFS Partners Backing Out of
Skull Valley Plan (Dec. 8, 2005), http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
PressReleases.Home (quoting Hatch).  The next week, a third company, Florida Power &
Light, also agreed to back away.  Suzanne Struglinski, 3rd Investor Abandons PFS Project for N-
Waste, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Dec. 14, 2005, at A1.
381. Private Fuel Storage, 62 N.R.C. 403, 405 (2005).
382. Id.  The Panel’s decision overruled its earlier determination that there was too
great a chance—four-in-a-million per year—that an F-16 would crash into the site, as op-
posed to the lower probability later assessed of also breaching a canister.  Private Fuel
Storage, No. 72-22-IFSI, at 4 (NRC Feb. 24, 2005) (on file with author).
383. Press Release, Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator, Interior to Re-Evaluate PFS Lease
(Dec. 9, 2005), http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.
Home; see also Notice of Request for Comments, 71 Fed. Reg. 6286 (Feb. 7, 2006) (request-
ing public comments on the application made by PFS to store spent fuel on the Goshute’s
land).
384. Roosevelt, supra note 2. R
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Congressman Rob Bishop, with the aid of fellow House members
Chris Cannon and Jim Matheson, succeeded in attaching to a defense
spending bill a measure designating a vast expanse of federal land
north of the Goshute reservation—over 100,000 acres—as a formal
“wilderness area.”385
The wilderness designation built on an earlier effort by Governor
Leavitt to erect a “land moat” around the Goshutes.386  The idea was
simple: If the Goshutes could not use surrounding transportation cor-
ridors to move waste to the site, whether they had a storage license
would be irrelevant.  Governor Leavitt effectively had seized control of
nearby railroad crossings and county roads,387 but those laws had
been struck down in the courts with the other state measures.388  The
wilderness effort, as a congressional mandate, avoided the earlier mea-
sure’s federalism problem.  That it was anything other than a road-
block to the PFS site, however, was not lost on anyone.  Ecstatic at the
authorization, Lawson LeGate, a Sierra Club representative,
explained:
Utah is not the nation’s dumping ground for high-level nu-
clear waste.  With the passage of this legislation, not only will
Utah get its first new wilderness area in two decades, but
Congress will have taken the first significant step in protect-
ing Utahns and other Americans from transportation and
storage of this dangerous material.389
Indeed, with the bill’s passage, the Utah political campaign saw
its target in sight.  “We have created wilderness the right way,” Repre-
sentative Bishop attested.  “We have moved forward in the effort to
prevent nuclear spent fuel rods from reaching the Goshute Reserva-
tion.  We have put another nail in the coffin of PFS . . . .”390
385. Id.; see also Utah National Guard Readiness Act, H.R. 3651, 110th Cong. § 2 (2006).
The land was designated the Cedar Mountain Wilderness Area.  National Defense Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 384, 119 Stat. 3136, 3217.
386. Clarke, supra note 340, at 53. R
387. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 54-4-15, 72-3-301, 72-4-125(4) (2000).
388. Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1252–53 (10th Cir.
2004).
389. Press Release, Wilderness Soc’y, Utah Wilderness Coalition Calls Success on Cedar
Mountain Wilderness a Victory for All (Dec. 16, 2005) (on file with author).
390. Press Release, Bob Bennett, U.S. Senator, UTTR-PFS Provision Included in Final
Defense Bill (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.senate.gov/~bennett/press/record.cfm?id=
249988.
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F. “Skull Valley Is Dead”
The politicians did not let up.  By the summer of 2006, Mike Lee,
Huntsman’s general counsel, characterized the ongoing legal, litiga-
tion, and policy efforts this way: “We will leave no stone unturned.  It
may take years, but . . . we will end this plan and dance gleefully on its
grave when it’s dead.”391  Within three months, Lee had his wish.  On
September 7, the BLM and the BIA issued companion “Records of
Decision” on the EIS, denying the PFS rights-of-way applications and
reversing the earlier lease approval, respectively.392
The decisions were curious documents.  It was not particularly
surprising that the BLM denied PFS’s rights-of-way requests, given that
the proposed rail spur would need to cross the newly named wilder-
ness area, which had been designed to prevent this very thing.393  Nor
could one claim that PFS’s proposed right-of-way for a rail-to-truck
transfer facility necessarily comported with the public interest, when
movement by truck would entail making 4,000 trips down a 20-foot-
wide road using 150-foot-long, 12-foot-wide tractor trailers.394  But it
also was plain that the decisions were based more heavily in politics
than reasoned decisionmaking, and the denial of the Goshute-PFS
lease was another matter altogether.
Both the BLM and the BIA, recall, had explicitly declared in the
EIS their preference for construction of the PFS facility.395  Now, in
the face of staunch political opposition and the flood of public com-
ments from the “exceedingly rare” reopened comment period the
politicians had requested,396 the agencies had flip-flopped.  The rea-
sons given for this change of heart were transparent.  The BLM, for
391. Michael Riley, Trainload of Debate over Nuke Storage, DENV. POST, June 11, 2006, at A1
(quoting Mike Lee, Chief Counsel for Utah Governor Jon Huntsman).
392. Record of Decision Addressing Right-of-Way Applications U 76985 and U 76986
(Bureau of Land Mgmt. Sept. 7, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter BLM ROD];
Record of Decision for the Construction and Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Installation (Bureau of Indian Affairs Sept. 7, 2006) (on file with author) [herein-
after BIA ROD].
393. See BLM ROD, supra note 392, at 8–10 (explaining that one of the bases for BLM’s R
decision was that the rail line would impact the wilderness in a way that was incompatible
with the wilderness values contemplated by Congress).
394. See id. at 11 (detailing the dimensions and physical parameters that would restrict
heavy-haul trailers); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(7) (2000) (giving the Secretary of the Inte-
rior and the Secretary of Agriculture the power to extend or renew rights-of-way on public
lands to facilitate “necessary transportation or other systems or facilities which are in the
public interest”).
395. FEIS, supra note 4, at liv–lv. R
396. Audio: Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Comments at Senate Republican Conference
(Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://src.senate.gov/public/_files/radio/hatchenviron09_07_
06.mp3 [hereinafter Hatch, Radio Interview].
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instance, repeatedly cited letters from citizens of Utah and Senators
Bennett and Hatch, translating those comments into reasons for its
decision.397
The BIA’s treatment was even more striking.  Though the Bureau
gave lip service to its duty to “conform to the fiduciary standard nor-
mally placed upon the United States,”398 and though placing high-
level nuclear waste on Goshute land certainly falls within the agency’s
statutory mandate of giving “adequate consideration” to a lease’s “ef-
fect on the environment,”399 the BIA’s decision seemed determined to
emphasize the agency’s “broad discretion” in how it carries out its
trust responsibility for lease approvals.400  The BIA was fully “cogni-
zant” and “aware” of the “income” and “economic benefit” the project
would provide the Goshutes, and it was deliberate in reassuring the
tribe that these factors “weighed heavily in [its] consideration of the
proposed lease.”401  Nevertheless, the BIA reminded that under stat-
ute, it was the Secretary’s role to balance “the long-term viability of the
Skull Valley Goshute reservation as a homeland for the Band (and the
implications for preservation of Tribal culture and life) against the
benefits and risks from economic development activities.”402  Making
that calculation, the Bureau decided that the lease was not in the
tribe’s best interest for a litany of reasons.  Among others, the EIS did
not evaluate the impacts of moving waste “away from” the reservation,
even though it had expressly found the impacts of moving the waste to
it negligible.403  The Bureau could not “ascertain when [the waste]
might leave,”404 even though the EIS specifically considered this and
the NRC license was limited to a total of forty possible years plus
397. See BLM ROD, supra note 392, at 13–16 (referencing comments from Utah’s citi- R
zens and politicians).
398. BIA ROD, supra note 392, at 17. R
399. 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (2006).
400. BIA ROD, supra note 392, at 16.  Courts have recognized such discretion, subject to R
statutory and fiduciary limitations. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 538, 562–63
(1998); Webster v. United States, 823 F. Supp. 1544, 1549 (D. Mont. 1992). See generally
Reid Peyton Chambers & Monroe E. Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and the
Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1074–75 (1974) (discussing the Act of Aug.
9, 1955, Pub. L. No. 255, 69 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (2006))).
401. BIA ROD, supra note 392, at 19. R
402. Id. at 18.
403. Id. at 21.
404. Id. at 26 (emphasis removed).  This certainly was a concern that Utah and public
interest groups fighting the proposal expressed it repeatedly.  Given the immense delay in
completing Yucca Mountain, one indeed must question how much political weight the
NRC might actually muster once any nuclear repository, whether “temporary” or not, com-
mences operation. Cf. infra note 554. R
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decommissioning.405  And there was no assurance of law enforcement
on the reservation, even though the NRC gave “exhaustive considera-
tion” to the proposed site’s “security,”406 and PFS had forged a contract
with Tooele County to provide all necessary emergency, fire, police,
and other municipal services for the site.407
Utah’s politicians were just as enthusiastic to receive these deci-
sions as they were ready to take credit for pushing the agencies to
them.  Representative Matheson, noting that he had sent comments
to the BLM, praised the result: “Utahns stand united against the East
Coast dumping its nuclear garbage on the West.  Today’s decisions
prove that perseverance pays and I couldn’t be more relieved.”408
Senator Hatch likewise declared the two decisions a “killing blow” to
the PFS project.409  “With today’s DOI decision, the PFS plan has been
burned to the ground.”410  “As far as I can see it, Skull Valley is now
stone cold dead.”411
Today, it is perhaps unclear whether there truly is no hope at all
left for the PFS project.  In July 2007, PFS and the tribe together sued
the DOI challenging the September 2006 decisions;412 that case re-
mains pending.413  What is clear, however, is that given the daunting
setbacks the project has already incurred, even if the parties win in
405. FEIS, supra note 4, at xxxii, 2-32, 2-33; Private Fuel Storage, 60 N.R.C. 125, 143 R
(2004).
406. BIA ROD, supra note 392, at 24. R
407. Agreement Between Private Fuel Storage L.L.C. and Tooele County, Utah, § 3, at
4–5 (May 23, 2000) (on file with author); see also Utah Lawmakers Take Aim at PFS Facility,
NUCLEAR FUEL, Mar. 5, 2001, at 8 (noting that Tooele County had agreed to dispatch of-
ficers to the storage site); Judy Fahys, Tooele Signs Deal for N-Waste, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 25,
2000, at B1 (noting that the agreement between Tooele County and PFS stipulated that an
annual payment would be made to the county for the provision of police and fire services).
408. Press Release, Jim Matheson, U.S. Congressman, Nix on Goshute Lease Could be
Final Blow to Radioactive Waste Dump (Sept. 7, 2006), http://matheson.house.gov/
press2006/060907b.shtml.
409. Press Release, Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator, Utahns Deliver Killing Blow to Skull Val-
ley Nuke Waste Plan (Sept. 7, 2006), http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAc-
tion=PressReleases.Home [hereinafter Hatch, Utahns Deliver Killing Blow].
410. Id.
411. Hatch, Radio Interview, supra note 396; see also Press Release, Bob Bennett, U.S. R
Senator, Bennett Hails News that PFS Loses Final Push to Bring Nuclear Waste to Utah
(Sept. 7, 2006), http://bennett.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=262652 (quoting Senator
Bennett that “[t]his ends any possibility that the Goshute facility will ever be used for the
storage of high-level nuclear waste”).
412. See Amended Complaint at 2–3, Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Cason, No.
2:07cv00526 (D. Utah July 20, 2007).  In turn, Utah and others have challenged the NRC
license issuance, though that case has been held in abeyance because the court deemed it
unripe based on the ambiguity of whether the project would proceed.  Ohngo Gaudadeh
Devia v. NRC, 492 F.3d 421, 422–23 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
413. This was true as of February 12, 2009.
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court, overcoming the tremendous opposition they face in Utah will
require something on the order of a miracle.  Hatch was right.  In all
likelihood, “PFS is dead.  It’s that simple.”414
The broader question that the Goshutes’ saga raises, though, is
not whether PFS is dead but whether, as Hatch put it clearly referring
to PFS, “Skull Valley is . . . dead.”415  For the story of the Goshutes’
plan to store nuclear waste did not begin with spent fuel rods.  It be-
gan with sovereignty.  It was the tribe’s own competing visions of what
sovereignty means—Bear’s claim that the tribe was exercising sover-
eignty to “keep our traditions and our cultural resources intact,”416
and Bullcreek’s conflicting view that accepting the waste would “‘de-
stroy who we are’”417—that drove much of the conflict, that showed
just how discordant modern notions of native sovereignty can be.  And
after nearly two decades of pursuing the project, it was sovereignty’s
own internally conflicted twin—the trust doctrine—that helped end
the Goshutes’ nuclear bid.  Ultimately, it is how these two principles
interact, how they are reconciled, that will answer whether tribes pros-
per or founder in the future.  Ultimately, it is sovereignty and the trust
that will answer whether Skull Valley is still alive, or if it is dead.
IV. A CONFLICTED PROBLEM, A DIFFICULT SOLUTION: RECONCILING
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE TRUST?
The most powerful product of reconciling sovereignty and the
trust may be expressly identifying what in these doctrines pushes
tribes down and what allows them to rise—what promotes their ability
to maintain a separate Indian-ness, and what suppresses that capacity.
Using the Goshutes’ nuclear plan as a lens, the remainder of this Arti-
cle attempts that daunting task.  This Part begins by arguing that sov-
ereignty and the trust are not reconcilable.  Next, the Part reviews
previously proposed solutions for combining the doctrines.  It then
contends that none of these solutions achieves a real sovereignty-trust
reconciliation.  Accordingly, I contend that enhanced tribal sover-
eignty is the best solution, despite its potential pitfalls.  Finally, with no
pretense that the innumerable nuances and variations of Indian rela-
tions can be captured in any single proposal, I offer a beginning
414. Hatch, Utahns Deliver Killing Blow, supra note 410. R
415. Hatch, Radio Interview, supra note 396. R
416. Lewis, supra note 3, at 321. R
417. Jerry Spangler, Foes of Goshute N-Waste Plan Take Case to D.C., DESERET MORNING
NEWS, Apr. 5, 2005, at B2 (quoting Bullcreek); see also Bullcreek Lecture, supra note 334 R
(arguing that there is “more to” sovereignty than simple self-determination because one
generation has a responsibility to keep traditions alive for the next).
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framework for a new doctrinal model to pursue greater tribal
sovereignty.
A. The Dilemma
Even a brief step back reveals that tribal sovereignty and the fed-
eral trust are, on their face, irreconcilable.  On the one hand, sover-
eignty is about self-governance and self-determination; it is about
tribal power.  The trust, on the other hand, is about a federal duty to
protect Indians; it is about the submission of tribal power to a higher
authority.
The sovereignty-trust conflict is perhaps best illustrated by its per-
meation of the Goshutes’ proposal.  Most prominent was the require-
ment that the tribe receive federal approval before leasing its land.418
This requirement is well-settled statutory law, and has come to be seen
as rooted in a nominally benevolent purpose—protecting tribal terri-
tory against actual or de facto attrition, a problem so devastating to
tribes in the past.419  In this way, the trust could be seen as promoting
tribal sovereignty.  Since land is necessary for self-governance,420 a
check against its loss should limit sovereignty’s diminution as well.421
Still, the very presence of this federal oversight begs the question: If
we really believe in tribal self-determination, why should any entity
other than the tribe exercise control over how its land is used?  Na-
tions and states do not require outside approval of their land regula-
tion or disposition, precisely because that authority is seen as
definitionally sovereign.  Restricting the same power for tribes com-
municates that, because of the trust, tribal sovereignty is not really
sovereignty at all.
The Goshutes ran headlong into this doctrinal dilemma.  They
negotiated a lease with PFS that they believed would benefit their
tribe.422  This was their sovereign determination.  Nevertheless, the
418. 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (2006).
419. See Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of
Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 1002–03 (1981) (noting that the
approval requirement for leasing Indian land initially served to “protect[ ] the tribal land
base”); see also supra note 183 and accompanying text.  The actual origin of federal lease R
approval authority for Indian lands was not so benevolent; it arose in 1891 as a way to
facilitate allotment. See Chambers & Price, supra note 400, at 1071–72 (explaining that R
leasing Indian land would assist in allotment by bringing in white farmers and producing
capital).
420. See Wood, Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 121, at 1474. R
421. See Clinton, supra note 419, at 1066–67 (explaining that protecting the Indian land R
base would allow Indians to determine the destiny of their communities and prevent fed-
eral leasing programs from resulting in termination).
422. See supra Part III.B.
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BIA had to “satisfy” itself that “adequate consideration ha[d] been
given” to a variety of factors, including the leased land’s relationship
with that around it and the accompanying environmental effects.423  It
was in carrying out this obligation that the BIA attempted to balance
the Skull Valley reservation’s “long-term viability . . . as a homeland”
against the PFS project’s “benefits and risks”424—a task one would ex-
pect the tribe to perform itself if tribal sovereignty is at all meaningful.
The BIA, in fact, disagreed with the tribe’s own determination on this
front, despite the tribe’s worry that without the project, it might dwin-
dle past its current status of barely surviving.  Thus, although it is un-
common for the BIA to disapprove tribally proposed leases,425 the
Skull Valley dispute stands foremost as an example of the trust’s ability
to quash exercises of tribal sovereignty.  If that risk exists, then the
trust-sovereignty conflict does too.  The Goshute example makes clear
that the risk is real.426  When the trust and sovereignty seek to coexist,
neither thrives.  For either to have real meaning, the other must
succumb.
B. Proposed Solutions
Numerous commentators have recognized the conflict between a
robust trust doctrine and full-fledged tribal sovereignty;427 their pro-
posed solutions cover just as broad a spectrum.  At one end, some
commentators have argued for greater faith in the trust doctrine itself,
or at least a re-tooled version modified for modernity.  At the other
end, a few authors have advocated for a complete return to sover-
423. 25 U.S.C. § 415(a).
424. BIA ROD, supra note 392, at 18. R
425. See Chambers & Price, supra note 400, at 1066–67 (noting that the Secretary applies R
a limited procedure to reviewing leases and discussing the possible endangerment of tribal
self-government if the Secretary begins disapproving leases sought by tribal members);
Wood, Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 121, at 1480 (noting that, practically, “BIA simply R
approves transactions that tribal governments support”).
426. Indeed, it is not just in cases as controversial as the Goshutes’ where the sover-
eignty-trust conflict crops up. See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 508,
518 (2003) (noting that the Secretary’s responsibility to review leases and tribal autonomy
are at odds, and that the two interests require balancing). But cf. Cross, supra note 122, at R
394 (seeing trust-sovereignty tension as needlessly “zero sum”).
427. See, e.g., Gould, Tough Love, supra note 258, at 675 (characterizing the doctrines as R
“opposing”); Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From
Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1254 (1995) (calling the doctrines “ut-
terly inconsistent”); Stacy L. Leeds, Moving Toward Exclusive Tribal Autonomy over Lands and
Natural Resources, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439, 441 (2006) (recognizing the doctrines as “in-
consistent”); Skibine, Reconciling, supra note 157, at 1156 (recognizing “inherent con- R
flicts”); Wood, Protecting Native Sovereignty, supra note 217, at 113 (noting “many inevitable R
direct conflicts”).
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eignty, with a significantly diminished trust role.  Finally, in the mid-
dle are suggestions attempting to balance the two.
1. Trust-Based Solutions
Professor Mary Christina Wood offers the leading example of the
trust-based proposals.428  In a series of exhaustive articles,429 Wood en-
visioned a trust divorced from Kagama’s “plenary power”—a trust she
terms the “sovereign trusteeship.”430  This solution draws on Worces-
ter’s conception of a federal trust obligation that protects tribal self-
governance,431 though updated with a twist.
The core of this solution is “a duty to protect a viable native sepa-
ratism.”432  Specifically, Wood defines four interlinking elements of
tribal sovereignty that she argues the federal government has a duty to
protect: “(1) a stable, separate land base; (2) a viable tribal economy;
(3) self-government; and (4) cultural vitality.”433  Without each of
these attributes intact, native peoples who “embrace tribal separatism”
and traditionalism will be deprived of “the freedom to choose their
own lifestyles within the larger society.”434  Wood acknowledges that
the attributes may at times conflict; thus, she concludes that this “new
trust paradigm” must ensure “protection to all four attributes.”435
Wood’s model would provide this kind of “sovereign trust” pro-
tection at two levels.  First, it would impose upon agencies a procedu-
ral obligation to weigh proposed actions’ likely impact on the four
attributes and “affirmatively protect the tribe’s interests when it un-
dertakes action.”436  Second, this trusteeship would compel courts to
“devise a substantive test” in which they would take an “independent”
look at whether the federal action “interferes with one or more” of the
428. For examples of other trust-based proposals, see Aitken, supra note 124, at 150, R
arguing that the trust obligation is binding on all branches of government and requires the
Supreme Court to evaluate violations of the trust using strict scrutiny, and Slade, Self-Deter-
mination Era, supra note 167, at 2A-23, urging a trust responsibility that assesses tribes’ R
“short-term and long-term interests.”
429. Wood, Protecting Native Sovereignty, supra note 217; see also Mary Christina Wood, R
Fulfilling the Executive’s Trust Responsibility Toward the Native Nations on Environmental Issues: A
Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration’s Promises and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733
(1995); Wood, Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 121. R
430. See Wood, Protecting Native Sovereignty, supra note 217, at 112 (explaining that the R
trust obligation requires the federal government to protect “native separatism”).
431. Id. at 128–29.
432. Id. at 113.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 132.
435. Id. at 132, 223, 234.
436. Id. at 225.
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attributes.437  In this way, Wood’s model seeks to resolve the inherent
trust-sovereignty conflict by using the trust as a vehicle for sovereignty.
The model would require the federal government to exercise its trust
obligation in a way that promotes sovereignty’s attributes.
2. Compromise-Based Solutions
Between Wood’s “sovereign trusteeship” and solutions emphasiz-
ing sovereignty is a broad range of suggestions attempting to strike a
balance between the two.
Reid Peyton Chambers’s approach is illustrative of what might be
referred to as such “compromise-based” solutions.  Chambers adopts a
two-pronged approach.  First, to maximize sovereignty but protect
against the risk of short-term profit maximization that might erode
long-term cultural survival, he would remove the trust-based require-
ment of federal approval for “short term” tribal leases, but maintain it
for longer transactions that could “permanently or irreparably alter
reservation lands.”438  Next, he would deploy the trust to serve “as a
judicially enforced limitation upon congressional power,”439 thereby
ensuring that gains in sovereignty achieved in one branch would not
simply be taken away by the other.
Numerous other authors have offered solutions based on existing
statutory frameworks for tribal-federal contracts.  In short, these au-
thors suggest that the best way for tribes to exercise sovereignty is by
sub-contracting out trust obligation work for themselves.440  Professor
Alex Tallchief Skibine pushes that concept a step further.  He would
solve the sovereignty-trust conflict by placing tribes in a status akin to
federal trust territories such as Puerto Rico or Guam, thus allowing
each tribe to negotiate the terms of its “political relationship” with the
United States.441  Likewise, Professor Hope Babcock has propounded
a proposal to allow tribes to “nullify (or opt out of) laws that diminish”
tribal sovereignty—though she warns that tribes will have to adjust
437. Id. at 223, 231.
438. Chambers, supra note 157, at 13A-37; see also Chambers & Price, supra note 400, at R
1084, 1086 (arguing that although retraction of the approval power for short-term leases is
appropriate to limit the Secretary’s discretion, the Secretary should retain the power to
review long-term tribal leases that would alter Indian culture and tribal self-government).
439. Chambers, supra note 157, at 13A-41. R
440. See, e.g., Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 427, at 1278–79; cf. Cross, supra note 122, R
at 396 (urging a sovereignty-centric judicial canon of construction); Robert Laurence, A
Paradigmatic, Comparative, Private-Law Perspective on the Federal Trusteeship, 46 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 463, 486–87 (2006) (envisioning a “contractually based” trust including an im-
plied covenant of good faith).
441. Skibine, supra note 157, at 1116, 1156. R
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their activities when their rejection of outside laws have “undesired
spillover impacts on adjacent communities.”442
3. Sovereignty-Based Solutions
Other commentators have taken the opposite course of Wood,
arguing for greater deference to sovereignty with a concomitant
diminishment in trust obligations.  An approach espoused by Profes-
sor Kevin Gover straddles the line between compromise-based ap-
proaches and such sovereignty-based proposals.  Like Professor
Skibine, Gover would have tribes negotiate with the federal govern-
ment to determine which trust obligations each would carry out, and
which would remain at all.443  Gover anticipates, however, that tribes
would typically have full “authority over trust lands,” including, poten-
tially, “the option of alienating land without thereby losing their au-
thority over it.”444  Professor Gover’s vision is thus of tribes as socio-
cultural governmental entities irrespective of land ownership.
An even more sovereignty-centric model builds on Gover’s notion
of allowing Indian land alienation.  Professor Stacy Leeds would exe-
cute this proposal in three parts.  First, title to Indian lands would be
conveyed to tribes and allottees.445  Second, federal law would be
amended to “protect against state interference and preserve tribal au-
tonomy” over the land.446  And third, tribes would then “decide for
themselves” whether they wished to manage, alienate, or encumber
their lands, or if they instead preferred to continue federal
supervision.447
442. Babcock, supra note 202, at 448, 566. R
443. Gover, supra note 179, at 359–60. R
444. Id. at 363.
445. Leeds, supra note 427, at 456. R
446. Id. at 457.
447. Id. at 457–58.  Still others urge a return to pre-colonial Indian nation-states, or what
might be termed modern Indian “secession” from the Union.  Russel Lawrence Barsh, In-
digenous North America and Contemporary International Law, 62 OR. L. REV. 73, 123–25 (1983);
see also Erik M. Jensen, American Indian Tribes and Secession, 29 TULSA L.J. 385, 396 (1993)
(calling for the exploration of possible Indian secession); cf. Babcock, supra note 202, at R
551–53 (illustrating the problems with possible Indian secession); Wallace Coffey & Re-
becca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective
Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 191 (2001) (advocating emphasis on
“cultural,” rather than political, sovereignty); Macklem, supra note 205, at 1345 (urging R
acknowledgement that sovereignty is distributed at many levels of American government).
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C. Toward Sovereignty
Although important, these solutions do not actually reconcile sov-
ereignty and the trust as much as demonstrate how they are at odds.
Taking each class in turn shows why.
Wood’s “sovereign trusteeship,” for instance, does not truly meld
its component parts, but elevates the trust above sovereignty.  Three
broad categories typify when the trust doctrine may apply to adminis-
trative agencies: (1) when they are managing Indian resources on a
day-to-day basis, as in Mitchell II or Cobell v. Norton;448 (2) when they are
making decisions directly about Indian resources but are not exerting
day-to-day control, as in leasehold approvals; and (3) when they are
making decisions about non-Indian resources that nonetheless affect
Indians, such as the permitting of a power plant upwind of a reserva-
tion.449  In the latter of these circumstances, a sovereign trusteeship
makes eminent sense, particularly if the tribe is meaningfully con-
sulted,450 because it is in this context that the agency must balance its
special responsibility to Indians with its statutory duties owed to the
general public.451  Conversely, if either day-to-day management or a
threshold Indian resource decision is at issue, the notion of a “sover-
eign trusteeship” would seem paradoxical.452  What such a trusteeship
means in those situations is that an entity other than the tribe will
decide what is best for it—the antithesis of self-determination.
The Goshutes’ saga with nuclear waste is a paradigmatic example
of how the “sovereign trusteeship” elevates the trust over sovereignty.
Had Wood’s model applied in the Goshutes’ case, the BIA would have
been charged with assessing the project’s likely effects on each of the
four attributes of Goshute sovereignty.453  Granted, this may have
been a more enlightened determination than what agencies tradition-
448. 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  The Cobell litigation involves the federal govern-
ment’s extensive mismanagement of Indian trust funds.  Id. at 1133–34, 1136.
449. See Wood, Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 121, at 1478–80, 1489–90 (providing R
multiple examples of all three categories).
450. See Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of Enlight-
ened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, 21, 23–24 (1999)
(arguing that tribal consultation will result in better federal policies and regulations).
451. But see Wood, Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 121, at 1527–35 (citing examples of R
agencies that owe fiduciary duties to Indian Tribes when making decisions that affect
reservations).
452. If an agency is merely managing Indian trust funds, there would seem no need at
all for a sovereign trusteeship because money is the ultimate in fungibility; private trust
rules should suffice. See Wood, Protecting Native Sovereignty, supra note 217, at 116 n.13 R
(stating that when the only relevant asset is money, the Indian tribe’s interest is similar to
those in the private context).
453. Id. at 226–27.
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ally have used, but it would still put sovereignty in second place.  Even
staunch opponents of the PFS project, such as Margene Bullcreek, de-
scribe the trust as a duty to “make sure [tribes] are not being both-
ered by non-Indians.”454  But a sovereign trusteeship gives the federal
government the power to decide the tribal/non-Indian interactions
that will be allowed and those that will not.
Indeed, the Skull Valley example appears to be precisely the kind
of case Professor Wood had in mind when she acknowledged that tri-
bal land uses “often involve inherently countervailing” aspects of sov-
ereignty.455  For instance, the PFS proposal could have been seen as a
“de facto conversion[ ] of land” weighing against lease approval under
this model.456  Conversely, the project represented a substantial eco-
nomic opportunity for the tribe, another factor recognized by the sov-
ereign trusteeship model.457  Moreover, the project raised deep
questions about how to assess the model’s “cultural vitality” factor,458
when many Goshutes strongly disagreed over whether the project was
consistent with their culture.459  What is thus most telling about trust-
based approaches such as the “sovereign trusteeship” is that they wrest
from the tribe the most fundamental decisions about what a tribe is.
It is one thing to say that a tribe may invoke private trust principles to
obtain compensation when the federal government mismanages assets
the tribe never asked the government to manage in the first place.
But it is another altogether to say that bureaucrats 2,000 miles away, not
the tribe, should make the core choices about a tribe’s very definition.
Ultimately, the federal trusteeship, even a “sovereign” one, collapses
into the latter category.
Compromise-based approaches likewise do not forge a true doc-
trinal reconciliation.  Although they may moderate the circumstances
in which sovereignty and the trust conflict, they do so by tinkering
with details, not finding actual common ground.  Apply the Goshutes’
case again.  Under Chambers’ two-tiered approach, for instance, the
Goshutes could have proceeded without BIA authorization because
their twenty-five-year lease would have qualified under his definition
of “short-term.”460  But this would be a mere expansion of sovereignty,
454. Bullcreek Interview, supra note 344. R
455. Wood, Protecting Native Sovereignty, supra note 217, at 223. R
456. Id. at 149.  Numerous parties made this argument in the Goshutes’ case.
457. Id. at 150.
458. Id. at 192–95.
459. See supra Part III.B–C.  More problematic, if the model also applied to the BLM and
NRC, different agencies could have reached different results on how best to promote
Goshute sovereignty.
460. Chambers & Price, supra note 400, at 1084. R
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not a resolution of the trust-sovereignty conflict.461  The two doctrines
would still conflict, but would simply do so at a different point—at
thirty years instead of zero.
Proposals for government-to-government contracts, such as
under the Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994 or Professor Skibine’s
federal territory analogy, also leave the conflict intact.  Models such as
Skibine’s, if they are meaningful, are most likely simply to edge toward
full sovereignty, with negotiations between two governing entities
modifying or cementing jurisdictional boundaries and responsibili-
ties.  Whether a trust duty remains in that scenario would thus be vol-
untary, not mandatory as it is today.  The very idea of self-governance
agreements, by contrast, is that the federal government must first give
its approval before tribes are deemed “capable” of performing the
pertinent functions.462  This is not to diminish the clear value that
such contracts currently provide tribes,463 but their limits mean that
the trust necessarily prevails:  These agreements currently do not in-
clude many functions of self-government that tribes might desire to
perform—including leasing authority—and the tribe is not free to
unilaterally expand the list of eligible categories.464
Nor is it fair to say that the various sovereignty-based approaches
solve the doctrinal conflict.  Indeed, advocates of these approaches
effectively admit their preference for the triumph of self-determina-
tion.  As Professor Leeds writes, “The only model that will return con-
trol and autonomy to tribes is one that envisions a final end to the
federal trust of Indian lands.”465
The question thus transforms from whether the trust and sover-
eignty can be reconciled to this: Which of the two should prevail?  Per-
haps what tribes need is not further attempts at combining concepts
that have been at war for nearly two centuries, but the certainty of
which will ultimately dictate.  In that appraisal, the obvious answer, it
seems, is to move toward sovereignty.
The moral reasons for promoting sovereignty over the trust are
many.  Foremost is that the trust is unduly paternalistic and self-deter-
mination is not.  The number of scholars pointing to the trust as in-
461. See id. at 1086–87 (arguing that even if tribes are given more discretion over short-
term leases, federal approval should still be required for long-term leases).
462. King, supra note 239, at 499. R
463. Id. at 476; Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Self-Determination and Environmental Federalism:
Cultural Values as a Force for Sustainability, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 229, 236 (1998).
464. Gover, supra note 179, at 346–50. R
465. Leeds, supra note 427, at 461; cf. Gover, supra note 179, at 373 (contending that the R
problem is not with the actions of the trustees, but with “the trust itself”).
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herently racist is legion, but their message is uniform.466  What the
trust means at its core is that “mainstream” society views tribes as inca-
pable of performing basic governmental services that we readily afford
numerous other types and levels of government across the nation.467
This vision of the trust traces back to Marshall’s deeming the Cher-
okees “wards,” reached its height in the plenary power cases, and con-
tinues today.  Of the Goshutes’ nuclear choice, Senator Hatch said
this: “Even more unfortunate, Mr. President, the only tribe they could
con into taking this waste was the Skull Valley Band of the
Goshutes . . . .”468  Whether such statements are simply political hyper-
bole or something else, their message is clear.  Arguments opposing
the Goshutes’ plan dripped with assumptions and assertions of Indian
inferiority and inability.469  Indeed, perhaps the most telling moment
in Utah’s campaign against the Goshute proposal came when a num-
ber of legislators floated “Plan B”—a proposal to have Utah store the
waste instead of the Goshutes.470  It was thus virtually a foregone con-
clusion that the entire Utah congressional delegation would assert
that the DOI had “both the authority and a fiduciary responsibility” to
deny the Goshutes’ lease.471  The delegation understood what the
trust, so often, is really about: sacrificing tribal self-determination to
non-tribal authority.
466. See Joel A. Holt, Note, Treat All Men Alike: An Analysis of United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe and Suggestions for True Reparation, 38 AKRON L. REV. 413, 454 &
n.195 (2005) (citing numerous scholarly articles).
467. See, e.g., id. at 454 (“The trust doctrine, the cornerstone of federal Indian law, is
rooted in colonialist notions of Indian inferiority, dependence and barbarism.”); Johnson
& Hamilton, supra note 427, at 1253 (“By their first principles, [government] programs R
borne of paternalism assumed that American Indians were incapable of managing and
governing their own affairs.”).
468. Press Release, Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator, No Private Nuclear Waste Storage
(June 23, 2005), http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.
Home (emphasis added).
469. See, e.g., Rex A. Allen, Op-Ed., Goshutes Can’t Manage N-Waste, DESERET NEWS, Apr. 8,
2002, at A10; Judy Fahys & Robert Gehrke, Church Opposes Nuclear Dump, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Sept. 11, 2005, at B1; Kit Miniclier, Tribe Seeks Nuclear Dump Site; Officials Fear Group Can’t
Handle Duties, DENV. POST, June 17, 2001, at B8; KUED, Skull Valley: The Documentary:
Interview with Rep. James Hansen, http://www.kued.org/productions/skullvalley/docu-
mentary/interviews/hansen.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009); KUED, Skull Valley: The Doc-
umentary: Interview with Rep. James McConkie, http://www.kued.org/productions/
skullvalley/documentary/interviews/mcconkie.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
470. Donna Kemp Spangler, New Trust Land Plan: N-Waste Storage, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 5,
2003, at B1.
471. Press Release, Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator, Utah Delegation Urges Interior to
Block Skull Valley Site (Sept. 9, 2005), http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuse
Action=PressReleases.Home.
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A further argument for elevating sovereignty over the trust is that
the United States has promised tribes self-determination.  This is not
just a matter of forty years of consistent policy472—though certainly
that must count heavily—but also of treaty obligations.  It is cliche´ to
quote Justice Black’s now famous statement that “[g]reat nations, like
great men, should keep their word,” but the rationale rings true none-
theless.473  The United States entered into treaties with tribes, includ-
ing the Goshutes, as sovereign entities, and to say now that such
sovereignty is not real would be unjustified, if not discriminatory.  As a
matter of history, whether as compensatory justice or as simply fulfil-
ling a promise, this nation owes it to tribes to let them determine for
themselves what it means to be Cherokee or Oneida, Cahuilla or Nav-
ajo—or Goshute.  The BIA publishes an annual list of tribes with
which the United States has “government-to-government relation-
ship[s]” for a reason.474  Ensuring native sovereignty simply lives up to
what our nation claims already exists.
Numerous other reasons, both practical and as furthering sound
policy, also weigh in favor of promoting sovereignty over the trust.
With respect to lease approvals, for instance, the evidence is ample
that the trust acts as an obstacle to tribal economic development.475
The result is that rather than encouraging economic sustainability,
the trust perpetuates poverty.476  Part of the problem is that the trust
creates a netherworld where DOI authority blurs ultimate responsibil-
ity, in turn impeding tribal economic leadership.477  “The Department
has neither the incentive, nor the responsibility, nor the capability to
act as a broker of Indian lands.”478  But when tribes seek to capitalize
on their resources themselves, the trust stands as an obstacle.  As the
Goshutes’ and Navajos’ experience shows, not only is the trust vulner-
able to the whims of political manipulation, the DOI may use it to
affirmatively meddle in tribal decisions.479
472. See supra Part II.C.
473. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
474. See, e.g., Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 72 Fed. Reg. 13,648 (Mar. 22, 2007).
475. Gover, supra note 179, at 346–50. R
476. Id. at 346.
477. Id. at 357; see also THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., THE STATE OF
NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 126–28 (2008)
[hereinafter THE HARVARD PROJECT] (explaining that economic successes among Indian
tribes are occasioned by “(1) aggressive assertions of sovereignty, resulting in (2) self-gov-
erned institutions, which are (3) characterized by cultural match”).
478. Gover, supra note 179, at 348. R
479. See supra Part III.E–F.
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Indeed, tribes have the most to gain or lose when it comes to
sovereignty, and they should be allowed to reap its fruits and bear its
burdens.  “Sovereignty’s value lies in the fact that it creates a legal
space in which a community can negotiate, construct, and protect a
collective identity.”480  Even opponents of PFS agree.  Sammy
Blackbear observed, “[Our] sovereignty is what protects [our] tribe
and [our] reservation.”481  Or as Margene Bullcreek put it, “Sover-
eignty is the only thing we have left . . . . [It allows us] to be able to be
who we are as indigenous people, to be able to build our way of gov-
ernment unique to us.”482  Sovereignty, in other words, allows for tri-
bal vitality.  The trust, ultimately, does not.
D. Sovereignty Pitfalls
Despite sovereignty’s importance, taking this path over the trust
is not without pitfalls, each of which the Goshutes’ experience illumi-
nates.  Although these obstacles are not insurmountable, they should
not be overlooked, and they must be considered in any new model of
sovereignty.
1. Externalities
The most prominent, and most formidable, of the potential pit-
falls is that the exercise of tribal sovereignty may visit externalities on
other parts of society that lack representation within the relevant In-
dian nation.  The corollary to the Goshutes’ situation is the long line
of modern Supreme Court cases curbing tribal sovereignty where it is
seen as infringing upon individual constitutional or property rights.483
Either way, the effect is the same.  Where such externalities exist, tri-
bal sovereignty risks inciting backlash from mainstream society, which
in turn risks diminishing sovereignty.  Governor Leavitt set the di-
lemma in stark terms: “I recognize the sovereignty of this group but
let’s put it in perspective.  [There are] 30 or 40 people who actually
live there.  We’re talking about that by comparison to the public safety
of two million people.”484
The implication behind such statements is twofold.  The first is,
again, an assumption that tribes are not capable of making important
decisions.  The second is that even if tribes are capable, they will reach
480. Macklem, supra note 205, at 1348. R
481. KUED, Sammy Blackbear, supra note 337. R
482. Bullcreek Interview, supra note 344; see also Lawrence Bear Telephone Interview, R
supra note 283 (“Sovereignty means that we’re our own government.”). R
483. See supra Part II.C.
484. KUED, Michael Leavitt, supra note 359. R
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decisions without giving voice to their neighbors’ legitimate
concerns.485
The seemingly obvious substantive solution is to moderate in-
terjurisdictional conflicts between tribes and states in the same way
that interstate conflicts are resolved.  States make decisions everyday
with potential impacts on neighboring states, and we do not hesitate
to say that such decisions remain within the deciding state’s sole prov-
ince.  It is typically only when the effects of those decisions spill over
in a way sufficiently deleterious to the non-deciding state that federal
law steps in to mitigate the harm.486  This kind of externality preven-
tion is one of the purposes of many of our modern environmental
laws,487 the dormant Commerce Clause’s prohibition against inter-
state discrimination,488 the Supremacy Clause’s preemptive effect,489
and so forth.
Making tribal decisions subject to federal law when they impose
externalities on neighboring jurisdictions thus could be an equitable
way by which to maximize tribal sovereignty without unfairly casting
aside other jurisdictions’ legitimate concerns.  In fact, a number of
federal statutes already include provisions for treating tribes as
states,490 even giving tribes authority to implement the laws under fed-
eral oversight, just as states would.491  Such an approach might pro-
485. Id. (comparing Utah’s resistance to the Goshutes’ plan to land zoning regulations).
486. Sometimes, of course, states themselves form compacts to address the question di-
rectly, but those too are subject to federal approval. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 10, cl. 3.
487. But see Noah D. Hall, Political Externalities, Federalism, and a Proposal for an Interstate
Environmental Impact Assessment Policy, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 71–75 (2008) (arguing
that interstate harms are not captured well enough by environmental laws). See also Re-
becca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of Ethics,
Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 232–33 & n.35 (1996)
(noting that most federal environmental laws apply to Indian Country unless that applica-
tion would breach a treaty right, and that sometimes, states themselves form compacts to
address the question directly).
488. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
489. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  Although courts traditionally point to the Supremacy
Clause as the source of Congress’s preemptive power, some scholars have argued that pre-
emption is constitutionally more complex. Compare Stephen Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to
Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 40 (2005) (arguing that preemption and supremacy
are distinct concepts), with Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 231–32 (2000)
(arguing that Congress’s preemptive power is derived from the Supremacy Clause).
490. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2006) (assuring full faith and credit to tribal court
orders under the Violence Against Women Act); 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2006) (providing for
full faith and credit in state court for tribal law on child custody); 26 U.S.C. § 7871(a)
(2000) (treating tribes as states for various tax purposes).
491. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (2000);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (2000); Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(1), (4)
(2000); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(o) (2000); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
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vide a compromise between the reality of state pressures to curtail
tribal sovereignty and the ideal degree of sovereignty for tribes.  In
circumstances where tribal decisions have only internal effects, they
would be free from outside oversight.  Where, however, those effects
influence other jurisdictions sufficiently to trigger applicable federal
laws, the tribe could determine its willingness to be subjected to fed-
eral law before proceeding.
2. Extinction
Another foreboding pitfall of sovereignty is the risk that by em-
phasizing it over the trust, tribes will vanish.  For all its problems and
paternalism, perhaps the trust’s biggest benefit is that, through its pro-
hibition on the alienation of tribal lands, the trust has helped preserve
a space in which tribes can be sovereign.492  Indeed, courts have relied
on the trust as a way to protect tribal lands from state jurisdiction and
taxation,493 and that certainly is one reason many tribes have been
unwilling to abandon the trust altogether.  If those barriers to assimi-
lation are removed, however, tribes will vanish one by one.494  The
first steps down that path were seen clearly in allotment, and they
could well be revived if tribes were handed sole authority to deter-
mine the fate of their lands now.
This battle was fought in Skull Valley.  Band members aligned on
both sides, staking positions in an “acrimonious identity war” fought
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (2000); see also David F. Coursen, Tribes as States: Indian Tribal Author-
ity to Regulate and Enforce Federal Environmental Laws and Regulations, 23 ENVTL. L. REP.
10579, 10579–82 (1993) (enumerating federal statutes authorizing the EPA to treat tribes
as states); H. Scott Althouse, Note, Idaho Nibbles at Montana: Carving Out a Third Exception
for Tribal Jurisdiction Over Environmental and Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 721,
763 n.287 (2001) (listing additional environmental provisions giving tribes state status).
See Ann E. Tweedy, Using Plenary Power as a Sword: Tribal Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction under
the Clean Water Act after United States v. Lara, 35 ENVTL. L. 471, 473 (2005), for the argu-
ment that such provisions can “reinvest” tribes with sovereignty.
492. 25 U.S.C. § 462 (2006).
493. See, e.g., Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103,
114–15 (1998) (concluding that lands once under trust and later reacquired by a tribe in
fee are subject to state and local taxation); Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians v. Utah, 428
F.3d 966, 982–83 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding trust land exempt from state billboard regula-
tion); Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. v. Vill. of Hobart, 542 F. Supp. 2d 908, 921–23 (E.D.
Wis. 2008) (finding that fee land held by tribe within reservation boundaries was subject to
locality’s jurisdiction because the land was no longer under trust); see also 25 C.F.R.
§ 1.4(a) (2007) (providing that state land regulations are not applicable to Indian land
held in trust by the United States).
494. See Wood, Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 121, at 1480–89 (arguing that as the R
public desire to exploit Indian land increases, the federal government’s trust responsibili-
ties will play a vital role in maintaining tribal control of Indian lands).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-2\MLR202.txt unknown Seq: 72 26-FEB-09 11:15
2009] SKULL VALLEY CROSSROADS 361
over the nuclear proposal.495  Goshute critics charged that the tribal
leadership was “sacrificing [their] lives and [their] future.”496  “We
need to preserve our land for future generations,”497 Margene Bullc-
reek asserted.  “Sovereign doesn’t mean to protect the destruction of
the earth.  It’s not worth it.”498
Project proponents saw things differently.  Adapting to changing
times was a necessity, not something Goshute culture foreclosed.  “I
consider myself to be a traditionalist, too,” Leon Bear rejoined.  “I
have reverence for the animals, plant life and the Earth.  But I also
have reverence for the people; we’re trying to balance things with this
venture.”499  This juxtaposition of the post-modern versus the tradi-
tionalist Goshute is but one example.  In the contemporary context of
tribal poverty and powerlessness, a context created by centuries of vac-
illating federal policies and court decisions that have pushed, pulled,
and stretched sovereignty and the trust to accommodate those poli-
cies, suddenly shifting full tilt to sovereignty now may well result in
only more battles going forward.
The outcomes of battles such as these are undeniably important,
but what stake do nonmembers have in the fight?  Traditionalists
might claim that the further erosion of conventional tribal cultures
would be another, unnecessary manifestation of this nation’s nefari-
ous colonialist-assimilationist legacy.500  The problem with this argu-
ment is that cultures change by definition.  Tribal cultures are no
different.  They evolved before European contact, and they continue
to evolve today.501  As Professor Bethany Berger has explained, “[T]he
genius of Indian tribes lies not in being living museums, but rather, in
adapting in the face of change to survive . . . .”502  Granted, debates
about what tribal culture means, about how much Euro-American in-
fluence it can absorb and still be Indian, will be contentious.  But the
495. Lewis, supra note 3, at 326. R
496. Brent Israelsen, Nuclear Panel Begins Hearings on Skull Valley Plan, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
June 3, 1998, at B3.
497. Bullcreek Interview, supra note 344. R
498. Hilary Groutage, A Sign of the Times: No N-Waste Here, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 22,
1998, at C1.
499. Bob Mims, Different Views: For the Goshutes, a Test of Tradition, SALT LAKE TRIB., July
17, 2000, at D1.
500. See, e.g., Wood, Protecting Native Sovereignty, supra note 217, at 197–203 (arguing that R
continued federal action on and around tribal lands could disrupt tribal traditions and
have a serious impact on Indian culture).
501. See D’ARCY MCNICKLE, THEY CAME HERE FIRST 283 (rev. ed. Octagon Books 1975)
(1949).
502. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal
Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1124 (2005).
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answer is one the tribe itself should find, not something the trust
should negotiate.
3. Hobson’s Options
A third potential pitfall of the sovereignty path is related to its
extinction risk: that tribes will make detrimental decisions not because
they normally would, but because the “choice” they are afforded is not
really a choice at all.  Put some hard data on the general poverty of
Indian Country, already alluded to a number of times.503  Native
Americans earn a real median household income not even equivalent
to 60% of the national median.504  As a group, Indians also face the
country’s highest poverty rates.  More than one-third live in poverty,
compared to 25% of African Americans, 13% of Asian Americans, and
9% of whites.505  The picture is even bleaker for Indians on reserva-
tions.  Nearly 40% of this group lives in poverty, and they make barely
a third of what average United States residents earn.506
Thus, any tribal economic development opportunity may quickly
assume the shape of a modern Hobson’s choice.  Tribes will take
whatever they can get because there is nothing else.  Indeed, the
charge that tribes are “targeted” for pollution repositories and other
unsavory economic “opportunities” is a common theme of environ-
mental justice,507 and this theme repeatedly appeared in the discourse
swirling around Skull Valley.508
There is no denying the truth that tribes historically have been
exploited.509  But when tribes take actions as extensive as the
Goshutes’—spending years educating themselves, changing positions
from wary of the storage idea to amenable to it, and, ultimately, ap-
proaching PFS themselves about the possibility—the appearance of
coercion begins to fade.  Indeed, other tribes, including the Mes-
calero Apache, took the opposite approach, eventually backing away
503. See, e.g., Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Bonds: Statutory Shackles and Regulatory Restraints on
Tribal Economic Development, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1009, 1013–16 (2007) (providing statistics).
504. THE HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 477, at 7. R
505. Id. at 115.
506. Id. at 114–15.
507. See, e.g., Sandra D. Benischek, Clean Air in Indian Country: Regulation and Environ-
mental Justice, 12 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 211, 228 & n.120 (2001).
508. See, e.g., Judy Fahys, Drafts Show Seamy Side of N-Waste Deal, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 29,
2002, at A1; Donna M. Kemp, Utahns Unite to Fight N-Site, DESERET NEWS, July 26, 2000, at
B1; Laurie Sullivan Maddox, Leavitt, Cook Battle Goshute Waste Storage, SALT LAKE TRIB., June
27, 1997, at A10.
509. See, e.g., Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States
Policy Toward Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643, 654–64 (1991) (examining the history of fed-
eral government policies toward Native Americans).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-2\MLR202.txt unknown Seq: 74 26-FEB-09 11:15
2009] SKULL VALLEY CROSSROADS 363
from the project after first pursuing it.  When these facts are added in,
the Goshutes’ decision begins to sound much more like free will, and
charges that the band is merely a target begin to smack of either racist
assumptions of incapability or stereotyped notions of what Indians
“should” be.  Many Goshutes themselves saw the PFS project as a way
to revitalize both their reservation and their tribe,510 and this may be
the most important point.  Empirical work repeatedly has shown that
sovereignty is key to meaningful economic development in Indian
Country,511 and economic development is a condition precedent to
the survival of tribal culture.512  As one study found, tribal sovereignty
is “the only strategy” with the potential to “break[ ] the patterns of
poverty and dependence . . . in Indian Country . . . . It takes self-rule
to be able to change institutions in ways that have a maximal chance
of matching Native nations’ respective cultures.”513  Sovereignty pro-
vides this self-rule; the trust only stunts it.
4. Internal Dissent
A final pitfall is the risk that turning tribal decisions entirely over
to tribes will silence internal dissent.  This concern is couched numer-
ous ways.  Most typical are that removing federal oversight will lend
itself to increased leadership corruption, or that the de facto result will
be to perpetuate Euro-American governance frames embodied in
most IRA-based tribal constitutions.514
Once again, both variations can be seen at play in the Goshutes’
experience.  Claims of corruption were levied both from within and
outside the tribe.  Charges, for instance, that Leon Bear had entered
into the PFS agreement without proper tribal council authorization
510. See supra Part III.B; cf. Jana L. Walker et al., A Closer Look at Environmental Injustice in
Indian Country, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 379, 390 (2002) (suggesting that Indian tribes
have considered and supported less desirable forms of economic development that “in-
clude potentially polluting industries and locally unwanted land uses” to free themselves
from federal dependence and poverty).
511. See, e.g., THE HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 477, at 135–36; Clarkson, supra note 503, R
at 1021; Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for Eco-
nomic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO? STRATEGIES AND
INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1, 14–15 (Stephen Cornell &
Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992); Miriam Jorgensen & Jonathan B. Taylor, What Determines Indian
Economic Success? Evidence from Tribal and Individual Indian Enterprises, 8 RED INK (2000),
available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hpaied/docs/PRS00-3.pdf.
512. See generally Lorie M. Graham, An Interdisciplinary Approach to American Indian Eco-
nomic Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597 (2004) (discussing the effect of politics, law, and
socio-economic and cultural norms on tribal economic development).
513. THE HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 477, at 126. R
514. See supra Part II.C.
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quickly surfaced,515 and perhaps the most divisive claim was that Bear
was funneling PFS monies to tribal members who supported his re-
gime, but withholding these funds from dissenters.516  It was these cir-
cumstances, indeed, that led to the disputed election of Sammy
Blackbear as Bear’s replacement, the ultimate aftermath of which was
criminal charges for both Bear and Blackbear.  All of this, critics
might contend, was enabled by the centralized form of governance
the Goshutes now use, which differs sharply from the family- and clan-
based scheme of the Goshutes of old.
No doubt, such concerns strike at the heart of good native gov-
ernance,517 but they are not reasons to strip tribes of their right of self-
determination.  Any observer can attest that governmental corruption
is not limited to tribes; scarcely a week goes by when some federal,
state, or local governmental scandal is not splashed across the morn-
ing headlines.  Certainly corruption takes on greater weight when
seen as related to tribes’ very survival, as it must for tribes like the
Goshutes who have dwindled to such meager numbers.  But there is
no reason to think that isolated instances of corruption will necessarily
lead to demise, or cannot be contained by those who care most—tri-
bal members.  Ultimately, that is the inquiry: not whether federal law
should permit tribes to choose, but why it must recognize tribal jurisdic-
tion as the forum for resolving conflict that is necessarily and prima-
rily internal.
Indeed, what such anti-self-governance concerns often boil down
to is the worry that modern “tribal councils cater to corporate devel-
opment interests to the detriment of traditionalist values.”518  Invaria-
bly, that will be true in some cases, but in others it will not.  And in the
end, that is the point.  Each tribe should be given room to negotiate
for itself what elements of traditional “Indian-ness” it wants to main-
tain and what aspects of “modern,” non-Indian society it will incorpo-
rate.  “Sovereignty must be understood in this light: not as the right to
stand still in a mythicized past, but as the power to change so as to
515. See, e.g., KUED, Sammy Blackbear, supra note 337; see also supra note 343 and ac- R
companying text.
516. See, e.g., Bullcreek Interview, supra note 344.  As Margene Bullcreek put it, “Those R
who were for the waste got lots of favors, and those who weren’t, didn’t.”  Bullcreek Lec-
ture, supra note 334.  Some members also alleged that the Bear regime began selectively R
applying tribal laws—for example, through inordinate fines for the use of reservation tim-
ber or animal grazing—to PFS dissenters. Id.
517. For an excellent assessment of what effective governance should mean in the tribal
context, see generally Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049
(2007).
518. Wood, Trust Doctrine Revisited, supra note 121, at 1556. R
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maintain and strengthen one’s community when many of the historic
bonds between that community have disappeared.”519  There will be
dissent no matter which way a tribe veers, but there need not be the
specter of federal oversight when it does so.  Tribes should decide for
themselves, on their own terms, whether they want any such assistance
or oversight.  They should decide for themselves who they are.
E. A New Model
Consider where sovereignty and the trust have been since the
Cherokee Cases, and three pillars emerge around which a new model of
greater sovereignty may be formed.  First, federal cases and policies
repeatedly have abrogated tribal rights of self-governance, thus mak-
ing clear a need for a new form of full tribal self-determination.  Second,
many, if not all, of the reasons for these diminutions of tribal sover-
eignty tie back to concerns of what harms—whether to individual con-
stitutional rights, as in Oliphant or Brendale, or to the non-tribal
environment, as in Skull Valley—mainstream society worries tribes will
visit upon them.  Thus, there is a need in any new model of tribal
sovereignty for formal externality moderation.  Third, the very fact that
native sovereignty repeatedly has been involuntarily reduced strongly
calls for a mechanism providing for strict tribal sovereignty protection.
Consider, also, the rights and benefits tribes seek from exercising
sovereignty.  Tribes, to have true self-determination, must be able to
define their membership, form and run a government of their chosen
design, make and enforce laws, tax, remain immune from suit, and
exercise police powers to regulate, among other things, public health,
safety, and the environment.  Take all these attributes together, and
what the full bundle of tribal powers very much looks like is a modern
American state.  States have virtually all these powers, and they have
them as a matter of sovereignty. There are three key differences, how-
ever, between tribes and states.  First, tribal sovereignty keeps eroding,
whereas state sovereignty largely does not.  Second, the federal consti-
tution formally protects state sovereignty, whereas tribal sovereignty is
subject to unilateral plenary power defeasance.  Third, tribal sover-
eignty also is bound up in a notion of separate tribal cultures, whereas
state sovereignty generally is not.
Accordingly, the new model I propose is to create a uniform—
but flexible—mechanism by which tribes can have guaranteed sover-
eignty equivalent to what we afford states today.  The greatest benefits
of this approach will be that native sovereignty should return much
519. Berger, supra note 502, at 1124. R
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closer to what tribes historically exercised, and that such sovereignty
will be protected in a way that it now is not.  Of course, there are also
risks involved.  Making tribes look more like states than nations may
create a perception that tribal sovereignty again has been reduced or,
conversely, that tribes are receiving special treatment because even
states do not now have some of the rights that tribes do, such as the
ability to define membership.
Of course, the very purpose of this model is to increase tribal sov-
ereignty, not to reduce it.520  That tribes may need to accept applica-
tion of some federal law certainly could be seen as undesirable, but
weigh the facts as they stand today: Tribes already are subject to Con-
gress’s largely unfettered authority to apply federal law to them.521
Tribal members also are U.S. citizens.522  In this “actual state of
things,”523 tribes may well want to submit to federal laws in exchange
for a greater guarantee of sovereignty than they now enjoy.
One might also complain that any proposal that seeks to elimi-
nate the trust is simply termination by another name.  But termina-
520. Likewise, states certainly set their own citizenship and residency requirements,
something that might be qualitatively equated with determining tribal membership.  For
one examination of this state power and the constitutional limits upon it, including how
Native Americans might utilize those limits, see generally James B. Wadley, Indian Citizen-
ship and the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the United States Constitution: An Alternative to
the Problems of the Full Faith and Credit and Comity?, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31 (2006).  In any event,
states have no legitimate complaint when tribes exercise historical powers that have no real
external effects.
521. See FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 123 (1960) (holding that Congress
gave the Federal Power Commission the authority to take Indian land for purposes of
licensed projects if they provide just compensation); see also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Applica-
bility of Federal Laws of General Application to Indian Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 85, 88 (1991) (discussing how courts have decided whether federal laws apply
to Indian tribes when the law and its legislative history are silent on the issue).  The clash
of this notion and the competing idea of tribal sovereignty (and the longstanding canons
favoring sovereignty) recently erupted in a labor case. See San Manuel Indian Bingo &
Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1308, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that federal labor law
could be applied in a labor dispute at a casino operated by an Indian tribe where the
casino was on the reservation but employed and catered to non-Indians). See generally D.
Michael McBride III & H. Leonard Court, Labor Regulation, Union Avoidance and Organized
Labor Relations Strategies on Tribal Lands: New Indian Gaming Strategies in the Wake of San
Manuel Band of Indians v. National Labor Relations Board, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1259
(2007) (analyzing San Manuel’s effect on federal Indian law and gaming and offering sug-
gestions for tribes dealing with labor relations); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law,
Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413 (2007) (criticizing the
court’s decision in San Manuel and its effect on how courts and agencies may recast long-
standing principles of law even while lacking the approval of Congress or the Supreme
Court).
522. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006).  This was not always the case. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S.
94, 109 (1884).
523. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823).
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tion was a policy of ending tribal sovereignty, inflicted on tribes by the
federal government, not elected by a choice they themselves made.
Full tribal self-determination as I envision it here promotes native sover-
eignty with or without a continuing trust and places the entire onus
on the tribe itself.
Indeed, the model anticipates malleability to accommodate
tribes’ specific circumstances.  Each tribe may opt-in if it wishes, or
not.  It may abandon the trust as it exists today, or keep it.524  The
model also expects substantial variation.  Different tribes are in differ-
ent places in terms of governmental and economic sophistication.
Some would be ready immediately to take on all or greater responsi-
bility with a concomitant diminishment of federal intrusion and over-
sight.  Others would pursue a slower course, moving only
incrementally, perhaps keeping some trust responsibilities in place
and shedding only a few, as a way to begin their own process of revital-
ization.  In the end, this is the most key aspect of the model: tribes
decide for themselves.  It is a model whose details will need to be
worked out, but that by its three pillars should ensure greater tribal
sovereignty.
1. Full Tribal Self-Determination
True tribal self-determination is the simplest aspect of the new
model.  It is the option for tribes to accept additional levels of govern-
mental power and responsibility up to the same level that states hold
today.  Recent statutes allowing tribes to contract to perform trust
functions historically provided by the federal government make great
strides in this direction,525 but they are insufficient.  They do not in-
clude every aspect of tribal governance, they have been criticized for
subjecting tribes to unduly onerous eligibility requirements,526 and,
most importantly, they frame the services being carried out first and
foremost as federal obligations—not the tribe’s.  Under my model,
treating tribes as states not only importantly expands what powers
524. The risks of extinction and silenced internal dissent also could be ameliorated if a
high threshold, a supermajority, were set for any opting-in to this model by tribes—what,
perhaps accurately, might be considered a final exercise of the federal trust responsibility.
In the same vein, some might advocate for the new model to employ a threshold determi-
nation by the federal government that the opting-in tribe is capable of providing sufficient
government services, akin to the Energy Policy Act of 2005’s provision for tribal energy
leases. See infra note 527.  Certainly incorporating such a feature could help guard against R
the predation on tribes by corporate and other development interests, but it would do so at
the cost of continued paternalism and all the baggage that comes with it.
525. See supra notes 237–239 and accompanying text. R
526. See, e.g., King, supra note 239, at 499. R
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tribes may have, but gives them ultimate responsibility for carrying
them out.
Even a few examples make clear the importance of these missing
powers.  The most obvious was seen in Skull Valley.  Continuing fed-
eral oversight of tribal land leasing drags down the value of tribes’
most valuable resource, even running the risk of thwarting a tribe’s
ability to revitalize, as the Goshutes’ believed nuclear storage would
help them do.527  Likewise, tribes wishing to make additional lands
subject to their sovereign authority must submit to a complex BIA-
administered process528—one that has been criticized as too slow, too
costly, and too loathe to expand tribal jurisdiction.529  Finally, many
tribal constitutions and elections currently operate under federal ap-
proval and oversight.530  Such pervasive federal involvement in every-
day Indian life is what has created the perception “on the
reservation . . . that the Indians may not do anything unless it is specif-
ically permitted by the government.”531
By contrast, states have each of these powers by definition.  Their
police power allows them to regulate not only the land they hold, but
any non-federal land within their borders.  There is no need to ac-
quire additional lands inside those borders to exercise jurisdiction,
but when they do make such acquisitions, there is no notion that they
must first obtain permission from the federal government.  And, states
operate their own elections by the terms of their own constitutions,
which they set without federal oversight.532
527. Indeed, even under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which seeks to increase tribal
self-determination by allowing tribes to approve their own energy-related leases, a tribe
may not exercise this power until the DOI first finds the tribe to have “sufficient capacity”
to do so.  25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(i) (2006); see also Tribal Energy Resource Agreements
Under the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
12,808 (Mar. 10, 2008) (describing a regulation by which tribes may enter into energy-
related leases and agreements without Secretary approval if, prior to executing the lease or
agreement, the tribe first enters a tribal energy resources agreement with the Secretary).
528. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006); 25 C.F.R. pt. 151 (2007).
529. Gover, supra note 179, at 371; Padraic I. McCoy, The Land Must Hold the People: R
Native Modes of Territoriality and Contemporary Tribal Justifications for Placing Land into Trust
Through 25 C.F.R. Part 151, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 451 n.128 (2003).  Certainly any
criticism of this process should not be read as oversimplifying the obviously complex prob-
lem of any sovereign annexing the land of another, but at least with respect to once-tribal
lands within reservation boundaries, the reasons for restoring tribal jurisdiction—particu-
larly where tribe or tribal members have reacquired the land—are many.
530. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2006); 25 C.F.R. pt. 81 (2007).
531. Warren H. Cohen & Philip J. Mause, Note, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1818, 1820 (1968).
532. That is unless, of course, there is an alleged federal constitutional problem. See,
e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (finding that the state of Florida’s vote recount
procedures violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution).
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Putting tribes in the same position would thus return true native
self-determination to tribes.  For instance, tribes could elect to quash
the false distinctions that cases such as Brendale and Montana have
used to bridle tribal authority—drawing lines on the basis of “open”
and “closed” portions of Indian reservations, or parsing whether tribal
jurisdiction exists depending on if an individual’s relationship with a
tribe is “commercial” or not.533  Instead, tribes could use the model to
exercise full zoning, police, and tax powers over the breadth of their
reservations, just as states do within their territories.  Similarly, tribes
might choose to abandon the legacy of plenary power cases like Lone
Wolf and Kagama and take charge of all law enforcement and prosecu-
tion on their lands based—just as state jurisdiction is—not on the lin-
eal descent of the defendant but on whether the alleged act violates
the jurisdiction’s criminal code.534  With this authority, tribes might
also seek to break free from the prescriptive model of the Indian Re-
organization Act-based constitutions and tune, just as states do, their
governance systems to better reflect their own local circumstances and
tribal traditions.535
Indeed, ultimately this is the core of what true tribal self-determi-
nation must be about in the new model: tribes’ right to implement
any mode of government—whether modeled on the federal form or
on native tradition, whether consistent with their existing constitu-
tions or different from them—without the specter of federal
meddling.
533. See supra Part II.C.2.
534. See supra Part II.B.1.
535. See supra notes 215–220 and accompanying text; see also Barry Friedman, Valuing R
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 387 (1997) (noting that governments can adapt their
policies to meet and satisfy individual preferences); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1988)
(noting that an advantage of state governments is the ability of the regional citizens to
shape their local political atmosphere).  One question that would have to be grappled with
is whether tribes also would be required to abide by the Constitution’s Republican guaran-
tee. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican
Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L.
REV. 749, 749 (1994) (arguing that popular sovereignty is the “central pillar” of a Republi-
can form of government).  Given the purpose of promoting tribal sovereignty so that tribes
may define their own governance structures in the context of each tribe’s own uniqueness,
a strong argument could be made that the Guarantee Clause would need not apply under
the new model, or at least not unless the tribe voluntarily acceded to it.  And although the
new model proposed here is certainly not fully pluralist, the further legitimization of politi-
cal diversification that it would offer is yet another reason for allowing tribal divergence
from this constitutional norm. Cf. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1155, 1181–82 (2007) (noting that the typical nation-state form of government, while
important, is not the only possible successful community organization principle).
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2. Externality Moderation
Mitigating externalities is the expectation that in order to exer-
cise greater sovereignty, tribes may need to submit to restraints on
their power addressing these harms.536  To be clear, such an accept-
ance must not be seen in any way as perpetuating a federal trust obli-
gation or power.  Rather, its inclusion in the model merely
acknowledges that because the actions of every sovereign entity in this
country can affect the others, there is a need to moderate such harms
in an evenhanded and fair way.  This is, then, the same acknowledg-
ment that cases such as Oliphant, Montana, and Brendale effectively
make, but the new model affords tribes a meaningful benefit for mak-
ing the exchange that those cases do not.  In other words, while today
the plenary power limits tribal authority without tribal consent, the
new model would use externality moderation, first, to abolish Con-
gress’s and courts’ right to unilaterally diminish tribal sovereignty,537
and, second, to explicitly set forth the conditions tribes must choose
to accede to in order to obtain such a strong protection.  In this way,
externality moderation might be seen as the new model’s “bridge” be-
tween full tribal self-determination and the accompanying protection
of that empowerment.
Undoubtedly, a challenging facet here will be determining what
constitutes a tribal externality, and thus, what aspects of federal law
tribes must submit to in order to receive the model’s greater guaran-
tee of sovereignty.  One way to handle this may be to tie the assurance
of specific sovereignty powers to the acceptance of specific federal
laws or constitutional provisions.538  Take again, for instance, some of
the broader exercises of tribal sovereignty just discussed.  If a tribe
wanted full authority to acquire, lease, and zone lands within its bor-
ders, externality moderation under the new model might require it to
accept application of the Fifth Amendment.  Likewise, a tribe seeking
full taxation power on its reservation, exclusive of state authority,539
might be required to accept the limitations that the dormant Com-
merce Clause imposes against discriminatory taxation.540  Or, in order
536. See supra Part IV.D.1.
537. That is, at least in the opted-into area of sovereignty protection.
538. Unless Congress specifically declares so, federal constitutional provisions do not
apply to tribes. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 379–80 (1896).  This may also require
modification of the current presumption for when generally applicable federal laws apply
to tribes. See FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960) (noting that settled
case law has found that general statutes applicable to all persons apply to Indians and their
property interests).
539. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001).
540. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).
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to take on full criminal jurisdiction over both tribal members and
non-Native Americans, the tribe might need to afford defendants all
rights available to them under the Federal Constitution.541
Certainly, as cases from Williams to Oliphant have shown, any fed-
eral constitutional right may be a battleground for what constitutes an
externality.542  And, if a tribe truly seeks the full sovereign status of a
modern state, it may well need to submit to the full panoply of federal-
state relations dictated by the Constitution, just as states do.543
Given this, tribes opting into the new model must recognize the
extent and kind of moderation they are accepting before making the
choice.  Consider, for example, doctrines that limit states’ governing
authority, such as the dormant Commerce Clause and federal pre-
emption.  Commentators already are critical of these rules for, among
other things, unnecessarily restricting the way states may protect their
environmental resources, stunting state-based governance experimen-
tation, preventing legislative adaptation to local conditions and cir-
cumstances, and being too subject to results-oriented manipulation.544
To the extent a tribe becomes more like a state under the new model,
it too likely would be subject to the same kinds of limitations, and the
same critiques would apply.  Critically, some tribes might see that kind
of moderation as a dilution of their historical sovereignty—particu-
larly when that sovereignty is couched in terms of the full nation-like
sovereignty tribes theoretically enjoy, or even in terms of sovereignty
541. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 applies many but not all of these restrictions to
tribal governments. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006).
542. See supra Part IV.D.1; cf. James A. Poore III, The Constitution of the United States Applies
to Indian Tribes, 59 MONT. L. REV. 51, 53–54 (1998) (noting that Indian citizens and non-
Indian citizens are entitled to the protection of their constitutional rights).
543. One disjoint in this circumstance is that, unlike states, tribes would not have direct
representation in Congress.  It is unthinkable, too, that the nation would suddenly increase
to nearly 600 states to accommodate tribes.  But other creative solutions theoretically could
be available, such as allowing the formation of cross-tribal associations that, once large
enough, would have direct congressional representation.
544. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal
Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1172–73 (1995) (arguing that excessive use of federal preemp-
tion interferes with the ability of a state to respond to local issues and concerns); Jamison
E. Colburn, Localism’s Ecology: Protecting and Restoring Habitat in the Suburban Nation, 33
ECOLOGY L.Q. 945, 988 n.173 (2006) (noting that the most common subject of Commerce
Clause scrutiny is state action relating to interstate markets); Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the
National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-Offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and
State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1496–97 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
dormant Commerce Clause decisions have limited state authority to adopt environmental
regulation); David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal
Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1187–88 (1999) (not-
ing that the majority of federal judges seem predisposed to preempt state regulation on
important environment, health, and safety regulation issues).
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exercised in a way that seeks to minimize federal contact—and there-
fore might choose not to partake in the tradeoff.  Others, of course,
may adopt a more practical view:  Seeing the United States’ consistent
diminishment of tribal sovereignty in the past, some tribes may view
the trade of moderation for protection as favorable.545
Thus, implementation of the new model must be careful in en-
suring (1) that there is a clear nexus between the power the tribe is
assured and the restriction it accepts and (2) that the restriction in no
way singles out tribes, but is only a uniform requirement, such as
those mentioned above, to which all states must submit.  Otherwise,
the condition of externality moderation would not be moderation at
all, but simply the trust by another name.
3. Sovereignty Protection
Given the diminishment of tribal sovereignty by every branch of
the federal government since this country’s inception,546 the need for
the final pillar of sovereignty protection should go without saying.  A
real barrier against continued withdrawal of tribal authority is desper-
ately needed.  The two critical questions are: How should the area of
protection be defined, and how should the protection be
implemented?
The analogy of tribes to states should provide a straightforward
answer to the first question.  Traditionally, tribes were seen as having
sovereignty within their territories; that territory remains essential to
their sovereignty today; and thus, tribal sovereignty should be pro-
tected within the boundaries of tribal reservations.  The elegance of
this solution is obvious.  It requires no manipulation of the existing
landscape.  It is the same kind of sovereignty protection that states
have.  And it would allow for tribes either to continue the same level
of sovereignty they now exercise, or to exercise more jurisdiction (sub-
545. Another thorny issue will be the mechanism for enforcing such externality modera-
tion.  Would parties have a cause of action in federal court, or would they instead be re-
quired to appeal to a tribal tribunal?  Ultimately, this answer may be intertwined heavily in
the act of defining the externality in the first place.  But assuming that the externality has
been defined accurately and fairly (as opposed to merely reflecting a predominating philo-
sophical resistance to an illiberal or unpopular method of governance with effects that are
truly only internal), recourse under federal law in a federal court may be inevitable.
546. See supra Part II; see also Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 241, at R
473–75 (noting that even if Congress’s authority over tribes were limited to its enumerated
powers, the authority would remain exceedingly broad).
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ject to externality moderations) in the place they would be most ex-
pected to do so.547
As to the second question—how to implement this sovereign pro-
tection—there are a number of options.  The most protective would
be to add to the Federal Constitution provisions guaranteeing tribes
their sovereignty and defining the terms and conditions by which they
may opt into that protection.  Another option would be to install the
protection as a matter of federal law.  Finally, somewhat similar to the
suggestions of Professors Gover and Skibine,548 the government could
void its ban on tribal treaties and create a pro forma treaty that would
guarantee a minimum level of sovereignty for all tribes, but could be
modified in particular circumstances via negotiation.
Each of these options presents challenges.  The negotiation path
would consume enormous resources if conducted tribe-by-tribe, could
place at a disadvantage tribes that the federal government views as not
particularly capable, and could needlessly ossify a tribe’s status.  The
codification avenue risks complete annulment by a subsequent legisla-
ture—especially in the absence of a meaningful judicial restraint that
the trust has for centuries failed to provide—though this approach
would be a substantial improvement on the existing status quo.
The constitutional possibility is the most promising and most ad-
mirable.549  As a matter of principle, I view it as the optimal solution.
At the same time, however, its obvious obstacle is that any constitu-
tional amendment is difficult to achieve today.550  When the amend-
ment is one that some might (inaccurately) attempt to characterize as
providing “special” status to tribes, its success likely would be even
more difficult to broker than the other options, which already admit-
tedly press the boundaries of political palatability.  But that is not to
say it should not be pursued.  We owe tribes more than they have to-
547. While the question of sovereign area protection should be relatively straightfor-
ward, a more difficult issue may be determining how to recognize the tribal government.
This can be problematic in the international context where different factions claim ruling
power, and it was echoed in Skull Valley through the Bear-Blackbear dispute.  Neverthe-
less, there is a clear difference between the BIA’s running tribal elections, and federal
comity for a tribal court’s determination of what tribal regime holds legitimate authority.
548. See supra Part IV.B.
549. For the argument that tribal sovereignty needs the protection and stability that
constitutional status can provide, see Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not so Little)
Constitutional Crisis Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 285
(2003).
550. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561
(1998) (book review) (discussing the process and the difficulty of amending the United
States Constitution).
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day.  And, ultimately at some point in law and policy, what is right
must push what is.
V. CONCLUSION
Where would a model such as the one proposed here have left
the Goshutes in the controversy swirling around them?  What would
reconciling the sovereignty-trust conflict by choosing sovereignty
provide?
The answer depends on the degree to which the Goshutes would
have opted into the model, but assuming they had done so fully, the
tribe would have had much greater control over its destiny.  From a
sovereignty perspective, the key hanging point for the Goshutes’ plan
was the lease approval authority the BIA held over them.  With full,
state-like sovereignty, this would not have been an issue.  The
Goshutes would have controlled what happened within their borders
because those borders are theirs.  They would have been able to de-
cide for themselves, without federal intervention, the project’s “impli-
cations for preservation of Tribal culture and life.”551  They would
have been able to set their future—as a sovereign.
To be sure, this boundary-based, state-like sovereignty would not
have removed the limits of other federal laws.  The BLM still would
have had to make its own decision about the proposed rights-of-way,
and if it denied the permits, the Goshutes would have had to find a
different transportation alternative.  An NRC site license—the real ex-
ternality moderation requirement in play here—still would have been
necessary.  And Utah still would have been able to push for wilderness
legislation that still could have severely cramped the Goshutes’ plan.
In the end, however, this is exactly what the model seeks.  The
purpose of a new model of full tribal self-determination is not to give
tribes unfettered authority to limit other jurisdictions’ rights, but to
ensure that they have the right to deal with those jurisdictions on a
true government-to-government basis.  Assuring the Goshutes full sov-
ereignty in this way, in fact, may well have resulted in nuclear waste not
arriving on their reservation.  But it would have given them a far
stronger position from which to negotiate with Utah over other eco-
nomic development opportunities the tribe might have desired.552
551. BIA ROD, supra note 392, at 18. R
552. Goshutes on both sides have said that they might have accepted, for instance, ca-
sino gaming in lieu of waste as an “equitable” solution.  Bullcreek Interview, supra note
344; KUED, Leon Bear, supra note 312.  The height of irony was that although Utah R
adopted legislation purporting to provide the Goshutes with $2 million for economic de-
velopment, funds were never allocated to this mandate, while the state spent multiples of
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My advocacy for this new model of sovereignty in no way should
be taken as an endorsement for bringing nuclear waste to Utah, for it
is not.  Rather, what the Goshutes’ story exposes quite clearly is the
very real danger in proceeding without a cohesive policy or coherent
doctrine.  This was true for the Goshutes, and it was true in the nu-
clear context as well.  As a nation, for centuries, we have allowed to
persist the myth that sovereignty and the trust can fully coexist.  Like-
wise, having never articulated a cohesive nuclear waste policy, we took
the path of nuclear power without a permanent solution in place,553
and now the chosen answer—Yucca Mountain—remains suspended,
perhaps indefinitely, in Nevada’s own fierce opposition.554  Skull Val-
that amount in legal and lobbying fees fighting the proposal. See Lewis, supra note 3, at R
325–26 (discussing the unfunded mandate to assist with Goshute economic development);
Judy Fahys, Legislators Fought Goshutes’ Nuke Waste Dump—But Now Consider Reactors, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Oct. 26, 2007 (characterizing the PFS fight as costing Utah “millions”); Robert
Gehrke, Governor Ends Utah’s Washington, D.C. Lobbyist’s Contract, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 22,
2007 (noting $90,000 per year in PFS-related lobbying fees); Glen Warchol, State Forks over
$844K for Goshute, PFS Lawyers, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 15, 2006 (discussing the state’s obliga-
tion for legal fees); see also GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND BUDGET, OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNOR OF UTAH, BUDGET SUMMARY FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 87–88 (2006), available at
http://www.governor.utah.gov/budget/Budget/Budget%20Summaries/2007BudgetSum-
mary.pdf (discussing PFS-related appropriation of $250,000); GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLAN-
NING AND BUDGET, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF UTAH, BUDGET SUMMARY FISCAL YEAR 2006,
at 23, 86–89 (2005), available at http://www.governor.utah.gov/budget/Budget/
Budget%20Summaries/2006BudgetSummary.pdf (discussing PFS-related appropriation of
$2,000,000); GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND BUDGET, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
OF UTAH, BUDGET SUMMARY FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 83–83 (2004), available at http://www.
governor .utah .gov/budget/Budget/Budget%20Summaries/2005BudgetSummary .pdf
(discussing PFS-related appropriation of $500,000); GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND
BUDGET, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF UTAH, BUDGET SUMMARY FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 5, 96,
100, 244 (2002), available at http://www.governor.utah.gov/budget/Budget/Budget%20
Summaries/2003BudgetSummary.pdf (discussing PFS-related appropriation of $432,000
and $250,000); GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND BUDGET, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF
UTAH, BUDGET SUMMARY FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 93, 98–99, 248 (2001), available at http://
www.governor.utah.gov/budget/Budget/Budget%20Summaries/2002BudgetSummary.
pdf (discussing PFS-related appropriation of $439,000, $300,000, and $800,000).
553. See, e.g., Michael A. Mullett, Financing for Eternity the Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A
Crisis of Law and Policy Precipitated by Electric Deregulation Will Face New President, 18 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 383, 435–38 (2001) (describing the failure in establishing the viability of the
Yucca Mountain nuclear repository and its negative effect on the government’s ability to
deal with nuclear waste); William Mabry III, Note, Can You Say “N”?: NIMBY, NWPA, and
Nuclear Preemption, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 493, 493 (1993) (noting that although the govern-
ment began dealing with nuclear energy in 1946, it was not until 1982 that it enacted a law
to even begin planning for nuclear waste storage sites).
554. See generally Cinnamon Gilbreath, Federalism in the Context of Yucca Mountain: Nevada
v. Department of Energy, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 577 (2000) (discussing the fierce opposition to
Yucca Mountain and the ramifications of recent case law on it and other federal nuclear
waste disposal policies); Robert Ressetar, The Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository from a
Federalism Perspective, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 219 (2003) (addressing Yucca
Mountain’s construction delays and the numerous challenges to its legality).  For one con-
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ley thus is, at one level, a symbol of the consequences that result when
we leave a crossroads with no consensus, no plan for what to do next,
but merely a hope of technology or solutions that “may be” in the
future.
Indeed, Utah’s opposition to the Goshutes’ plan strikingly resem-
bles Nevada’s to Yucca Mountain.  It is by Nevada’s exertion of politi-
cal force—it is by exercising its sovereignty—that it has pushed back
against this federal proposal.  And it was in the context of Utah’s sov-
ereign-to-sovereign relations with the federal government—it was by
exercising its sovereignty—that Utah did as well.
It is in this way that, at another level, Skull Valley is a symbol of
the crossroads all tribes today face.  Drive forty miles west out of Salt
Lake City and you will find it.  Under the white desert sun, at the
intersection of the roads to Skull Valley, California, and New Jersey,
there is a choice.  It is a choice between tradition and change, be-
tween the future and the past, between survival and disappearance.
Head one way and tribes will always be second class to the other sover-
eigns of this nation.  Go another, and they can decide for themselves.
tinually updated anthology of news on Yucca Mountain, see Yucca Mountain: Nuclear
Waste in Nevada, Las Vegas Review-Journal, http://www.lvrj.com/hottopics/
yucca_mountain.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
